

EUROPE

AFTER

THE CONGRESS OF AIX-LA-CHAPELLE.

FORMING THE SEQUEL

TO THE

CONGRESS OF VIENNA.

BY

M. DE PRADT,

FORMERLY ARCHBISHOP OF MECHLIN.

PUBLISHED AT PARIS, 1819.

TRANSLATED, WITH NOTES,

BY GEORGE ALEXANDER OTIS.

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA, TO WIT :

BE IT REMEMBERED, *That on the eighteenth day of February, in the forty-fourth year of the Independence of the United States of*
[SEAL.] *America, A. D. 1820, M. CAREY & SON, of the said district, have deposited in this office the title of a book, the right whereof they claim as proprietors, in the words following, to wit :*

“Europe after the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle. Forming the Sequel to the Congress of Vienna. By M. De Pradt, formerly Archbishop of Mechlin. Published at Paris, 1819. Translated, with Notes, by George Alexander Otis.”

In conformity to the act of the congress of the United States, intituled “An act for the encouragement of learning, by securing the copies of maps, charts, and books, to the authors and proprietors of such copies during the times therein mentioned.” And also to the act, entitled, “An act supplementary to an act, entitled ‘An act for the encouragement of learning, by securing the copies of maps, charts, and books, to the authors and proprietors of such copies during the times therein mentioned,’ and extending the benefits thereof to the arts of designing, engraving, and etching historical and other prints.”

D. CALDWELL,
Clerk of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.

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NOTICE.

THE translator believes he cannot more acceptably offer his first respects to the public than by presenting to their notice a distinguished stranger, M. De Pradt. As a Frenchman, it will excite no surprise if he should speak our language with a foreign accent; but his ideas at least will not be found provincial. It has been objected to his present work, that he discovers in it "a silly admiration of England." How far this is well founded the reader will be his own judge. He will naturally take into view the vicinity of England to the continent; and will perceive, that a power which, at this distance, excites no terror, may still be sufficiently formidable *across the channel*. It will also be considered that the writer addressed himself particularly to the people of France, who are remarkable for being more affected by results, than by principles; by their senses, than by reasonings; he wrote soon after the evacuation of France by foreign troops; at a time when the *Ultras* were in power, resisted the execution of the Charter, and opposed all constitutional government. England was in view; had shared in the triumph at Waterloo, and gained all her objects in the war of the French revolution; M. De Pradt attributes all her successes and prosperity to a free constitution. The greater and better the effects, the greater and better the cause. To persuade his countrymen not to remit their efforts

to accomplish the entire and practical establishment of such a constitution, he points to England as an example of its salutary results; he presents a bold outline of her power and prosperity; but refers it all to the revolution of 1688. To gain proselytes for the worship of Liberty, he adorns her temple with paintings that glow with the rich tints of a brilliant imagination; and erects her statue colossal like her own magnificent proportions. In the character of her Apostle, he employs parables, and hyperboles, that startle while they instruct. Our country, if not the cradle, and the sole temple of this divinity, is at least her chosen asylum; and, since it welcomes the pilgrims, cannot frown at the devotion, of the European world. The views here attributed to M. De Pradt, are expressly avowed by one of the ablest advocates of the same creed that Europe has produced. "I am well pleased," says this writer,* "to hear the praises of the English constitution. I have always believed the English to have been indebted principally to this constitution for the possession of those qualities which have procured them the consideration of Europe. Now, without any disposition to depreciate the merit of a people who, for a period of *one hundred and thirty-two years*, have held forth *great examples* to the world, my conviction is, that if a free constitution has been followed with such good effects, in this instance, the French have a right to expect still better from a similar cause. Are not our resources more real, our climate more desirable, our manners more polished, our affections more gentle, and less personal, our minds more flexible, and active,

* B. Constant.

our character more hospitable? If, notwithstanding, liberty has given the English, for a period of more than a century, an elevated rank among nations, liberty will render to the French the rank assigned them by nature."

If, after all, the panegyric of England be a dainty too luscious for certain fastidious palates, they are invited to season it with a condiment prepared by the same hand.

The posthumous work of Madame de Staël, like this of M. de Pradt, contains an elaborate eulogium of England, and of her constitution; her indulgent critic retrenches from it but a single epithet; he is not sure that the constitution of which she speaks can be called "the *actual* constitution of England." Circumstances have much changed it. I see frequent suspensions of the *habeas corpus act*; the *system of spies* openly avowed, as a legitimate instrument of government; the alien bill perpetually renewed; retro-active, and consequently unjust, measures, adopted to secure its execution. I see the opposition feeble; elections becoming every day more openly corrupt; the traffic for seats in parliament ceasing to be scandalous, so regular is the operation, and their *current price* so accurately defined; and, were it not for the press, which survives, thanks to the habit and *tradition* of a secular liberty, I should be ready to exclaim, in speaking of this constitution, which excited the envy of Voltaire, and the admiration of Montesquieu,

PREFACE.

THE Congress of Vienna has given to Europe her new political Charter. That of Aix-La-Chapelle has pledged the solemn faith of Europe to the internal tranquillity of France, and given her a kind of certificate of qualification to govern herself and to walk without aid. Thereby every thing is restored to the ordinary and accustomed order between states. From that time the political machine of Europe is found to be perfectly re-established. All its parts are distinctly perceived; we can measure their proportions and reciprocal relations; it is mounted, and it remains only to indicate how, according to the nature of things, it may be expected to play. This is what we have attempted to demonstrate in the following pages. The time of mutual felicitations, as well as that of public rejoicings, is past. *It was the honey-moon of diplomacy.* The season has arrived for reflections and serious occupations; the subject will reward the trouble. Each, on returning home, endeavours to arrange himself there; to fortify his weak points, and to profit by his natural or adventitious advantages. An eagerness will be discovered to form alliances, the same as in times past. Already we hear of divers systems relative to connexions of this nature. The moment has

appeared to us favourable for examining this important subject with a prospect of utility. It is connected with another which we have already treated; or rather, it is merely its continuation. We refer to the treatise on the *Congress of Vienna*.

The truth of some views, which we ventured to publish at that epoch, appears to be now generally admitted. We then indicated two principal points of the European policy, as being at the same time its regulators—and its defects. 1. The supremacy of Russia and England. 2. The inconveniences of the transportation of part of the Prussian monarchy to between the Rhine and the Meuse; and the subjection of Italy to Austria.

Public opinion appears to have confirmed these views; and if we call them to mind in this place, it is not that we desire to display them as titles of glory, but as letters of credence which we present to establish confidence and legitimate our mission. We proceed in this part of our speculations as in those we have hazarded on the *Colonies*.

When South America discovered symptoms of approaching agitations, we called the attention of the public to the exploit she was about to achieve: when her career had commenced, we supported our prognostics relative to its approaching, and inevitable termination, by reference to predictions made at the moment when she declared herself. In these two cases truth upon the past is summoned to testify for the future. We have been obliged to labour on a subject absolutely new; the product of circumstances heretofore unknown in the diplomatic order. Nothing is more important than to form a just idea of the poli-

tical state of Europe; for where all is new, all likewise needs to be explored; and as in representative government, all force is derived from opinion, and from without the government, it is essential to enlighten this opinion fully, that it may always be qualified to discharge its office—that of redressing the false steps that may escape the administration; the latter cannot see all, and its fairest privilege consists in the power of realising useful ideas, which others can only conceive.

In England, public policy is discussed in all parts of the country; in all the publications that are circulated daily, and thus opinion never remains inactive, whether as the occupation of citizens, or as their organ. At every instant it is challenged to act and to declare itself;—and at every instant, it does so. Thus, in England, it is rare to see the government make false steps, and when it occurs, the fault is immediately perceived, exposed, and corrected. England owes the height of her prosperity to the activity, and even severity, of this control. It compels the government to form for itself a system and adhere to it. Whereas, in France, policy has almost always been an occult science: immersed in the interior of a sanctuary impenetrable to all except the divers winds which have blasted the system with perpetual mobility. France accordingly, has never had a steady system. Under Napoleon it centered in him alone; fashioned like its author's own proportions, gigantic and eccentric like him.

Then all was commanded; since 1814, all has been, as it were, obeyed. We must lay to the charge of the times, and there leave, the necessity of this pain-

ful transition. But, at length, this cup of bitter degradation should be exhausted; it seems that it has been drank to the dregs. It is quite time to resume the attitude natural to a great country, and alone worthy of it. With greater power than many others, France has not less right to her own direction than all in general—than each in particular,—have to their own. For states, independence is the first good, and the common good. The system of France is the most simple and the most inoffensive that can be conceived; the maintenance of peace towards all—independence for herself—and the avoidance of all connexion with others. Whoever causes her to deviate from this route, will lead her a false course and compromise her dearest interests.

What is here said with respect to France applies equally to other states; for such is the effect of general principles, and in an order of common interests, good can only result from the wisdom of the dispositions of each part, and from that of the whole, and here is a fair application of the axiom—

Bonum ex integra causa, malum autem ex minimo defectu.

In policy, as in every thing else, it is rare that the most consoling and the most encouraging should be also the most true. The present period, it is to be hoped, will furnish a proof of the contrary. Peace, and its duration, are two blessings desired by all. We have been careful to place the appearances of its solidity in a favourable light; for the removal of whatever might cause it to be doubted, tends to its confirmation. Conviction has pourtrayed this picture. Confining ourselves to the examination of *certain* subjects duty restricts us to that only of the declarations which

emanated from the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle. It would be as difficult as imprudent to follow the spirit of fiction through the infinite variety of combinations it has created.

There is but one point upon which it is permitted to dwell without temerity; and this point is also relative to France. We see her admitted, and a party to the alliance, of which before, she had been, in a different sense, the original and persevering object. But is this alliance entire, definitive, and equal in all its points, between her and her allies. Have not the patent articles a lining which is kept out of sight, but which may be brought to view in case of need? Would it not follow that France, in certain cases, might become a party against herself: might not a convention of Pilnitz of 1792 be concealed behind the congress of Aix-la-Chapelle of 1818? The wishes of Europe for the well being of France are formal and extensive. But, it is too probable, they are attended by many fears and distrusts. That which is within inspires fear for that which is without, and on this ground precautions are believed justifiable. False reports may have fomented and increased these apprehensions. Other nations have generally been deceived in regard to the spirit of France, and have misconceived it. Too often have they received impressions from men who know it no better than themselves. In 1790, they made sport of what took place in France, and viewed it as a mere tumult to be left to the care of a few battalions. In 1792 they had already gone to the opposite extreme; dejection had taken the place of presumption. Under Napoleon, under the Directory, they could only negotiate or tremble.

They had never any steady plan; never any judgment founded on certain bases. Meantime, ought the destiny of France to depend on interested suggestions, or erroneous suppositions? ought the state of a great people to be appreciated and regulated according to phantoms created by fear, or disappointed ambition? For example, it is too probable that these influences have acted upon the allies; and that they have chosen to have apprehensions the very moment in which they had just declared to Europe, and to France, that all was tranquil. On the supposition that they had reserved to themselves the right to pronounce upon the internal tranquillity of France, and to act in consequence—to what would not an interference, grounded on false impressions, expose both themselves and France? What, in this case, would be the place of the fifth ally, the king of France, if these terrors were to be renewed: and no doubt the authors of the former will become the officious propagators of many others, would it be believed there was good cause of interference: would they come to dictate laws to a great people; to propose it should give or should suffer a second representation of Poland? By what signs would the necessity for this interference be recognised? Would they expose themselves to the hazard of fatiguing a people already quite weary of so many humiliations and sufferings, strong in its rights, its numbers, its approved courage, and in the great example of Poland? The geographical map does not represent France so commodiously situated for partitions as Poland may have been: she would present neither a Russian nor a German faction, nor great men sold to Petersburg and to Berlin. France, like

Poland, would not have to expect a king from the capricious hands of her spoilers. She possesses princes who would remember that their ancestors thrice expelled strangers from the soil that supported their throne; and on this occasion would no longer listen to evacuation of territory merely by strokes of the pen. France has a right to despise all the pictures of her position which fear, or fancy, or want of patriotism may dictate. How can they affect her interests? What need has she of others? and to whom is she accountable? Is she not still the most prosperous state of Europe? With a certain revenue of seven hundred millions,* and an augmentation in the product of thirty millions; with a free territory; three hundred millions of expenditure diminished (the expense of occupation); her fields loaded with harvests; an exuberant population; an industry increasing with giant strides; a commerce free to spread its sails towards every part of the universe; and, in the midst of this apparatus of wealth, and as if to give it greater activity, a rigid observance of the laws on the part of all; citizens living together in harmony; the public roads without danger; justice without obstacle in the execution of its decrees; taxes paid without delay;—in such a state, what has France to fear for herself, or what have others to fear from her? What is there to fear for a throne surrounded by an army; supported by the two branches of the legislature; always ready to put in motion all the forces of the nation to sustain this throne, from which flow, as from an inexhaustible fountain, and gush as it were, all the advantages of

* Of francs.

honours and interests to which all the citizens aspire? Where could a commotion spring up in a country covered by the agents of authority, named by itself, and responsible to itself alone? How ridiculous are the terrors raised by these men who go about representing France as impregnated with a demagogue spirit, because in some places names stamped by public attention have been nominated anew; as if this result of the struggle of parties were not in the essence of representative government; as if the choice of a people were any thing else than the expression of their well being, or of their sufferings, and an invocation to guarantees; or of vengeance for severities endured; as if the candidates were not enlightened men, friends of their country, discreet judges of their own times, which by all their influences prescribe to them a moderation, the germ of which is in their hearts, as the demonstration of its necessity is in their intelligence! What meant these men who went about scattering cries of alarm, and represented democracy as invading France, anew, and menacing thrones, because they had been disappointed in the result of a few assemblies? But, in these assemblies, has a single word been uttered against the throne, against the public order, against any citizen; has any one seen Spafield meetings, as in England? Have Paris and France copied these foul orgies, whose disgusting spectacle changing London and England into a vast field of licence has scandalised Europe, and justified Rousseau in saying of the English that "their manner of using liberty, during the few instants in which they exercised it, proved them little worthy of it." "There exist no troubles and disorders except in the

heads of some dark or ambitious characters, who create these phantoms to take advantage of them and cause themselves to be reputed necessary.

At the conclusion of these excesses in England, have we seen any proposition for suspending popular elections, or for changing their regulation? As if fewer than a hundred thousand citizens, invited to exercise this right in a country peopled with thirty millions of men, did not resemble a strong aristocracy, rather than a democracy; as if this limitation were not the most satisfactory solution of the problem that has always agitated societies—the participation of public powers. The English ministers, when the storm bursts forth, like experienced pilots, think not of weakening or cutting loose the anchor that fastens the vessel to the shore, but they strive to strengthen the anchor of mercy, the constitution; they ascend to its principles instead of suspending it. In France, on the contrary, raw sailors, the moment the surface of the waters is ruffled, think of nothing but cutting the cable; abandoning the vessel to the surges which, coming in succession, will drift it and dash it to pieces. Fine means to introduce tranquillity into the minds and assemblies of a people to deprive it of its rights! Will the foreigners think they have the right to interfere, because this people shall resent with vivacity the presumption that has had the power to make it fear the interruption of its inheritance by the suspension of its right to choose its representatives in uninterrupted succession?

We can never be enough astonished at the presumptuous ignorance that could have inspired a similar resolution. Its authors were doubtless ignorant—

but France knew, that the renewal of representation by re-election is for a people what natural inheritance is for the prince and the peers. The people must be represented; it can only be represented by election; this is its mode of inheritance; to interrupt it is to destroy it; to continue it without the people, is to give it a life, the principle of which is not in itself; to suspend it, is to create a chasm in an existence, the thread of which drops from the hand; to dispose of it in any way, is to thrust usurpation into its legitimacy; each branch of the legislature has its own, independent of that of others. And if the throne or the peers should arrogate to themselves the right to violate the inheritance of the people, would they not have a parallel right over the inheritance of the two other parties? When it shall be attempted to suspend the one, it will be necessary to do the same for the others. Similar notions can have no existence except in heads impregnated with the inhuman prejudices that nations, the sources of all rights, live on the contrary without rights, restricted to the precarious enjoyment of those which have been condescendingly conceded them. These men ought, before they form these conspiracies, to persuade themselves intimately of this truth—that in human societies there is nothing substantial but nations themselves; and that all the rest is only artificial;—mere combinations adopted by them for their better administration.

The reflections suggested by such thoughts would lead to infinity. France has furnished against her enemies,—for such speculators are nothing less,—an answer far superior to any that could be added; this country, so near to troubles and commotions, has

maintained the calmest of attitudes during the suspension of government, while its fate was under deliberation, waiting with respect and silence the decision of him to whom the laws have resigned the right to choose the agents of his government. Such is the force of public reason, enlightened and directed by the system of representative government, similar to those piles destined to support, in the bosom of the waters, the pressure of the heaviest structures, which, while their head is beaten by a mass of iron, raised by a thousand arms, seem at every stroke likely to be overthrown or dashed to pieces—and which do but settle more deeply in the earth; the representative government will be confirmed by the very shocks which may be aimed at its destruction; its eternal roots will penetrate to the very centre of the French soil, which has remained constitutional and monarchical in spite of all that could be said or attempted to the contrary. Thus the last attempt against the charter and its props will tend to its confirmation and duration. Thus during the session of the constituent assembly, each essay renewed periodically, every six months, against it, did but increase its power, and recoiled upon its enemies. This last example excites a more ardent desire that France may see the end of all foreign influence. She needs all her liberty to perfect her institutions, to appear, at length, what she really is. She respects the liberty of others; she pretends to no influence over it; she maintains no committee among them. The law of reciprocity is the first of laws between polished societies; France has a clear right to claim it, and with it, as its completion, the entire accomplishment of those promises and

of that happy and peaceful futurity, of which the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle has inspired the hope; and which can only result from the most entire enfranchisement from all foreign influence. The honour of the nation demands it; and since Europe asks of her repose, and expects it from her, it is wise to commence by banishing whatever may wound her; for nothing is more certain to interdict repose than wounds; and nothing would wound her more than the spectacle or even the suspicion of a foreign pretension to influence her counsels. *Otium cum dignitate*—repose and dignity. Such are the aspirations of France. Dignity cannot be found without the most entire independence. Restricting herself to that, France cannot fear to be accused of ambition; in circumstances nearly similar, Louis XIV. repressed some haughty expressions which fell from the minister of a power that had acquired great advantages in the war of the Spanish succession, by saying to him, *Mr. Ambassador, I have always been the master at home; do not force me to recollect that I have been such sometimes amongst others.*

EUROPE

AFTER THE

CONGRESS OF AIX-LA-CHAPELLE.



CHAPTER I.

*Conduct of Europe with respect to France, from
1813 to 1818.*

THE Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle may be considered as the completion of the general acts in which the states of Europe have participated with respect to France, since the coalition of 1813. It will also be their last general act relative to the domination exercised by Napoleon over Europe and over France. Against him was formed the coalition of 1813; and against him, also, in stricter union, its energies were directed in 1815. In 1813 it only aspired to restrain the power which menaced it; in 1814, it resolved to free itself from its weight; in 1815, its object was enlarged; it laboured at the same time to efface the last traces of this power; to render its return impossible; and to shelter itself from new eruptions on the part of France. Such were the three objects of the action of the coalition at this time; they were distinctly perceived.

Too confident, perhaps, in 1814, Europe was, in 1815, too distrustful; at which epoch, she imposed on France the penalty of the two-fold imprudence committed by herself in 1814. 1. That of abandoning the direction of her own work to hands that could only mar it, and endanger themselves. 2. That of leaving at the gates of France, in view of his ancient legions, him, who could not fail to act upon them by great recollections, and to which he was invited by great interests. In expiation of this fault, Europe should have taken on herself half of the contribution she has imposed on France. She had the imprudence neither to remove nor to guard the enemy. Hence all the mischief has arisen. It was evident that the Island of Elba could be nothing but a watch-tower against the Thuilleries; but a magazine of intrigues against the new order of France; and that an interchange of wishes and hopes would soon be established between this island and France.

At this day, when all is calm, and the event has spoken, such an aberration appears inconceivable on the part of statesmen, who had shewn themselves for some years more discreet. These are faults such as decide at once the fate of men and that of empires. But the allies never well understood the strength or the weakness of Napoleon. In 1813, at Prague, they offered him more than his position exacted. In December of the same year, at the moment of the passage of the Rhine, they proposed to leave him Belgium and all the left bank of the Rhine; and thus paid a new homage of terror to a power which already existed no more; for it was at forty leagues only from Paris that they met the first battalions of Napoleon,

in the midst of a people rather a spectator than actor in this contest. At Chatillon in 1814, they pressed to retain the throne of ancient France him whom France permitted to fall from it; because by means of having raised himself above, he at last found himself separated from her; and fixing his attention on the world entire, it was only by chance, and at intervals that his eyes were turned towards her. The allies, in 1814 knew not distinctly why they confided in France; it was a wrong confidence: in 1815, they knew as little why they doubted her; it was a wrong distrust; they had equally misplaced the elements of each; they beheld in 1815 the causes of distrust they ought to have perceived in 1814: and they did not see in 1815 the motives of security which they very erroneously believed they recognised in 1814: they should have trusted in 1815, and distrusted in 1814; for then all the elements of this distrust existed and were seen every where; whereas in 1815, after the explosion, they were dissipated. Europe has set herself to guard the powder magazine after having left it to explode by her negligence. Hard fate of nations, to be compelled by turns to pay for the excesses and faults of memory of those who direct them. The absence of all precaution when all the train of means, result and support of Napoleon's power, was still on foot, was still seen embodied; and this excess of precautions when this formidable mass had been crushed in pieces; when the most menacing centre of this power strewed the fields of Waterloo; when the chief and the most prominent among his followers, were flying or dispersed, or in fine reduced to their individuality; all this contrast of actions with the real

state of things presented the most deplorable contradiction between what was done and what the position indicated; and proved that then, as well as the preceding year, and throughout the course of the revolution, the physicians had not well consulted the pulse of their patient, and that the forces of the coalition were more easily drawn together than their ideas had been enlightened. One of the most illustrious commanders of their armies said in 1814, that they had never imagined the catastrophe of Napoleon so easy; as it entered into the calculations of the coalition that it would require three years more to overthrow him; a certain argument that the principle of his weakness like that of his force had been equally mistaken by his enemies: they combated against him with a surviving sentiment of the fear he had so long excited. So true it is that what is feared once is feared always. The coalition believed the fortune of Napoleon attached to anchors, long since worn out, and he who was unable to escape the sword of his enemies, had escaped the penetration of their sagacity. The treaty of Paris of 1814, had restricted the demands of Europe with respect to France, to her reduction within her ancient limits. Her monuments, her treasures, her moveables as her territory, her independence as her glory, had been respected. In the language of conquerors are ambiguities whose interpretation force reserves to itself: and generosity without duplicity forms not the vocabulary of victory. In 1815 France was therefore doomed to defray the war declared and made against Napoleon alone; there was again a treaty of Paris; treaties signed in the capitals of the vanquished bode them no good, and France will do well henceforth to avoid treaties of Paris.

The moderation of 1814 gave place to severe exactions; the soldiers of Waterloo must lend their aid in the spoiliations of the museum;* Barbarians were heard to howl around the trophies of France, the ornaments of her capital; and they challenged from bronze the glorious emblems which could not be wrested from history: they left mutilated triumphal arches under the eyes of a people who sought in them its titles of glory with an eagerness equal to that which had been employed in effacing them: these vacant accusers spoke to the eyes of the French as did the absence of the statues of Brutus and Cassius to those of the Romans.

At last the torrent of Europe retired from the soil of France, loaded as after storms, with the fat of the fields; recommending their diligent culture to the inhabitants, and reserving to herself a share of their fruits. Many went out of France as from an auction to which they had come to redeem their furniture. Once masters, they gave to the war the direction they pleased; and Bluchers were still more easy to vanquish than to refute.†

The second treaty of Paris left France loaded with an immense foreign debt: and as if it were not enough to overwhelm her with the expenses of the war, to these were added the expense of fears she was no longer in a position to justify. For upon a near survey it was evident, that neither in her external political, nor in her internal order, did she longer

* Justus Grunner, a modern interpreter of the Apocalypse, who discovered in this part of the New Testament, denunciations applicable to France, and the city of Paris!

† General Blucher was made prisoner at Lubec, in 1807; he was defeated at the battle of Fleurus or of Ligny, 16 June, 1815, which he acknowledges in his own relation; and the danger he twice incurred of being made prisoner.

present any danger to the peace of Europe, or to her own tranquillity: but the expenses of her presumed convalescence were taxed at a price as high as those of the disease itself. Seven hundred and fifty millions for the charge of the war, seven hundred and fifty millions for the expense of occupation, with five hundred millions, consumed or destroyed from the first of March 1815 to the first of January, 1816, form the balance of this fatal epoch; a cruel lesson both for those who come to govern a country against the sense of whatever they find in it; and for those who, too prompt to be led away by deception, irritation and egotism, heed not the precipices which open behind them as much for themselves as for others; for the abyss was excavated by hands equally inexpert, rash, or interested. The half of the defensive circumvallation of France, must be given up as an observatory from which she might be guarded. The principal seat of this guard varied according to the seasons; in summer it was stationed at the distance of forty leagues from Paris; for the winter in the centre of the capital. Even some part of the territory was ceded to increase the security of a troublesome neighbour given by the congress of Vienna;* the thorns of which then began to be felt. The kingdom of the Netherlands needed a direct route to some parts of its possessions: France must again furnish it by the cession of Philippeville and Marienburgh, destined to bind together all the parts of the new state.

Huninguen paid, by its destruction, for the broken slumbers of the inhabitants of Basle; for there exist-

* Sarrelouis and some parts between the Sambre and Meuse.

ed no military reason or political fact to furnish a motive for this ruin; and the dismantling of Landau opened Alsace, while it secured Germany. Assuredly, on this one occasion, they had no cause to reproach themselves with having forgotten either their coffers or their securities; and France paid usurious interests, in the distractions of 1814, and the explosion of 1815, for a generosity of six months. It would be superfluous, at this hour, to examine the principle of right for these exactions; perhaps, in the discussion, we should arrive at a result quite different from what has been alleged on either hand. France was placed in the worst of all possible situations for discussion; the head-quarters of the strangers contiguous to the barriers of the Louvre; the state divided; a part of the citizens thinking the rigours exercised against the other part always too mild; never content with the shame and disgrace stamped on their country till their thirst for domination and revenge was allayed; they contested nothing with those who procured them these gratifications; the dispositions of this party could only appear in the eyes of the stranger as an encouragement and an apology; provoker of the violence of the stranger, auxiliary of his rigours, admirer of his severities, contemner of the national glory, the depreciator of the qualities and the talents which had blazed forth in France; this party, the same that for five-and-twenty years had not ceased to demand France by the sword of her enemies, at this moment would sooner have traced for them the route of rigours than have laboured to divert them from it. The strangers might have considered themselves less bound to respect a country on seeing so many of those

who appeared at its head more forward than themselves in resentments and animosities.

At that period, contrary to the usual order, France could not be sustained by her own government; it was no longer there her strength lay. Twice reinstated by the foreign powers, the price of service implored and accepted being neither defined nor regulated between the nation and the foreigner, between the alliance and the enmity, between the restoration and spoliation commenced; having no other force than that same from whence came the exactions; situated far more unfavourably than in 1814, fearing to aggravate the sufferings it witnessed, of which also, it might fear being pronounced the author; admitted to sign what it had been useless to discuss, and what it wanted power to refuse; there remained for it but one mode of serving France, to give the precept of resignation and its own example. For such was the strange constraint of its position; nor was it for what it then did that it had cause of regret, but for what it had done at an earlier period, and which had been the prelude to these cruel circumstances. For whoever attended to what passed in 1814, must have foreseen the events of 1815.

Thus was regulated the fate of France. She remained under the custody of Europe. It is the first example presented in the history of Europe of a similar measure, embraced with regard to any state whatever, and executed by common consent. A quarantine of five years was imposed on her to give time for the miasmata called revolutionary to dissipate and be replaced by a purer element. The government of France was put to the test; it was desired to have

the assurance of time for the solidity of its march and the regularity of its movements; the reins were restored, but they still held the leading strings. If the tenth part of these precautions had been taken in 1814, none of them would have been needed in 1815.

In this cruel situation, France has discovered two great forces—that of character, and that of moderation. She has endured and paid all, without murmur and without delay; and as paying is all, for nations as well as individuals; as the discharge of debts is comparative wealth, and the exercise of good faith is the key to treasure; prosperity has returned with her sister punctuality, and we have seen the price of deliverance, the subscriptions for which commenced at fifty-five, completed at eighty. So true it is, that burdens are the exclusive portion of bad faith, and that good renders them all supportable. But as prosperity is a plant, all whose branches are interwoven; as all public prosperity has its origin uniformly in the measures of government; to the system embraced by the administration must be attributed especially the healthy condition of France, and the effects it has produced.

On the 5th of September was prepared the deliverance recently effected. It is essential not to mistake it; the fifth of September has introduced the result of the congress of Aix-la-Chapelle. By the afflicting treaty of Paris, the allies had reserved to themselves the discretion of pronouncing upon the state of France, and to regulate by it the duration of the measures of precaution it might require.

Assuredly had France continued abandoned to the pernicious gales that have blown upon her for many

years, the catastrophes which this fatal direction could not fail to produce in the interior would have introduced others from without. The agitations—what do I say? the convulsions of the interior would have provoked new severities from the hands of the foreigner. Men were not wanting, it is natural to suppose, who ardently wished it, and who would have returned with joy towards pleasures which had appeared too short in proportion as their relish had been exquisite and their price inconsiderable. Pretexts would not have been wanting. But whilst on the one hand we were hastening with press of sail to perdition; on the other, the good genius of France, too long absent, approached her, and with his tutelary hand, dispersing the agents of darkness and of discord, replacing power in its true direction, rallying the scattered forces around a common centre, he restored a respect for authority; he removed the obstacles that had opposed it; he revived hope, confidence, and prosperity; and presenting France to Europe, disengaged from whatever might have obscured her, solicited in her behalf the termination of rigours become useless, shades of terrors without foundation, and causes of irritation, grounded on their inutility. Honoured be, therefore, the 5th of September, this restoration of restorations; honour to the hands which have given it, which will consolidate it, and cause it to triumph over all the designs of malevolence. Let him who can endure the thought, imagine the futurity which its absence or its despair would have produced.

Seeing the alacrity with which France has marched in its ways, all can judge if it was agreeable to her sense, and if it was on this occasion she felt herself

France again. But for the 5th of September, the excellent citizens who in their secret notes so patriotically implored the prolongation of the stay of strangers on the land they were inclined to dispose of, would not have had need to recur to this generous and loyal step; for it had been long before any question of evacuating it. At length the hour is arrived, and the congress, assembled according to the terms of the treaty of Paris, has pronounced it without hesitation as without division.

Here two things should be noticed. The evil was done; it dates from 1815, a time of distraction and of anger; but an evil, decreed in principle, may be mitigated in the execution, when time has dissipated the first motives of irritation, and brought back days of moderation and sentiments due to misfortune. An unnecessary evil of prodigious extent had just been inflicted on France; it might rise to degrees equally exceeding the intentions of those who imposed the burden, as the faculties of those who had to support it. Thus pretensions, to the charge of France, have been seen to swell to the sum of sixteen hundred millions. It had been as well to demand the surrender of half her blood, on the alternative of defending it; and, perhaps, she would have sold it dearly. From the moment permission was given to prefer demands against her, there was no longer any limit to demands. Worms from a thousand tombs were seen crawling to devour her.* But neither was it the ruin of France,

* Bills drawn by Henry IV. were produced; those of the Reiters and Lansquenets were expected. Perhaps there was no necessity for despairing to see some bills of St. Lewis and Philip Augustus, for the transportation and supplies of the crusaders in the Holy Land.

nor the triumph of cupidity, that the princes desired, whom unfortunate circumstances had forced to impose on her hard conditions. It is known that many among them had never thought of spoils. By them also the voices of such as thirsted for extortions, were controuled; and the tributes were balanced by the faculty of acquitting them. The chief of the European armament displayed an honourable zeal against greedy exaggerations. Invested with the powers of the most flattering arbitration possible to be granted to a mere individual, he appeared to lean towards the weakest and the most unfortunate. The congress relaxed something of the rights already acquired by treaties; and not to have delayed its decision, is, in some degree, to have enhanced its benefits. In this part, therefore, all is consummated, and of the year 1815, there remains only inscriptions on the register of public debt, disagreeable pages in history, and sad recollections in the memory.

Here two things are to be noted: 1. The various speculations to which the congress had given occasion. The convention of the principal sovereigns of Europe is an event calculated to suggest a host of conjectures; it is natural to attach the highest importance to the excursions of personages of this rank. Even the errors of the imagination find their source and their excuse in the greatness of those who are the objects of them; but here nothing favours such vague suppositions. The subject in agitation was not a new and inceptive action, but the anticipated conclusion of an action already ancient; but the accomplishment of an order arranged on principles steadily pursued for a course of several years. From 1813 to the close of

1815, the allied sovereigns have never separated. They saw distinctly, that in their approach consisted their strength, as their past separation had caused their weakness. In the rapid change that daily occurs in the face of affairs, how arrive at directing them according to the exigencies created by this very mobility; when, at every moment, it is requisite to go to a distance to take and to give counsel; to send orders; to redress wrongs; and provide for a futurity rendered more obscure by the distance of the theatre of events? Therein is found the principle of the inferiority of Europe with regard to France, during the whole course of the revolution. All assumed a different appearance, when Europe assembled; when there was no longer but one tent and one council-chamber for all the enemies of Napoleon. In this permanent convention was forged the spear that pierced him, the force of which he ought to have foreseen; he perished because he was blind to the results of this new species of opposition; he continued in renovated Europe, to see only ancient Europe.

What had become of the coalition, if, instead of finding it assembled at Vienna, the descent at Cannes had surprised them dispersed, at London, Vienna, Petersburg, and Berlin? Perhaps the contest would continue still; or, at least, it must have continued longer.

The advantages experienced from anterior conventions were therefore the pledges of a new congress; and this, authorised by an express stipulation, did not, in the least, countenance the supposition of the introduction of any affair foreign to this congress; no important event, foreign to its known object, had taken

place in Europe; every expectation, therefore, wide of the declared object, was not within the limits of legitimate calculation upon this assembly. If a single question, passing the determinate object, were admitted, why not two? why not three? and then, where was the term? The treaty of Westphalia might have been seen to commence anew. Some considered the congress as the sequel to that of Vienna; this was a great mistake; it was but the sequel to the treaty of Paris. The two conventions were acts absolutely independent of each other. Others summoned Spain and South America to appear at Aix-la-Chapelle; this was quite another affair; Spain had no more to ask; especially than to see America condemned for contumacy. It will some day become necessary to meet this great question of America; nor will it always be possible to avoid it; but assuredly, it was not the hour of this congress, which could be that of America.

The congress has had but one object, to pronounce on the expediency of the evacuation of France; it has had but one session, that in which it has been pronounced.

2. A long habit of Machiavelism, of abuse of force, of unworthy or vile pretexts to colour violations of faith, have extinguished, in the minds of a great number, all confidence in political good faith, or the sincerity of treaties; and have disposed them to distrusts and suspicions, justified, unfortunately, by too many anterior facts. *That which is good to take, is also good to keep: think you pretexts will be wanting to retain what they have in possession?* Such is the language which has incessantly been sounded in our

ears, for some years past; perhaps by those who, when it was their turn, gave occasion for those, to whom they thus applied it, to apply it to themselves.

Meanwhile, numerous motives were perceived tending to remove this apprehension, so disgraceful to the intellect and the heart. Good faith, it should be hoped, has not made this eternal retreat from the earth which the poet paints, when he says,

Extrema per illos
Justitia excedens terris vestigia fixit.

The number of Princes who must have concurred to violate their sworn faith, the diversity of their interests, and more than all, the consideration of their personal character, presented the most encouraging guarantees.

In this point, the evil has a remote origin; and those, who in hatred of the revolution, represent it as the school of these fallacious dispositions, ought justly to look higher; they will discover the true causes of it in the perfidies sown, throughout the course of the negotiations of the cabinets of Vienna and of Berlin, by Frederic and the prince de Kaunitz. Silesia had vitiated the Austrian and Prussian diplomacy. The partition of Poland; the invasion of Bavaria, by the emperor Joseph; of Holland by the duke of Brunswick in 1787; the war against the Turks by Catharine and Joseph, had entirely despoiled diplomacy of its lustre before the revolution; England had invaded Canada, and captured from France three hundred merchant ships before the declaration of the war of 1756.—*What would become of England if she were always just towards France?* was the answer of the English minister.

The school was perverted: all diplomatic acts, in the minds of too many, presented this art as composed only of ambuscades; as a career in which to prevail was all: over which there presided one only divinity, and one only expiation was received—*SUCCESS*. There has been ample time to experience the effects of these detestable principles.

At present, when all is changed in so many other respects, all, also, ought to be changed in this. No examples but those of rectitude ought any longer, to be exhibited to men: all should remain convinced, that whoever begins to despise restraints, infallibly releases others from a multitude of ties. Good faith in diplomacy, and confidence in diplomacy are two things to be created anew in Europe. As the wounds are ancient and deep much time will be required to cicatrize them: it will take time for diplomacy to recover an honourable place in the esteem of men.

The fidelity to engagements contracted at Paris, observed at Aix-la-Chapelle, lays the first stone in the reconstruction of the edifice. If the liberation of France had been adjourned, the credit of diplomacy would have been irretrievably ruined; it was its last shoal: whereas, a loyal and prompt execution, emanating from what, by its power, has no account to render but to morality and itself, forms the example; and closes the lips of peevish or interested malevolence. Europe had promised; she had fulfilled her engagements; she had all power; force therefore can acknowledge and impose laws on itself; can be moral; we may therefore confide; diplomacy and probity may then terminate their long divorce:

at this new spectacle it might be felt that a purer air was breathed; and the clouds seemed to disperse in the horizon, opening a serener sky.

The act which presents the commencement of this moral reformation is, for that very cause, the principle of a most important good; no less than that of reconciling men to good faith: and for my own part, if the expectation which, after the 5th of September, I did not hesitate to form, respecting the result of the Congress, had been disappointed, I felt that I should have been less afflicted for France than for Europe herself.

The drama of 1815 is then entirely concluded. Let us next see what is about to follow.

To explain this, it is requisite to state:

1. What is the political state of Europe at the existing epoch, which may be considered as the conclusion of the order introduced by the revolution.

2. To compare the order of the present time with that by which it has been preceded.

3. To indicate the tendency of the spirit of the present policy of Europe.

4. To designate the moral dispositions of the different nations of Europe.

5. To anticipate the questions of general interest that may be expected to arise.

The Congress of Vienna is to the policy of the revolution, what the treaty of Westphalia was to that of the reformation. The latter gave regularity to all that had been done in this long period of perturbations: it became a new era for individuals, as well as for states: during near two hundred years, in vast countries, all was dated from it.

Great commotions involve great changes; and strong stipulations founded on broad bases, attached to solid anchors, can alone prevent the past from returning to the charge to dispossess the present, and thus render peace impossible. Now peace is the first good; and for its maintenance, policy grants these grand social amnesties, which are admissions of the impotence of justice; the latter, in her despair, without changing her aim changes her object; directing her entire solicitude to the body itself of society; the health of which then serves to compensate the losses its members may have experienced.

It is with this view to social preservation that the Congress of Vienna has sanctioned the work of the revolution; and accepted its succession.

It is the treaty of Westphalia of our age; it is the new normal era of Europe. During a long time diplomacy will have few other important cares besides those of explaining and maintaining it.

CHAPTER II.

General Observations.—General Political Order of Europe.

It is requisite to separate the continental power of Europe into two grand divisions, that of the north and that of the south. We must distinguish those powers which contribute to the maintenance of the general order, from those who contribute nothing to its support, and do, as it were, but march in the train of the former. In this order of powers there are some active, others inactive, and merely passive. The policy of Europe is transacted exclusively in the North and in Germany. It does not pass beyond the Alps and the Pyrenees; whatever is found within these two zones, is neither in position nor proportion, to influence it. This direction tends to become permanent in consequence of the events of 1813, 1814, and 1815. The supremacy of Russia is one of the principal causes of this new location of policy. It is natural it should approach the most powerful state; lately, it was the same with respect to France when she was the most powerful. At present, concealed as it were on one side, by the kingdom of the Netherlands, and covered on the other by the ramparts raised by Germany to keep her at a distance, she is insulated by these two new barriers, from the rest of Europe. Thereby the continental policy is concentrated in the grand square formed by the Alps, the Rhine, the Bal-

tic, and the Vistula; this is the field in which it will be henceforth exercised.

The existing positive order of Europe is that which flows either from the congress of Vienna or from the transactions which have taken place since 1813 and 1815. Thus the state of France was regulated by the first treaty of Paris, as that of Sweden was by that of Keil.

According to the new order, the greater part of the states of Europe exist double, and contain unions of nations and states which heretofore were not embodied with these sovereignties; thus Russia and Poland, Sweden and Norway, Holland and Belgium, Prussia and the Grand Duchy of the Rhine, with half of Saxony, present these grand unions in which one of the accessories equals the principal, as in the instance of Belgium with respect to Holland, and of Norway in regard to Sweden. In this case, there is association almost as much as adjunction or *reunion*, a term as employed in policy, implying adjunction with inferiority.

Inferiority is discovered in the other adjunctions, such as that of Poland with Russia, of a part of Saxony with Prussia, of Venice with Austria, of Genoa with Piedmont; in all these cases there is rather subjection than union; the sacrifice on one side, the acquisition on the other, are observable at the first glance. It is perceived, besides, that if, in one case, the union may have been desired, in others it must have been forced, and that the wish of separation is not likely to be long waited for, and will always be ready to return. The more civilisation shall extend its benefits, the more this disposition will gain strength; for the principal

and ever increasing effect of civilization, is to expose the deformities of the political as those of the social order. It would be a great self-deception to believe, that while advancing upon one point, it will remain stationary upon others. It is the nature of civilization to lead the way, and to control by an influence, as universal as irresistible, the destinies of human society; it acts in every direction like air and light.

The family of Europe has always reckoned among the members which compose it, powers of a superior order; objects of much jealousy and distrust. When Russia and Prussia, these creations of the eighteenth century, did not yet exist, Germany constituted the material of the European policy, and the dominant power in this country, therefore, occupied the chief rank in the political order; it was then Austria; Charles the Fifth would have been the master of the continent but for the reformation. At that day it saved Europe from the chains of Austria, by dividing Germany between the Protestant and Catholic leagues; and by causing the creation of the first political system that Europe has had. It gave France, in alliance with Sweden, the means of reducing the power of Austria to proportions less formidable to the common liberty. The reformation facilitated the creation of Prussia; who, whenever it was in her power, sustained herself by this league; and hastened to place herself at the head of this politico-religious confederation.

When religious ideas had facilitated the introduction and prevalence of those of policy, the Catholic states of Germany, such as Bavaria, the Palatinate, and some ecclesiastical electors, detached themselves

from Austria, whom they had followed thus far by reason of religious conformity; and adopted the policy, which indicated France as their natural ally against the dominant power in Germany. Louis XIV. was almost always followed by the electors of Bavaria, of Cologne, and by other princes of the empire, who dreaded the power of the emperor; they attached themselves in the same manner to Prussia, the moment she had exhibited the same character, of protector against Austria; this policy, which might be called instinct, has served them well, as it was seen in the war of Bavaria in 1778; this state would have been crushed under the weight of the forces with which the emperor Joseph was preparing to overwhelm it, but for the prompt interference of Prussia. Austria found the latter always at her side, and was subjected to a more inquisitive observation than could have comported with the dignity of the modern Cesars.

Previously to the revolution, a great number of causes combined to temper the effect of superiority in power, and to give it limits. As yet there was no absolute domination; for there was no power which was not attended by what might be called its corrective. France found it in England; what state could she have attacked on the continent, without encountering this powerful rival upon every sea, before all her ports, in the midst of all her colonies? Her navy, as usual, would have annulled all conquests made by the armies of France, and would have forced her to restore them. By the possession of Belgium, Austria was rendered dependant on France, and kept in check by that power. In Germany, she was balanced by

Prussia; and, towards the East, by Turkey and Russia. The latter had in Finland a dangerous neighbourhood. Gustavus III. astonished Petersburg with the roar of his cannon; and the haughty Catharine was nigh feeling the effects of the terror which she had been accustomed to inspire afar off. Denmark kept Sweden in check. Turkey repressed Russia. There were therefore counterpoises, and fortune in creating them, had, in her sports, been more friendly to the liberties of Europe than the combinations that have succeeded.

The revolution has caused great invasions; and it is remarkable, that the power most infatuated by the spirit of invasion, is the same that has finally profited least by them; and those, who have lost the most, who have been the most menaced, the most despoiled, are finally the most enriched.

The time of equilibrium and ancient checks is past. Colossal powers have been erected in Europe; this is the capital vice of her new state. Let us first consider that whose weight oppresses the continent; the power of Russia.

RUSSIA.

THE domination of the power which, during the first fifteen years of the century, has weighed upon Europe, has, by its ruin, experienced a complete change of location.

It has passed from France to Russia, and Europe has lost by this change as much as France herself. It is in this immoderate augmentation of the Russian power, that the capital defect of the European policy consists; it is this which has impressed the false direction sanctioned by the congress of Vienna; which has forced some of the arrangements that were made there, and which has prepared ages of toil for Europe.

By a singular, but fatal conformity with England, Russia is now almost as insular as England herself. From the wall of China to the plains of Moravia, and the gates of Breslaw, Russia is unbroken and without a neighbour. All this immense space acknowledges her for its only master. On one side, she is flanked by the Pole and the Baltic; on the other, by Caucasus and the Caspian, the Danube and the Euxine. The nations which border upon her, brutalized by superstition or slumbering in voluptuousness, are too much her inferiors to be able to disquiet her. She may bring all her forces, therefore, upon the menacing front she extends towards Europe. Sweden can no longer reach her by Finland, which has slipped from her grasp.

England could not employ in repressing her the same means which are so effectual with respect to France, placed within her reach; for Russia has not the marine, the colonies, and the commerce, that have rendered France so vulnerable. Immense distances, boisterous seas, and Boreas, with his breath of ice, defend Russia from England.

Charles XII. in the eighteenth century, and Napoleon in the nineteenth, have taken upon themselves, by a similar ruin, to engrave in characters not to be effaced on the frontiers of this land of perdition, what Dante inscribed upon the gates of his *Hell*,—" *Ye who enter here, abandon hope.*" Thus Russia finds her force augmented from the despair of her enemies, and their known inability to retaliate upon her at home, the evil she can always inflict upon them; terrific certainty, that of being always exposed to dangers, from which others must always be protected!

The augmentations of population in Russia follow the same proportions they are seen to acquire in America; and, for the same reasons, the extent of spaces, the abundance of subsistence, and the progress of civilization. The United States departed in 1778 from the point of two millions five hundred thousand inhabitants, to arrive, in 1818, at that of nine millions. It is calculated that in 1920, and perhaps before this epoch, their population will exceed one hundred millions. Nothing can prevent it; the causes which have given them the first million will give them also the hundredth. It is the same in population as in the products of commerce; the difficulty is not in gaining the last million, but the first. Russia possesses more than forty-five millions of inhabitants; a fair

point of departure, and a rich fund to ensure further accumulations. This population results from fifty ages of barbarism, and but one of attempts at civilization. To what will it not arrive, when civilization, diffused over the whole empire, may produce on the whole body of the monarchy the beneficial changes it has already produced in the parts it has been able to attain? It cannot be doubted, in a hundred years, the population of Russia will exceed one hundred millions of men; the spaces to receive them are all prepared; the earth opens to them a virgin bosom for their nourishment; commerce invites them; industry will form the classes that will provide for their wants; a varied climate will favour every species of culture; a thousand rivers will transport the products given by art or by nature; there exists no cause capable of arresting these progressions; there are a thousand to accelerate them. Each advance, as always happens, will become the principle of another. To which may be added, at the present time, that the communication of ideas by the liberty of the press; and of men with each other, by commerce and travelling; furnishing the means to know all that passes every where, has made a common fund of all human sciences; from which each draws in his turn, and which, instead of being exhausted by what is drawn from it, is augmented. Therein consists one of the principal benefits of civilization. For the daily melioration of condition it is no longer requisite to study, as one might say; to look only would seem enough; all is created, all is known; all is at hand.

The time employed in other epochs upon inquiries may be devoted now to successful applications:

the models are found in all places: they exist to multiply instruction, and to render it general. Such is the distinction between modern and ancient societies. Men dispersed, innumerable barriers and arts in their infancy, could not conduct society to so rapid an improvement, as do the intercourse of men, the increase of communications, and arts acquiring greater perfection every day. The departure should be taken from this point of view in forming a judgment of the future progress of Russia. She has not only all that Europe possesses, but she has still more; for she has a thousand places to dispose of for one that may be vacant in Europe. Besides no part of Europe is susceptible of so uniform a progress in a better order, as Russia.; because, with her, all will be formed upon modern models, as at Petersburg, and as in America. It is the advantage of new countries; delay is compensated by better formation.

If any country of Europe were capable of a progress equal to that of Russia, it could only be Ireland; because, after Russia, it is the country where population is most scattered, and civilization most retarded: and there, as in Russia, it is very easy to procure the means of subsistence. In this is found the whole secret of the respective population of states. What completes the terror of this too certain prospect of the increase of the Russian power, is the contemplation that this immense population, attracted towards the south, (as that of the north has always been, flowing in that direction, like a river,) formed under the hand of a revered authority, of men robust, obedient, patient, as it were malleable, will be at the disposal of men equal in civilization to the most civilized men

of the rest of Europe, and that, as under the Roman emperors, a capital of great luxury is to commission its *Corbulos* to complete the conquest of the world! A hundred millions of Russian peasants, always ready to support with their docile and muscular arms all the projects that power or caprice may engender, presents an appalling perspective; twice already they have hewn their way to the capital of France: by them the empire of the Sultans lies subverted on its shattered crescent; nor is it long since the cries of these sons of the Scythians have been echoed by the tomb of the Mantuan Swan. Add to this, that Russia strengthened by a van guard of ten millions of Poles, is the only power of Europe that possesses in very great abundance, one of the most essential machines of war, one of the vital principles of the military state of a country, namely, horses. They exist in Russia in immense quantity, and in qualities of every species, each excellent in their kind: consequently also at prices that permit them to be used without parsimony: whereas in the rest of Europe the progress of population combined with that of agriculture has narrowed the spaces necessary for rearing them. The advance of their price resulting from that of all the productions of the earth and of industry, has become so excessive as to render the acquisition and support of a numerous cavalry, a burden incompatible with the revenues of the greater part of the states of the continent. Napoleon was never able to create anew the cavalry whose ruins strewed the plains of Russia; whereas, the latter, to repair a similar loss, would only have required an act of her will, and the time necessary to assemble them. In this particular,

Russia resembles those parts of America filled by the animals transplanted from Spain, which from their numbers, seem the real inhabitants; while the rest of Europe is unprovided with this species of force.

Russia at present is therefore the dominant power on the continent; the power that menaces others; in a condition to come in contact with others; and beyond all reach on their part; consequently presenting a danger that always impends. The congress of Vienna, by sanctioning the occupation of Poland, has given a false direction to the policy of Europe; which required that Russia should be kept at a distance, at any cost: all should have been sacrificed to this consideration. The moment of establishment is that in which reflections are the most necessary; it is that of precautions: once formed, what does it not cost to repair, to correct, and often to obtain a slender redress! This will be perceived with respect to Russia. Now that she is fortified by such a vanguard as two thirds of Poland; when her wings are perfectly protected, who could cause her to retreat a step, who will prevent her from stepping over her barriers? Between her and Germany what henceforth is the distance, the wall of separation, and the rampart? In vain will it be said, that the effects of this combination will be tempered by the personal qualities of the sovereign of this formidable empire. Is it then that policy is framed with men, and not rather with things? Is it that augmentation of power does not include an invitation to the exercise of power? Is it that the eternity of Alexander can be assured like his immortality: will his soul like his sceptre be transmitted entire to his successors?

We may be assured, on the contrary, that Europe which has sighed for the reverses of Napoleon, and has profited by them to effect her emancipation; in reality, has but changed the yoke and taken that of Russia instead of that of France; it was for the advantage of Europe even more than for his own that Napoleon made war upon Russia; and let us take heed lest the day arrive in which his defeat shall be deplored.

The part of Poland last united to Russia has received consolations rather than a state. There are things for which there can exist no compensation. Nations have in this respect a sensibility still more delicate than individuals: their very existence ceases with their independence. Whatever name may decorate a foreign domination, it is still to be commanded. The smallest particle of dependance suffices to embitter all the liberty that may remain. The Polish army will be a very powerful auxiliary for Russia; nothing can surpass the Polish soldier in courage, in patience, or in force; he unites the qualities of the Russian and the Frenchman; he is an excellent horse-man; loves war and has been trained to it. Among the Poles will reappear the Sobieskis, the Kosciuskos, the Poniatowskis, and their banners associated to those of Russia, will one day perhaps be displayed in the same places where they have appeared at the side of other ensigns. Poland is now cut into more pieces than it ever was. Galicia appertains to Austria in consequence of the first partition: the dutchy of Posen, Dantzick, with the lower Vistula, are subject to Prussia. Three other parts are possessed by Russia; Volhynia and Lithuania,

as Russian provinces, and the kingdom of Poland as a state united with Russia. The combination appears singular at the first glance; but a little attention enables us to discover in it precautions against the reestablishment in one mass of too large a portion of the ancient Polish family. Divisions of states, and of aggregations, excite less umbrage, and are less disposed to question authority than unions of greater strength: ten millions of Poles united in the same state would have felt a degree of strength altogether different from that which results from their separation and distribution between three different governments. To have reunited the three great parts of Poland had been to accomplish a work sketched by Napoleon; and his conquerors could not persuade themselves to become his testamentary executors.

SWEDEN.

NOBLE and pacific destinies await Sweden: policy has reestablished the order of nature; and what her Gustavuses, her Charles Xs, her Charles XIIIs, were unable to effect, a Frenchman invited to this throne has executed. Sweden is indebted to him for the acquisition of a position proof against all attack. Happy, henceforth, in having nothing more to fear or to desire, her attention will be confined to two principal objects: to confirm the union with Norway; and maintain her connexion with the body of Europe, should she ever have occasion to act against Russia: Sweden alone cannot have the temerity to encounter this power; and, very fortunately for her, she has no other neighbour; peace will be, therefore, her portion, and with it the peaceful cultivation of its consoling and beneficent arts, agriculture, manufactures and commerce. A new dynasty forced to incessant vigilance for its own security; instructed by great examples in the dangers of slumber, as in those of presumption; must seek in the augmentation of the public prosperity new pledges of stability; and in this case, the great advantages attached to this necessity of seeking to merit the consideration of a people, may balance the inconveniences inherent to such changes, even when they have become the work of necessity.

In the course of time, the population of Sweden will also experience great augmentation: she will owe

it more to commerce and manufactures than to agriculture; resisted by the climate, and little favoured by the soil.

Her ports will contribute more to it than her fields; it will be with her as with all maritime countries, (for Sweden has become such since the union of Norway,) in which it is more by furrowing the sea than by working the soil, that the state prospers and increases in riches and in population. The great wars of Gustavus Adolphus, those of Protestantism and of Charles XII., had given Sweden a direction towards land armaments; this direction was forced by the possession of the greater part of the territory bordering on the Baltic; which Sweden has lost.

When she occupied Pomerania, Livonia, and Finland, she had need of great armies of the line; and her navy was of little service but for the transport of her troops, and the defence of her coasts; but at present, when her own shores are her limits, she has more need of a strong militia than of regular troops; and her marine may take the extensive direction required by the new order of Europe, with which she ought to co-operate.

The grand movement which agitates the continent of Spanish America will extend its effects to Sweden; it has the appearance of being made for the maritime nations of the north; and for those that have few or no colonies; for they are destined to gain those of others, without losing their own: and what a colony is all America! This great and astonishing event, the separation of Southern America from Spain; an event now inevitable, and a certain prelude to the enfranchisement of all the colonies in the four quarters

of the globe, will lead to immense accumulations of power and of wealth among the nations of the north ; far superior to those of the south, in the useful arts, in activity, in the pursuit of luxuries, and in the love of gain. Europe would not resemble herself, if, instead of falling into the hands of superstitious and indolent Spain, South America had been shared among the laborious and enterprizing people that inhabit the north of Europe. There was a fatal mistake for the human race in the gift made by heaven of America to Europe; that of having destined her to the indolent men who dwell within the Pyrenees; they could make nothing of her when she slept; they are incapable of retaining or releasing her, since she is awakened.

The union of Norway to Sweden, gives this power good ports of commerce upon the ocean, which she wanted; and which will place her in a condition to extend her commercial relations, about to take the place of warlike occupations; which have hitherto formed the chief business of life among the people of Scandinavia. By this pacificatory union, the country in which the cruel God of War had established his horses and his car, will no longer be disturbed by its terrific rumblings : henceforth it is destined to become the residence of a peace, little short of eternal.

Some slight agitations at the surface of a soil that has recently felt a general shock, ought to excite no alarm for the future ; and the piercing eye that watches over these countries ; the firm, able, and paternal, but vigorous hand that rules them, will not fail at the same time to prevent, to obviate, to compress and to punish all that shall attempt to interrupt this peace. The security of the Baltic is better guaranteed by the

concentration of Sweden and Norway, in the same state, than it was before this union. A strong state, single, is more strong than two weak states, united, but subject to be separated. In the state of maritime and continental preponderance which, at the same time, both England and Russia have acquired; it was for the interest of Europe to fortify and strengthen as much as possible, the power of the north that was found most competent to guard the Baltic at once against England and against Russia. This charge for the future, devolves on Sweden. In this view her union with Norway is an act as beneficial to Europe in general, as to Sweden in particular. The acquisition of Norway has more than recompensed her for the loss of Finland.

The fortune of states must be estimated like that of individuals: the expense, as well as the receipt, must be taken into the account.

Nothing is more economical for a state than not to have borderers; and this is what Sweden has gained by the loss of Finland, and by the acquisition of Norway. The one has relieved her from the formidable vicinity of Russia, the other from contact with Denmark. The diminution of expense compensates for that of revenue. Finland, it is true, yielded more than can be drawn from Norway. But the defence of the former, and the defence against the latter, more than compensated the inequality of the two products. The causes of wars, which are always the occasion of the greatest expenses of states, and in one year absorb many years of revenue, appear to be removed by this insulation of Sweden.

The comparative force, with respect to Denmark, is

augmented, and the relative weakness, in regard to Russia, is diminished; for Sweden, enclosed in the Scandinavian peninsula, is much less exposed to the encroachments of Russia than she was in possessing Finland. The latter has much regretted Sweden; Sweden, in return, has much regretted Finland; as Norway, on her part, has much regretted Denmark; and on all sides, from a sentiment of habit, far more than from reflection; for the best thing that could have befallen these states was, to be as they are, and cease to be as they were.

The new relations of the political existence of Sweden, resulting from its new formation, are highly important. They deserve to be carefully remarked, because in its present state this power will have an influence upon the affairs of Europe which before it was unable to obtain. Not that she will be permitted to see the return of the brilliant days of Gustavus Adolphus or of Charles XII.; days in which the Swedish arms shone with a splendour like that which lately graced the arms of France; which, besides, have had with it the cruel conformity of a Pultawa; it is only intended to present her as entitled to expect a futurity more important than was her position under the pressure of Russia, and in a proportional equality with Denmark; she is enfranchised from the one, and she surpasses the other.

Sweden has no longer any subject of controversy with Prussia, formerly made her enemy by the Swedish possessions in Pomerania; nor with the German empire, to which Sweden is no longer held by any tie. She will have, therefore, at all times, the entire disposal of her forces, 1. For herself; 2. To concur

with the rest of Europe in repressing the two invaders that menace, at the same time, by land and by sea; Russia and England. No one, therefore, has any thing to demand of Sweden in her insulated state; Sweden has nothing to ask of any one; there can exist no situation of peace more decided, more confirmed by the nature of things; nor that could better enable a state to turn all its views towards its internal improvement.

DENMARK.

THIS state is found in a situation nearly similar to that of Sweden. Its weakness does not allow it an active part in policy. It cannot attack Sweden, from which the sea separates it; it could still less encroach upon the German empire, which commences at its gates. Sweden has no longer any thing to demand of it; she would be prevented from it by Russia, by England, in fine by all the world. Denmark is therefore secure of the consistency of its territory and of its peaceable possession. By the late treaties it has been subjected to many sacrifices; and the victim of many evils, of which it was innocent. The policy of Denmark is, therefore, to turn its views towards maritime commerce; as a source of riches and of population. Its position offers it all the means; and will cause it to participate largely in the augmentation of wealth, promised the North of Europe by the emancipation of South America; and by that of the European colonies generally. This emancipation will be the fortune of the shores of the Baltic; whose riches, all circulating upon the coasts of Denmark, cannot fail to leave there traces of their passage, which money usually leaves in the hands in which it has been lodged. Copenhagen is destined to become the necessary emporium of the Baltic, in its commerce with America.

This result is inevitable in the movement of the

commerce which is now opening between America and the north of Europe; and which cannot fail to experience a great increase. Denmark is situated upon the route between the two countries of the world that are destined to make the largest and the most rapid strides; America and Russia. Every vessel carrying to Russia that which she wants, and on returning, laden with her products, must pass by the shores of Denmark. The latter is even better located to receive the tributes of the commercial world; than is the Cape of Good Hope, to profit by the commerce that connects Europe with India; and besides, what a difference, in the activity of the two communications. The vessels in the Baltic will be counted by thousands; when at the Cape a few hundreds will hardly be reckoned. The naval increase, whether commercial or military, in all the states of Europe, will add every day to the value of the commerce of the Baltic, which supplies all its elements; the increasing wealth and population of the north will render more abundant the consumption of the commodities produced in the south of Europe.

Already, within a century, this commerce has increased an hundred fold. When Petersburgh did not exist, or when it had recently sprung from the bosom of marshes; the Russian commerce was very far from being what it is at this day. It will grow in proportion to the improvement of the Russian empire; in proportion to the luxury of the cities that border upon the Baltic; to the taste for luxuries which these nations will acquire in their turn; who by the Baltic communicate with the rest of the universe, and who by navigation may participate in all its productions. The future

commerce of the Baltic is therefore incalculable; and Denmark, occupying the entrance of this sea, cannot fail to be associated to this prosperity, the dawn of which already gleams on the Baltic. It is one of those fortunate positions created by nature to give the fruits of all, without any share of the toil. The futurity of Denmark is therefore altogether commercial. She ought to leave policy to other states; who can only turn it in her favour; while her efforts in policy could only tend against herself; as has been manifested in the course of her alliance with Napoleon. She has the happiness to possess only colonies of little value; and will lose nothing therefore by the general discontinuance of this species of national property; which will inevitably take place; and she will thus be admitted into all the others; this is to gain all for nothing, than which, there is no surer means to become rich.

It is, unfortunately, not usual that the prosperity of others should become the subject of joy. But who could feel wounded at seeing the prosperity of a moral, pacific people; whose name, unstained by ambition, has not for ages been loaded with the weight of an unjust aggression; that has suffered wrongs of an aggravated character; that has been mutilated for a cause in which it had no interest; and that cultivates peace under the government of princes whose virtues would be the apology of the legal despotism which is attributed to them; if despotism could, in any place on the earth, be the object of law or of apology? The materials were wanting to give Denmark the indemnification that had been promised her. The same difficulty always occurs in countries whose fortresses are all occupied by the enemy.

It is impossible to enlarge spaces; the possessors defend them; and treaties remain without the possibility of executing them. Accordingly supplementary conventions have been seen to take place, entered into between Austria and Bavaria. Austria, on resuming her ancient territory, was obliged to pledge herself to procure indemnifications for the state which made her this retrocession. But where were they to be taken, in the midst of a country occupied by princes not parties to these private stipulations; much attached to their possessions; and by as good a right as the contracting parties could have to their own. Baden was designated to furnish the indemnification for territories in the release of which it had no concurrence; thus these two powers had settled between themselves at the expense of a third, who had not been consulted.

The object was to reinstate Bavaria in all that part of the Palatinate which had appertained to her, as she also reinstated Austria in her own. Thus far all went well; but as Baden could not relinquish that which appertained to itself, in the sole view of sanctioning contracts made without its participation; or to procure Bavaria the satisfaction of finding herself re-established in her ancient dominions; as there were no territories ancient or new to give Baden; a controversy has ensued, in which the Grand Duke has published remonstrances, in favour of which justice and nature seem to have conciliated the general interest; and the business has remained in a state of litigation which the great powers are invited to determine.

Denmark has experienced the effects of the same failure of the means of indemnification. The nature of things, in accordance with the better order of Ger-

many, which demands the simplification of the political machinery; with the better order even of Europe, which renders it necessary to fortify the powers that support the burden of maintaining the general system; and to diminish those who are numbered without contributing to it by any real force; should cause Lubeck, Hamburgh, with all the part of the duchy of Lauemburgh, situated to the right of the Elbe, to be adjudged to Denmark.

In the treatise on the Congress of Vienna, we have shewn why, in former times, Hanseatic cities were necessary; and why, in modern times, these ancient emporiums of commerce have become superfluous.

It is found on a near survey, that this arrangement is no better for these cities in particular, than for Germany in general; and that it diminishes the strength of the defence of the north; which, at the present day, ought to be the capital object of the policy of Europe.

This is one of the errors of the congress which the magnitude of some others has screened from the animadversion it deserved. It has escaped in the crowd.

KINGDOM OF THE NETHERLANDS.

EVEN the most lawful and natural grief ought not to impose silence on reason; tears ought not to close up the avenues of sight; so also, with whatever anguish of heart a Frenchman must contemplate a creation which costs so dear to his country; it cannot be forbidden him to examine and to remark, the properties of a state formed by a dismemberment he must so deeply regret. After having paid to sentiment a tribute but too legitimate, let us return to the positive order of the existing policy. It has willed a defensive system in Germany and the north against France; it was believed that these two points had always been left without sufficient defence; and that the multitude of petty principalities situated in this quarter, did not constitute an effectual defence of it against her; thence resulted the creation of the kingdom of the Netherlands; to be complete, this system ought to carry this state to the Rhine.

Since this territory was stripped from France, the new state should have been invested with the entire spoil. With its actual limits, all the eastern part of this kingdom has nothing to support it; and remains equally unprotected against France and against Germany; whereas by the complete possession of this space, the kingdom of the Netherlands would have had only a single front to defend. The Rhine would have separated it from the German powers. It is one

of the failings of policy; in producing great changes she leaves them incomplete; one would say that whatever goes beyond mere sketches fatigues or baffles her art. Diplomatic brains resemble not those of Jupiter; their conceptions are not created armed at all points. Since an idea was conceived of so much elevation as that of giving a defensive barrier to the North; it ought to have been extended to a degree which would have constituted it an efficient force correspondent to its destination; instead of stopping on the road, as has been done.

Here again are met the aberrations of the Congress of Vienna. The creation of the kingdom of the Netherlands in its actual state had preceded the convention of that congress; but Russia having taken the greater part of Prussian Poland; and Prussia by her position being exposed to sustain the first shock of Russia; it became necessary to seek for the latter means of extension correspondent to her losses, as well as to her new exigencies. There presented two of these means; the one, Saxony, in the neighbourhood of Prussia; the other distant from her, that is to say, the vacant parts of Germany; which had formed the ecclesiastical or temporal states between the Meuse and Rhine.

The interest of Europe, in accordance with reason, attributed Saxony to Prussia; and indicated the transportation of the sovereignty of the king of Saxony to the borders of the Rhine; the evil genius of Europe has caused it to be ordered otherwise. It has been his will that the highest considerations of the political order, embracing the eternal security of this country, should have been sacrificed to abstract principles, at

the same moment, violated by other acts of the most solemn character, whose effects are seen by all the world; he has willed that, when the sacrifice of republican states cost not a moment's discussion, the aspect of a monarchy four days old, should inspire an awful respect; as if the rights of some were of an order inferior to those of others; and that legitimacy were merely patrimonial and restricted to families. Venice and Genoa had more of legitimacy than the Saxon monarchy; the infant of Parma was more legitimate at Parma, than Maria Louisa of Austria; and since each resumed his place by the sole authority of ancient possession, it is not seen why some were readmitted with so much facility, whilst others were turned aside with so much rigour. Can any one assign a sufficient reason why the Doge of Genoa, and the infant of Parma, might not have been allowed to resume the seats of which the revolution had deprived them, with altogether as much propriety as the king of Sardinia, the duke of Modona, and the pope were permitted, each to resume theirs? Those on whom it is incumbent to direct the affairs of the world, ought to remain thoroughly persuaded that nothing more distorts the understanding of those they have to direct, than an unequal application of equal principles; and that the eyes of men follow all the movements of the balance they hold in hand, to discover what causes it to incline to one side more than to the other; and still their aberrations excite astonishment, after the model has been furnished them; yet their suspicions excite irritation, when the real causes of them are created by the circumstances continually before their eyes! It is therefore in an espe-

cial manner, the invasion of Poland by Russia that has prevented just proportions being given to the kingdom of the Netherlands. Therein exists the principle of all the disorder of Europe. Such is the first fruit of it, and a foretaste of others. It has produced the necessity of seeking indemnifications for Prussia, for the losses she had sustained. Around her all was taken, occupied, and defended. The obstacles were insurmountable. A necessity was therefore imposed of seeking at a distance for that which could not be given her adjacently: it is this which has brought her upon the Rhine, for there was no room except there. She has transported herself thither at the expense of all, and to her own injury; whereas she would have remained upon the Elbe with utility for others and for herself. This fatal resolution of the Congress of Vienna has marred all. It has given to the whole continental policy a false gait, from which nothing will be able to recover it. Prussia is the citadel of Germany against Russia: this citadel has been divided into two parts, which have no reciprocal adherence; which may create umbrage in a great number of places, but safety nowhere. This is one of the greatest faults that policy has ever committed; ages will scarcely suffice to correct it. If ever circumstance exacted the full exercise of the perspicacity and of the energy of statesmen, assuredly it was that in which the eternal foundation of the establishment of Europe was in agitation: interest commanded them to marshal all the forces of their understanding and of their will, to give this establishment all the solidity required by the protecting order of Europe; which could only be

accomplished by concentrating, by rendering great and compact the Prussian power; Europe's first line of defence against the danger that threatens in the north.

Situated between France and Prussia, in view of England, the kingdom of the Netherlands, locked in between three powers, each of which is stronger than itself, can present nothing to offend. It has no interest but in peace with each individually, and in reciprocal peace between them; for it would be very difficult for it to escape unhurt amidst the explosion of their quarrels. France would defend it against Prussia; Prussia and England against France; the bases of its existence are therefore solid. It ranks in the first class among states of the second order. Nothing should induce it to be jealous of France; this would be a thought unworthy of it; it ought to discover in its position enough to raise it above these vain suspicions.

In the actual state of Europe, with the ever certain succours of England, the author of its existence, and of Prussia its neighbour, it ought to confide in its security against France; it ought to know that she would not incur the dangers of a general war, to wrest from it a few leagues of territory. To triumph over it, it will be necessary to triumph also over all Europe; the army of the kingdom of the Netherlands is not only in Belgium and in Holland, but besides it is found in all the garrisons of Europe, especially in the ports of England: the ramparts of the kingdom of the Netherlands are not only found in the fortresses which strengthen its frontier; but besides they are in all the arsenals of Europe; which would be seen to

pour forth all their destructive contents upon France, at the first movement she should make against this kingdom. According to these considerations of the general system, the degrees of the solidity of this state must be estimated. It constitutes a part of the general European system; it resides under its protection, this system will permit nothing to be retrenched from it: encroachments upon France would not be prohibited this state, so rigorously, as they would be interdicted to France upon it.

Besides, no account is to be made of what is published so widely, relative to the alienation which the two parts of this new union are said to feel towards each other; the true cause of it ought to be known; it should be ascertained how far it extends, and what is its tendency : whether the foundation itself, of the union, is susceptible of being affected by it; or whether it be only the result of those passing clouds that are observable in recent unions; whether it be merely a question of certain restraints created by circumstances, or of certain errors, to be redressed in the administration; all which are matters that may be left to time, and that no-wise impede the movement of a state. Now such is the picture presented by the kingdom of the Netherlands. The government is seated on a level with that of all other countries. All the parts of the machine move harmoniously together under the direction of a superior; abundance exists in the treasury and among the people; the administration discovers no reluctance to any reform, or to any improvement; a few men, a few casts, may perhaps not find themselves placed as they might think they ought to be, according to their imagina-

tion, or their habits of discontent: wherein does this affect a state, or differ from what passes every where? To whom, besides, would these querulous personages appeal? Nay, if the state, of which they complain vaguely, were positively attacked, perhaps they might shew themselves the most zealous in its defence.

The kingdom of the Netherlands will perceive the advancement of its prosperity in the extension of its agriculture and commerce.

One of its parts, Belgium offers the richest theatre of cultivation that exists in Europe. Agriculture will follow the degrees of augmentation experienced by commerce: one never advances without the other. If the kingdoms of the north will gain infinitely by the emancipation of America, this great event will be attended by results not less advantageous for the kingdom of the Netherlands.

The Flemish labourer, the Dutch calculator, the economist of Antwerp, will be associated in all the benefits with which this event is replete for the entire world. All will partake of the harvest of this new field, in proportion to the particular qualities for which each is distinguished. The Dutch colonies in America are points almost imperceptible in the colonial world. Those of the Moluccas must be considered as precarious enjoyments, while England occupies the Cape of Good Hope, and reigns in India, without a rival. Even were they a thousand times more precious, for what is not America a large indemnification? And, besides, in the state of commerce, and relations which bind all nations together, to lose a colony, is almost always to lose merely a nominal, and often a burdensome, sovereignty.

When the genius of commerce is possessed to the degree in which it appertains to the Dutch, do not the colonies of the whole world belong to whoever can render his commerce with them the most advantageous; and procures them, for their productions, the market of the world? Now, in this respect, who can flatter themselves to surpass the Dutch?

The kingdom of the Netherlands has for allies, upon land, England and Prussia: they are its guardians against France; upon the sea, France and neutrals are its allies against England.

The system of this state, as is seen, is double; but much more restricted upon land than upon sea: for on land, it is in contact but at two points; with France and with Prussia: whereas, by sea, it is in contact with all. The kingdom of the Netherlands forms a branch of the maritime confederation, established by the nature of things between all maritime states against the preponderant power; superior to each, in particular, and to all united together.

All the navies of Europe are in permanent alliance against England; as are all the armies of the continent against Russia; and for the same reason, the excess of the superiority of each. These, at present, are the two menacing points; and every thing indicates the importance of never losing sight of them.

The population of the Netherlands, though in a restricted circumference, is destined to acquire very great augmentations. It amounts to seven millions of inhabitants. But as this country is the seat of an excellent culture; and takes a distinguished part in commerce; and as it contains vast spaces still unoccupied; the population will increase by these three causes.

Europe becomes every day more commercial. This is so much sure gain for the Dutch genius, which is eminently commercial. America will offer, every year new commercial advantages; advantages of which it is impossible to assign the term, and of which the Dutch will participate largely. The general commerce takes the direction of the north: Holland is upon its passage, placed in the centre of Europe; it must therefore enjoy the profits of the north and of the south. The increase of the Dutch commerce is, therefore, very certain; and that of its population, as its necessary consequence; for the one cannot advance without the other.

From the gates of Antwerp, and from those of Bergen op Zoom to the Meuse, and from the Yssel to the Ems, vast spaces extend, as yet scarcely visited by cultivation, and which are void of inhabitants; but which will not always be able to elude the action of wealth and of population. Essays are made every day; establishments are formed; encouragements are given by the government; a gradual conversion cannot fail to be made of these moors into fertile fields; under the able and laborious hands of the same men, some of whom have redeemed from the sands, and others from the sea, the animated scenes of cultivation and fertility, which present so cheerful an aspect throughout Belgium and Holland. A numerous population will here find the means of subsistence. The population of the kingdom of the Netherlands cannot therefore, fail to increase greatly, and in as great a ratio, at least, as that of all the countries that environ it; for it is a truth, no one can deny, that population is on the increase in every part of Europe. This re-

sult seems incredible, after five-and-twenty years of continual and terrible wars: it is, however, not the less certain: it flashes in the eyes of all who do not wilfully close them: it is manifest at every step, by the increase of cities and villages; by structures that rise in every part of the country.

This result overwhelms with confusion and despair a class of men who would that the revolution had been a box of Pandora, and a tomb excavated by her for the human race. In their despair at not being able to reproach it with the destruction of the species, they will, at least, enjoy the pleasure of reproaching it with having diminished its numbers.

However unpleasant it may be to have to deny them this gratification, yet it cannot be conceded them; and they must learn that in the whole course of the revolution, population has not ceased to increase; that the revolution repaired by active though imperceptible means, what it consumed on the other hand.

However numerous and repeated the hecatombs of the human race which have been sacrificed during so many years of blood, still the result has disappointed all calculations in favour of humanity. The reason is, that of late years war and its scourges have not acted uncontrolled; superabundant compensations were furnished by a better civilization; which has given the means of repairing and even of overbalancing the losses experienced in other respects.

Too much has been insisted on the multiplication of marriages produced by the laws of the revolution, and the precautions taken by each against war. Assuredly this cause has not been without some effect, but as it has not acted equally in all the countries

where the same increase of population is manifest: to arrive at a solution, recourse must be had to a cause which, by its generality, is of a nature to operate equally every where; and this cause cannot be found but in civilization. The progress of the one can be measured by that of the other; a certain proof of their filiation.

The countries of Europe in which civilization is least advanced, have participated in this progress; but only in proportion to their respective degrees of civilization. Civilized nations have acquired a knowledge of all that tends to promote the salubrity of habitations, of food, and of clothing; these three great means of the preservation of the species; the curative methods, better conceived, have become more conformable to nature; and scourges of a nature to decimate humanity have been arrested; and almost destroyed in their germ; death has been driven from this vast field of his cruel harvests; better attentions given to infancy have preserved it from serious evils; competence has been diffused; lucrative occupations have multiplied; heavy weights have been retrenched from the burdens supported by the people of the different states; vast properties in lands have been divided among colonies of new proprietors; which have become under the hands of persons interested in the success of their cultivation, nurseries of men and granaries for their subsistence; thus that which had furnished the luxury of one only, has become the means of subsistence for a hundred. To this assemblage of causes is to be attributed the increase of population which war has not been able to arrest; causes which, in the future absence of war, that may be

hoped with confidence, when all the social relations will no longer suffer interruption, cannot fail to operate with redoubled energy; and will carry the population of this part of the globe to a maximum that cannot be calculated. This is what renders so vain the terrors betrayed by some governments and some writers, at the existence of some trivial emigrations that are perceptible in certain countries; as if the absence of an hundred thousand men would create a chasm in the whole population of Europe; as if these hundred thousand men, transplanted in other climates, did not take with them the tastes of Europe, and thereby establish relations, the maintenance of which require more hands, and consequently an increase of population; as if a consumer in one country did not instantly create a producer in another; as if the inhabitants which Europe has furnished the new world, in the course of the last three centuries, had not contributed by their commercial correspondence to the augmentation of European population. Ten millions, five-and-twenty millions of consumers in America, must have occasioned the birth of as many producers in Europe. Such are the secret ties, concealed, as it were, in the gauzy tissue of society, which it is essential to trace, in order to appreciate truly what passes in their bosom, and to prevent the errors that will deceive those who judge only from appearances.

PRUSSIA.

As placed by the Congress of Vienna, Prussia stretches one of her arms to the gates of Thionville, upon the Moselle, and the other to Memel, upon the Niemen, the frontier of Russia; the body that should unite these two members is to be sought for.

There are three Prussias; the first in Poland, the second in Germany, the third between the Meuse and Rhine. The first is extended along the Russian frontier, which runs upon all this flank; Russia presses also upon her front in Silesia; the third is situated at the corner of France; there is nothing compact, with the exception of the German part; but this part is separated from the third by the interposition of the sovereignties of Saxony, of Hanover, and of Hesse. The first attack of Russia would separate the first part from the body of the monarchy; which would, besides, be held in check upon its front by the Russian armies assembled in Poland; the first attack of France would deprive it of all the grand duchy of the Rhine; and, in a war against Austria, Prussian Silesia would have to sustain the weight of all the Austrian power, at liberty to move and bear upon it from all the points of that monarchy; for Austria has no dangerous neighbour either in Italy or in Germany. It is plainly impossible, therefore, to accumulate more embarrassments than Prussia has done; or to comprise

a greater number of vulnerable points. Prussia is, out of all proportion, too feeble against each of the three powers in her immediate vicinity, Russia, France, and Austria.

There will always be found, therefore, a degree of constraint and dependance in her situation, resulting from the inferiority of her position; and this position, which neither permits a complete developement, nor a perfectly free action, is the worst of all for a great state. Prussia, in future, can only make wars of alliance, 1. With the rest of Europe against Russia; 2. With the kingdom of the Netherlands against France; 3. With Russia against Austria; but, in this case, which would be the most dangerous, the ally or the enemy?

The position of Prussia is, therefore, absolutely false, under all its relations; and this disastrous position is the effect, 1. Of the invasion of Poland by Russia; 2. Of the sanction given it by the congress of Vienna. The augmentation of Russia rendered still more evident the necessity of strengthening Prussia; she ought not to be found in a state inferior to that she occupied before the change; she had lost almost all the grand duchy of Warsaw, as well as the Polish part of Bialistok. It was requisite to give her, at the same time, an indemnification for her losses; and an equivalent for the augmentations acquired by Austria and Russia; there were but two means of providing them, Saxony; or the countries vacant between the Meuse and Rhine. The interest of Europe designated the choice of the first as an exigency of primary necessity for the general security; dropping from what clouds I know not, legitimacy caused

it to fall upon the countries of the Rhine; thus the whole policy of Europe acquired a false bias. France will have to reproach herself eternally for the efforts she made in this circumstance; the mistake aimed its first blow at her; she has already felt its effects, and she will encounter them often. The duchy of the Rhine will make Prussia for France what Silesia had made her for Austria. How, in these moments of lasting importance, when it was a question of founding the liberties of Europe, of fortifying its approaches against the dangers that soon or late will infallibly arrive from the direction of the North, how was it possible to hesitate a moment? A more fatal disregard of the common safety could never have been committed.

This preponderant influence of Russia is already seen. She has already filled the place of France, with respect to Europe. If her sovereign spreads the veil of his personal virtues over the dangers of his power, and tempers the excess of the one by the greatness of the others, the preponderance exists not the less; the instrument is created, and the common fate will depend on the employment the hands, into which it may happen to fall, may please to make of it: an alarming perspective, whose dangers should have been diverted at any sacrifice! Prussia is the first exposed to sustain the weight of the Russian power. The first blow will inevitably fall upon her. Berlin is only a few leagues from the Russian frontiers. Royal Prussia is a sort of wedge locked in by Russia. In any war between the two states, this country would be taken by the rear, together with all that should attempt to defend it. The Prussian fortresses, upon the Oder, are

small, and would be masked by a part of the Russian armies, whilst the others marched to the capital.

Prussia cannot, therefore, defend herself with her own means, against Russia; consequently, on this side, Europe is unprotected. In case of war against Russia, Prussia would act with the confederation of Lower Germany, Hesse, Hanover, and Mecklenburgh. But will the bond of this confederation have the same force in all its parts? Will the associates all feel an equal interest? Will it not be enfeebled or swerved by dissensions, by fears, by the difference of the proximity of dangers, by affinities with the common enemy? for Russia has penetrated into the secondary courts of Germany; and labours to establish herself there by alliances which cannot fail to be courted, as those offered by the family of Napoleon were, and would have been more and more, already very forward in German alliances: policy, soothed the murmurs of pride, and power imposed silence on the laws of heraldry, so dear to Germany.

Prussia, to be in a condition to guard, effectually, the avenues of Germany against Russia, must be sustained by France and the kingdom of the Netherlands. These two states compose the *reserve* of Europe against Russia, and her van-guard against England; but the neighbourhood of Prussia will always more or less affect France, in a manner to deprive her alliance, which can only exist in extreme cases, of that entire frankness and alacrity of succour, that distance would have secured on her part. This succour, therefore, no longer refers to Prussia, but to the barrier against Russia. On the separation of France and of Prussia, by great distances, depended the alliance of the two

states; and their alienation is found inseparable from their approach. In policy, would you produce union? Separate; place far apart. Would you create separation? Approach.

This is what has been done for Prussia, with respect to France, by giving her an establishment at the gates of the latter.

France, also, has soon had a foretaste of the sweets of this neighbourhood, in the demand of Sarrelouis. It was natural that Prussia should covet it, and vastly more. She has been placed by the side of France, under the cannon of French fortresses, without any defensive point; it was altogether natural that she should desire to acquire some point of support against a first attack; and Sarrelouis could not be refused, at a time when intreaties had become necessary to save the bridge of *Jena*.* France began to feel there all the extent of the fault committed at Vienna; by the high protection openly granted to Saxony, and by the application of an abstraction, intruded into this affair.

Prussia beyond, or Prussia on this side of the Rhine, is no longer the same power, in regard to France; and this fatal transposition has left them both without sincere allies; for, unable to employ them mutually, they both equally want them. France could have no other ally but Prussia: and, on her part, Prussia could have no other than France. Their juxtaposition has dissolved the cement that had united them.

This partition of Prussia is so vicious in itself, that it appears to be one of the obstacles to which this state owes its inability to enjoy the constitution which

* A new bridge over the Seine.

had been promised it. The distance of places are alleged, and the differences they establish between interests and manners; no greater correspondence is found to exist between the inhabitants of Treves and Aix-la-Chapelle; than there was between those of Hamburgh and of Rome, whom Napoleon brought together at Paris; and even in this case, the moral alienation was much less considerable; for, by the state of civilization, the relations between Hamburgh and Rome, are much more numerous than they can be between Elbing and Treves. In this arrangement, therefore, of the Prussian monarchy, all has been inconsiderateness, danger for Europe, and privation of strength for itself. Succeeding ages will feel its weight, and will reproach the congress with its consequences.

Before this political subversion, the direction of Prussia consisted, 1. In opposition to Austria; 2. In the protection of the Protestant league in Germany; or rather in the protection of Germany itself against Austria; 3. In alliance with France. The latter departed from it in the war of 1756, but to her great disadvantage.

In the actual state of things all is changed; it is no longer against Austria that there can be any necessity of defence, but against Russia; it is no longer Silesia, but Europe, that should be the object of solicitude. Dangers are augmented, and have changed place; they have substituted the necessity of alliance for that of enmity; Prussia and Austria are invited by an equal and common interest to oppose Russia; whatever the one might lose, by strengthening Russia, the other would lose with her: the weakening of the one would be that of the other, and always to the

profit of the common enemy. His presence upon the frontiers of the two powers has rendered necessary to each other, and inseparable, these ancient rivals.

Austria will no more attempt invasions upon the Germanic body; no future wars of Bavaria will be seen. It would be only in case of a violent eruption of ambition on the part of Austria, a case not probable, that Prussia would have to separate from her: until then she ought to make it her chief study to strengthen the ties which attach her to this state.

Since the war of 1756, Prussia has always acted in concert with the states of lower Germany, royal Saxony excepted. Brunswick, Mecklenburgh, Hanover, the states of Hesse, the ducal houses of Saxony, have always marched by her side. This alliance is of a nature capable of maintaining itself, though attacked by principles of dissolution of later date. Since 1795, Prussia, by virtue of the treaty of Basle, covered all these states by the line of demarcation; thereby rendering them an important service; for these states enjoyed seven years of peace amidst the conflagration of the rest of Germany.

Prussia numbers a population of twelve millions of inhabitants. This population will experience great augmentation, from the same causes which are propelling that of all the countries of Europe. This increase will take place principally upon the Prussian coasts of the Baltic; destined to become the centre of an immense commerce, especially by the revolution of America.

This part of Prussia must inevitably take a great part in it. Besides, she possesses great tracts of uncultivated lands in all the extent of country situated

between the Rhine and the Oder. The wealth produced by the extension of commerce will change these deserts into fertile fields; and consequently cover them with a numerous population.

In time the Prussian population will rise very high, without however rivalling that of the great states in its vicinity, Austria, Russia and France; which depart from points much more elevated.

Prussia is a nursery of excellent soldiers; taken as a whole, this state forms a species of military school. The division of its parts will require that also of its forces; and, consequently, compel it to continue them upon a more considerable establishment than a greater compactness of its territory would have demanded. Prussia has to make head upon three principal points; Russia, Austria, and France. Concentration is no more possible in her army than in her territory. This army must serve her instead of fortresses; be present at the same time every where; and consequently must be very numerous. As it will have to guard on all sides, and as the multiplicity of points of contact multiplies the occasions of contest, it must be always prepared to march. The armies of other states, more secure in their neighbourhood, have more chances of stability and of repose. The maintenance of so numerous an army will occasion a burdensome expense to Prussia. She is not opulent; her greatest wealth is her economy; and it will be impossible for her to make war without subsidies. In the ancient system they came alternately from France or from England, but especially from the latter; who has always more money than soldiers to give the continent. It follows from this statement that Prussia is

not to be envied the advantages which the Congress of Vienna has conceded her; for they involve great embarrassments, and of a nature to impede her action continually. They condemn this power to a state of eternal vigilance, and an attitude of defence against all; subject herself to the umbrage of all; for her want of acquisitions is so evident, that she may always be supposed to hope or covet them. It is by its nature an expectant power.

AUSTRIA.

WHAT dangers has not Austria encountered, during the tempest of twenty years she has sustained! What toils has she not endured before she was permitted to repose in the haven she is seen to occupy! What a vigorous body, and what constancy! Her resources have seemed to increase in proportion as her territory was restricted; she had the appearance of acquiring, or rather of receiving, instead of losing. The peace of Presburgh deprived her of the Venetian state, the Tyrol, of all her insulated possessions in Suabia, in Brisgaw, and in Switzerland: she appeared at Wagram stronger than before. The peace of Vienna finally despoils her of a part of her ancient domains, and gives her for neighbour the kingdom of Illyria, composed of her shreds; far from being dejected, she reappeared in the coalition with new and more numerous forces. It might be said that her fields are sown with the teeth of that dragon which caused the earth to yield harvests of weapons and of warriors. War appeared to be her element; her territory a manufactory of men; and her breast to be covered by a cuirass impenetrable to adversity. A solitary example in the world of the force of perseverance and of habit. Austria owes nothing to genius,* which seems to inspire her with fear still

* The present emperor of Austria excels principally in the manufacture of sealing wax; which is said to have been his occupation when the French were at the gates of Vienna, in the war which terminated in the surrender of Maria Louisa.

more than with desire. Imagination neither sustains, nor torments her: but in a gradual movement like that of time, without shock as without parade; without precipitation as without noise; as a man, who by travelling each day a limited distance, would not the less accomplish, at length, his voyage round the world; so Austria in continual action, though slow, tends to one object, never loses sight of it, and finally attains it. Better fitted to blunt the shafts of adversity, than to create the chances which become the sources of great prosperity. Austria conducts her affairs with the quiet modesty of private fortunes; and like them, her fortunes flourish when some more brilliant, sink and disappear. Her territory is immense; the material of her power, without known limits, inexhaustible in men, in horses, in means of subsistence; insensible to a state of finances which elsewhere would compromise the state; moving in penury, as others in abundance; she pursues her march through these aberrations, without declension, as without amendment.

The stability which is found in the state, is met also in the ranks of society; even ambition is regular and shuns the sallies, or the splendour, of which the examples are so common elsewhere: all its routes are traced by the line; and in this career, as in other countries upon the roads, the miles may be counted.

Austria is a country of order, formed by habit. Manners have created it; they sustain it; and, the activity with which the blood circulates in this country, does not menace it.

During three hundred years Austria has been almost always in arms. The greatest reverses were

always for her a prelude to the greatest prosperity, and the introduction to an augmentation of power. The protestant league and the Swedes attack her, and cause her to tremble; Ferdinand II. re-establishes her solidity, and restores her the domination of Germany.

The Hungarians and Turks dismember, and prepare to crush her; they are before Vienna; and, from this point of depression, Leopold sets out to balance and check the fortune of Louis XIV. Maria Theresa is, at one moment, without the patrimony of her fathers, and without a refuge; a few years after, she overshadowed vast countries with a majestic and formidable figure. Three times in the space of ten years, her grandson saw his capital menaced, or rather invaded; Belgium escapes from his grasp; Venice, given for its ransom; the Milanese, and the ancient inheritances of his fathers, are taken from him; four years after, all is reconquered, garnished by precious accessories; so great in Austria is the force of persevering regularity; and that of a soil exuberant in productions.

It is the union of these different elements which constitutes the robust temperament of Austria. Whoever purposes to contest her, should commence by reflecting that he will find men immoveable in their line; insensible to adversity, over whom it has no more power than imagination; and a soil inexhaustible, that will furnish the exigencies of a long contest; and that he will have to combat at once both nature and men. This consideration induced Frederic II. to conclude the peace of Hubertsburgh; struck, as a man of his genius must have been, at seeing op-

posed to him, after seven years of defeats, the new armies of Maria Theresa, more firmly constituted than those with which he had strewn so many fields of battle.

When, since 1800, France had become the dominant power in the west of Europe, Austria, apprized by costly experience of the dangers of contact with this giant, embraced the system called *oriental*; that is to say, that of keeping at a distance from France, and from every place subject to her influence, to fortify herself on the side of Turkey. The return of the ancient system, in consequence of the reduction of France within her ancient limits, has brought Austria back to her former policy; that of extending herself in Italy by the entire renunciation of Belgium. By the peace of Vienna in 1809, the frontier of Austria had been restricted to the Inn, in Germany, on the side of Bavaria; and to the Saave, on the side of Italy; she lost the Tyrol and Saltzburgh, united to Bavaria. This state became stronger than it had ever been; it thus acquired a defensive barrier against Austria. The creation of the kingdom of Westphalia, of the grand duchy of Frankfort, and the confederation of the Rhine, had excluded Austria from the policy of Germany.

All this has disappeared in a day; and, with the exception of some vain titles, and a few inconsiderable domains, Austria has resumed her ancient existence in Germany.

From the moment the Germanic empire was created anew, she necessarily resumed her ancient place; consequently, as before the change, she occupies all the space comprehended between the lake of Con-

stance and the gates of Belgrade; between Alexandria upon the Tanaro and the frontiers of Turkey. This space is very extensive, peopled by inhabitants of various origin, without reciprocal relations or affections. Austria resembles a confederation of different states, rather than a single state. A common sovereignty with a different country; where the prince and the subjects are united by a common tie, which does not extend to the subjects between themselves; thus the Hungarian and the Italian may be equally attached to the sovereign of Austria, without the mutual connexion which exists between the inhabitants of Bohemia and of Austria.

The population of Austria amounts to thirty millions of inhabitants. This equals that of France, and exceeds what Austria has ever possessed. This population is destined to increase greatly, especially in all the Polish, Hungarian, and Sclavonian parts; which offer great vacant tracts, in which the means of subsistence are very abundant. The population of Austria being entirely continental, can only increase by agriculture; whose effects are always less rapid than those of commerce and of navigation. Besides, Austria will participate less directly in the advantages of the emancipation of America; because she has but a small number of ports; which, besides, are situated upon a sea remote from the route of the great commerce. The name of gulph is well applied to the Adriatic; as if to apprize that it is not to be considered altogether as a sea. It seems to exist chiefly for the inhabitants of its shores; and Austria occupies only a part of it.

The protectorate of Corfu, and the other Ionian

islands, having, in reality, given these islands to England; this position being supported by that of Malta, appropriates the Adriatic to England, and renders it, in effect, an English roadstead.

Austria is mistress of Italy. Venice, the Milanese, the Alexandrin, are her immediate domains. Parma must revert to her; an Austrian prince reigns in Tuscany; another is expected at Modena; is not this being completely the master in Italy? for, in comparison with this, the few other powers which exist there are as nothing. Austria has taken, therefore, in this country the place recently occupied by France; in this great change, there has only been a transportation of the seat of power from the shores of the Mediterranean to those of the Adriatic; the only remarkable difference is, that the French occupation did not exclude a great Italian power, such as resulted from the creation of the kingdom of Italy; the certain prelude of a more extensive creation, that of all Italy in a single sovereignty; the French sovereignty momentarily exercised over Italy, prepared the eternal liberty of the Italians, by causing it to be known and valued in this beautiful region; on the contrary, the Austrian domination confirms its annihilation, and gives to the dependence of Italy the seal of eternity. By this the ancient tomb that began to open has been closed anew; by this, the country which held the world in chains, is sentenced to bear eternally the yoke of others.

The sacrifice of Italy, of this so illustrious, so interesting a portion of Europe, so full of monuments and recollections, what claims has it not upon every breast friendly to the order of human society, and sensible to the woes of humanity!

This unfortunate country has been, of late, the theatre of great violations of this nature. If this invasion of nations, and giving them for the benefit of strangers, would admit of excuse, it could only be that of the necessity of strengthening Austria against Russia; which should also be done for Prussia, since the pressure against both is equal; efforts are required to render their burden less oppressive, and to give them the means to guard more effectually the avenues of Europe; for, henceforth, this charge will devolve on these two powers.

To this fatal augmentation, therefore, of Russia, it is always necessary to return whenever any disorder in the establishment of continental Europe is perceived; it is felt in Italy as in Germany; in the kingdom of the Netherlands as in the Milanese. It has deranged every thing in the political system; and as in the shock of bodies, the first impulse communicates itself to all the chain of contiguous bodies in swift succession; so in the new order of Europe, the steps made by Russia towards the centre of this region, have forced Austria and Prussia to make correspondent movements on their part. All has become displaced in consequence of a primary combination incompatible with the good order of the rest.

The enmities of Austria against France and Prussia are at an end; the enemy is no longer on this side; the enmities between powers exist not in hearts, but in interests.

At this day Francis I. and Charles V. would be seen to embrace; as also Frederic and the emperor Joseph; because all the motives of their ancient hatreds are dissipated and replaced by very active mo-

tives of union. There is no longer an Austrian Belgium, no longer a house of Austria controlling the Germanic body; France has no longer, therefore, reason to fear Austria; in Italy, the state of Piedmont and the Alps are two barriers fitted to continue their interests widely separated. All the causes of their ancient divisions have, therefore, disappeared. Prussia, on her part, has nothing to demand of Austria; the saying of Joseph, "*there is no longer a Silesia*," has been realized; it is become the axiom of Austria. On the side of Austria, Prussia will, in future, only have to preserve what she has acquired. She could not attack her without rendering herself more feeble against Russia. Single, she can effect nothing against Austria; will she form alliance with Russia? but would not this enormous fault be punished instantly by the desertion, as by the reproaches of all Germany, and of the rest of Europe; to whom she would be justly responsible for the diminution of strength that would result from this desertion of the general interests, in favour of the common enemy!

It cannot be doubted that, in future, all connexion with Russia will have the appearance of a conspiracy against the rest of Europe; and should Prussia ever unite with Russia against Austria, this combination will be attributed to the darkest recollections, and to the most sinister projects.

When Turkey yet retained some energy, she gave occupation to Austria; as Prussia has likewise done, since the former has been eclipsed.

From the time of Soliman the Great to the days of Maria Theresa, the Turks have given much employment to Austria: but, sunk in the deepest slumber,

obstinately resisting all civilization, and all progress in the human understanding, these *quietists* are no longer formidable to any. There is one way only to have nothing to fear from them; this is never to set foot amongst them; for, in that case, they would be seen like the Spaniards, to pass from this profound repose to the most terrible awakening. Such is the character of Orientals and of Africans, who never go from home but whom it is also temerity to visit.

Italy will be more productive for Austria in tributes than in soldiers. Her exactions will not be made in the form of conscriptions; a strong body of Italian troops would excite her distrust; the difference of manners, and of language, would present obstacles to the incorporation, with utility, of Italians in Polish, German, or Hungarian corps.

This intermixture would be unnatural; and who would not commiserate Italians transplanted upon the ramparts of Temeswar, and Peters-Waradin; with ears accustomed to the harmonious voices of Ausonia, compelled to listen to the howlings of Turks; condemned to combat with Cossacs, and all the hordes that flock from the deserts of Scythia! What a barbarous transplantation! What a cruel destiny; and how can we refrain from commiserating, from the bottom of the heart, those for whom it may be reserved!

GERMAN EMPIRE.

THIS ancient empire was wrecked during the wars of Napoleon. Austria abandoned a title, which had caused her much vexation, and added little to her real power; it had created her more enemies than servants; and as the sword is always the emblem of the Cesars, this empire was found on the side of the strongest sword; consequently, the protector of the confederation of the Rhine had become, in reality, the regent of the new German empire. This confederation extended on the south, from the Rhine to the Inn; on the north, from the Rhine to the Elbe. In this new order, the number of sovereignties being diminished, added a new principle of strength: those which remained had become more important. They were more compact, as well as less broken by including the territory of others; a second principle of strength and of peace. No mixture of Austrian or Prussian possessions was remarked in them: and, consequently there was more liberty for the princes of these different states. Austria commenced at the Inn, and at the Saltza; Prussia, at the Elbe. It ceased to be as in times past, and as at present, when these powers have possessions in Germany every where, and frontiers, no where. The kingdom of Westphalia; the grand dutchies of Francfort, and of Wurtzburgh; the

three states, of Bavaria, of Baden, and of Wurtemburgh, replaced the patch-work of sovereignties that had covered Germany. This country resembled a garment formed of shreds, and shaded with different colours. By the confederation of the Rhine, this number was diminished, and the tint had acquired uniformity. Perhaps even, the number of these sovereignties continued still too great: for example, the utility of a grand dutchy of Francfort was not perceptible; and assuredly its creation in the mind of Napoleon had more reference to sentiments of personal affection for him he invested with it, than to a real political combination: a mode of operation of infinite danger, that of substituting affections, and sentiments, to calculations of political order. The latter being of a durable nature, admits not of motives whose nature, on the contrary, is transitory and evanescent.

The confederation had scoured Germany of a residue of its anarchical rust, the immediate principalities: they were to Germany, what the exemptions from the jurisdiction of ordinaries were to the religious order; embarrassments, and nothing more. States, such as those of Bavaria and of Wurtemburgh, contributed much more to render Germany strong and imposing; than a congregation of nominal princes, without states, without subjects, burdensome to the trivial number they possessed; whose entire existence referred to themselves, without any relation to the public order. Nothing in the world was less interesting than these petty princes. Their suppression meliorated also the moral state of Germany; for thereby numberless causes of divisions disappeared, local affections diminished, views and ideas were enlarged,

the German soil became more the soil of country. Commerce gained equally by this suppression, which is cramped by narrow limits, and prospers most in wide spaces; such as are formed by great sovereignties, enfranchised from the multiplicity of barriers, raised by the diversity and multiplicity of sovereignties.

It is true that Austria and Prussia had disappeared from the German confederation; but did these powers add to its real force? Did not their divisions tend to diminish it? By their constant opposition, had they not dissolved the ties of German union; were not they the cause that in Germany there were no longer Germans, but only Prussians and Austrians; and much fewer of the latter than of the former: for it cannot be disguised that the greatest part of Germany leaned towards Prussia, as towards its point of support and defence against Austria. These two powers, independent of the empire, did they consider themselves as existing for it, in the same degree that it should exist for them? Was it for herself that each of them seemed to cling to it still, more than not to have the appearance of yielding it to others? Thus we may measure the degree of interest with which it had inspired Austria, by the willingness she discovered to detach from it, and, as it were, *to lay down the empire*: as by the little eagerness she has shewn to resume the burden of her ancient rank in Germany. It might be asked, though the solution of the problem be not difficult, if a collection of sovereigns of a secondary order, had a greater interest in submitting to a tutelage, from which it was impossible, in any case,

to withdraw, on the part of great powers agitating continually in the midst of it; than in accepting the protection of a power separated from it, not interfering with its interior, and having no direct interest with it? The latter protection, is it not, by its nature, more disinterested and more personal for the client?

This question of the German confederation is more complicated than it seems to be, at the first glance. It has been resolved of late, in the same manner that so many others have been, by irritation, or by inconsideration; both bases of bad calculations. The military and contributive dictatorship of Napoleon would have found a term: it was not of a nature to endure for ever: for after an establishment is consolidated, it is not natural to act, as at the moment of its formation; when fears are dissipated, as when they betray themselves on all sides; when the edifice is completed, as in the time of its construction. Napoleon was building. He associated the confederation of the Rhine to his labours; because it was associated to his general system, and was to share the fruits of it. Assuredly the confederation would have enjoyed in this system a better fate than that which it owes to the new. Bavaria would not have lost all that Austria has recovered; she would have had frontiers: the state of Baden would not have been subject to the molestations it has experienced.

The system of Napoleon had evidently two branches; 1. A guarantee for France against the coalition of Prussia, of Austria, and of Russia; 2. The establishment of a barrier against Russia. Napoleon had Russia and her dangers always in view; his hostility

was not personal to Russia, but in the cause of Europe.

Two principles constantly governed and directed him; the necessity of arresting the English power upon sea, and the power of Russia upon the continent. He considered its extent and dangers for others as well as for himself. The event has fully justified this calculation; for he has fallen by the shafts lanced from these two bows, which he was unable to unstring. In these two relations, the plans of Napoleon were even more European than French; it was neither ambition nor hatred by which he was animated against Russia; he had nothing to gain personally in a war with her: he had received no injuries from her; he had nothing to fear from her; personally he bore sentiments of high respect and esteem towards her sovereign: he was actuated alone by an European sentiment; that which caused him to feel the necessity of placing at the gates of Russia barriers of sufficient strength to arrest the torrent; he had located them in places the most suitable to this employment; and committed them to hands the most interested to defend them; and therefore the most sure. The plan was vast, and salutary for all; sound in principle, but disorderly in its execution: source of safety for Europe, and of ruin for its author. It must be left for time to reveal whether Germany will find it better to meet the advanced posts of Russia upon the Oder, and the frontiers of Moravia, than upon the Dnieper and the Dwina; whether she will be better defended by little sovereignties in great number, than by great in little number. Therein lies the whole question

respecting Germany. The Germanic body is by its nature in a state of perpetual tutelage; it always needs a protector against some state or other.

Sweden, France, Prussia, have successively exercised this protectorate. France occupied it with prepotence by the confederation of the Rhine. The height of the protection was compensated by its solidity; and, (since Germany is devoted to a state of eternal pupillage,) it might as well have been that of France as any other.

The congress of Vienna has re-established, not the ancient empire, but a confederation, in Germany; for the empire, speaking properly, has disappeared; there is no longer an emperor of Germany; but the body remains after the disappearance of its chief, and survives the loss of its head.

The population, comprehended in the confederation, equals thirty millions of inhabitants. A federal bond unites its members; common laws regulate all the parts of the association, determine supplies, assess contributions, provide the means of defence and those of execution.

Germany, placed between France and Russia, must keep on her guard against them both; she can effect nothing against Russia directly, with whom she is not in contact; and who, on her part, could not reach Germany till after having overthrown the armies of Prussia and of Austria; in this direction these two powers are the outworks of the German empire; this is what ought to continue it so strictly united with them; for if they were to succumb in the conflict with Russia, it would be overwhelmed. Upon the Rhine, the

contact with France creates for Germany the necessity of a different system. On this side she must act in person. Too many recollections invite Germany to multiply her precautions; thus she will form a large federal army; she will erect fortresses to rival those of France; she will oppose Landau, Mayence, Luxembourg, and other ramparts besides, to the girdle of fortifications with which France is strengthened upon this frontier; thus, by continuing to cover themselves with ramparts judiciously distributed, they will become finally insulated, and reciprocally out of the reach of attack. It is clear that the suspicions of Germany will, during a long time, be directed against France; it is the consequence of all that has passed in the course of the last twenty years; past injuries excite vigilance against their renewal. As yet, Russia has only been felt as the means of liberation; the princes reinstated by the coalition, the princes emancipated by it, and freed from the tutelage of Napoleon, may think themselves bound to show much gratitude towards Russia, as well as much rancour and umbrage against France; these two sentiments will not soon be effaced, and the policy of Germany will be warped by them. The confederation is raising a considerable army; this barrier also is marshalled against France, not to conquer, but to hold her excluded from the general policy; which, in future, will be arranged in Germany, between Russia, Prussia, and Austria; it is this triumvirate of power which will decide every thing in time to come, upon the continent.

The persevering remonstrances of the ex-princes, are the thorns of the internal policy of Germany; they

are met every where, with their pretensions and their complaints; a political excrescence, occupied exclusively with their personal existence; they weary and embarrass both princes and people; their agony is as clamorous as their lives were obscure; and they present to the world the scandalous spectacle of the combat of the feudal and useless sovereignty—against the sovereignty that is social and necessary.

FRANCE.

OH grief! to see banished to an extremity of Europe, as if exiled, as if proscribed, receiving her laws and destinies from others, the power which for fifteen years has given the word of command to Europe! Napoleon, what hast thou made of us? how had we deserved to see thee enrich with objects which had cost us so dear, those who are about to become our oppressors? how couldst thou forget that there are ranks which must be retained under the penalty of a precipitous fall; that the excess of power has no safeguard but in the continuance of power; and that oppression is always the vengeance that awaits oppression; thou hast condemned us to the reaction of the world; and what all reaction brings with it need not be told!

Napoleon was the key of the vault, in the new edifice that was erected in Europe; when he fell, the whole structure was necessarily involved in his ruin.

Never did greater interests repose upon one head; never head appeared less to feel their importance. By this neglect, the world and the human intellect have been compromised.

An ever memorable example of the imprudence of nations who place their destiny, *like an annuity*, upon the fortune or the genius, however brilliant, of a sin-

gle man; a cruel lesson, well fitted to teach them to take a near survey of the manner in which affairs are transacted amongst them.

The French empire comprised more than forty-two millions of inhabitants.

France at present may contain thirty millions.

The French empire enjoyed a revenue of eleven hundred millions of francs.

France has, of certain revenue, six hundred and fifty millions.

Never did a state lose so much at once. It is the first time since the reign of Henry IV. that France has retrograded, or lost an inch of ground upon the continent.

Cardinal de Fleury, when more than eighty years of age, a pacific and unarmed conqueror, added Lorrain to the ancient domains of France; and Louis XV., never reproached for the love of conquest and aggrandizements, acquired Corsica.

I am aware it is said that these acquisitions were conquests, and conquests of the revolution; which rendered them odious to some, and indifferent to others. But I would fain learn what America is for Spain, India for England, Poland for Russia and her fellow partitioners. Is there not also something to object to the *certificates of origin* of these possessions; and if the acquisitions of France dated not quite from the transactions of the golden age; it appears, that, even in the others also, there might be found some traces of the age of iron. But such is the measure of the judgments pronounced upon the events of the last five-and-twenty years. All is estimated by public clamour, and the word revolution seems to have dis-

pensed with the duty, or deprived of the faculty, of reasoning.

It is not here intended to rouse regrets or to exasperate irritations; far from that; it is destined only to awaken the sentiments which the spectacle of great catastrophes, whether they overwhelm states, or whether they affect individuals, is fitted to inspire. Men, in too great numbers, without France as well as within, have suffered by these triumphs, or profited by these reverses; sometimes they are irritated against her because she has been great without them; let them learn by their own regrets to share those of a great people; and, returning to themselves, let them listen to the voice that reminds them of the words of the most tender of poets:

Sunt Lacrymæ rerum et mentem mortalia tangunt.

France appertains to neither of the divisions which form the political state of Europe. By her geographical position she is detached from them both; her territory, her population, her language, have little conformity with the corresponding particulars that are remarked to the north, and to the south of this country. The division of the north extends to the banks of the Rhine, and continues till it expires at the feet of the Alps.

This space includes the nations of the north, and of Germany; who have more affinity with each other than with the inhabitants of the south. The division of the south commences at the Alps, and at the Pyrenees. There, are found other manners, another sky, other productions; all as foreign to France as to Germany. France forms, as it were, the shade which marks the gradation of the people that inhabit the

north to those of the south. The French bear no greater resemblance to the one than to the other. It suffices to remark the conformation of a Frenchman, to hear him speak, to observe him when he moves and acts, to recognise in him a member foreign to the families of the north and of the south.

France is very populous; and experience proves that she will still increase in population; what has taken place throughout Europe, manifests itself equally in France; she is not less liberally endowed by nature than the other states with which she shares the benefits of increasing civilization. This is a practical truth no longer contested, but by the men who are indignant that the revolution should not have combined all kinds of wrongs; and who would be pleased to have a right to accuse it of having excavated the tomb of the human race, with the exception of their own. However afflicting this truth may appear to this class of men, it is not the less certain; one thing only remains to be determined, and this is of importance to France; to ascertain the proportion of this increase, as it compares with that of other nations.

The wealth of France is very great, and must be still greater. The country that furnishes Europe a part of the enjoyments most essential to her gratification, will be associated in the prosperity of other nations. Of this a judgment may be formed by the sum of the tributes paid by Europe to the attractions of her climate, of her arts, of the multiplied charms of her capital. These tributes exceed annually the sums that France became obligated to pay, temporarily, to strangers. But the latter were, by nature of a limited

duration; and the nature of the others is to increase progressively. They will more than compensate the inequality of the commercial balance that France has lost with her colonies: it is Europe, and especially England, that is now the colony of France: this country is a thousand times more visited by strangers than it was before the revolution: and, as the French feel not the same desire to see and to transport themselves out of their country, they retain the profits attached to the successive rotation of the passage, and of the stay, of strangers amongst them.

To this must be added the developements, and the elasticity, that France will owe to the new springs of action she has lately acquired, and which manifest themselves in her bosom; liberty and industry. The latter, it cannot be denied, each day makes rapid advances: liberty, who fructifies all, will not be more sterile for France than she is for all those who exercise their talents under the shelter of her tutelary alters. Genius, free to display itself is always creative: as I have said before, it acts in every direction, and from each of its excursions brings home some new harvest. If all the arbitrary, restrictive, and oppressive governments have, during so many ages, been unable to prevent the French genius from creating so many master-pieces; what may not be expected from it, when, under the auspices of a government whose essence is liberty, it may develop all its faculties, and reap the reward of its efforts!

Since the reign of Francis I. the epoch of the outline of a political system in Europe, France has always exercised a great influence upon the continent. Opposed from that period to the house of Austria, which

reigned in Spain, in Italy, in a part of Germany, France naturally was placed at the head of those, and their number was not small, who had reason to fear this colossus. Francis I. in spite of religious prejudices, which at that time had so much power, made alliance with Soliman against Charles V.—The Catholic prince, who gave the example of burning protestants at home, united with the Turks against the Catholic emperor, who consumed himself in efforts against the same protestants. Francis was at the same time his ally against them, and that of the Turks against him; receiving thus from policy a double direction, and as it were, a double existence. The wars of religion, by restricting the attention of France to her internal agitations, detached her during a long time from the general policy.*

She resumed her place in it, under Henry IV. and took a larger part in its transactions than at any former period; under the able inspiration of this prince,

* Such is the ordinary effect of factions. They love country only as the object and the means of domination, and properly speaking factions have no country; for them country is there where is power; where is control; and for them must have been invented the selfish axiom: *ubi bene, ibi patria*. In the time of the league, an appeal was made to Spain; Paris was surrendered to her; the counsels of France were abandoned to her; secret notes were addressed to the *Demon of the South*; to this cruel king, to this gloomy tyrant, who from the recesses of a palace, invisible himself to all eyes, covered the world with intrigues, with flames, and with blood. The league, faithful to the same spirit, did likewise; but also, unfaithful to country, they made a second appeal to Spain; the envoys of the latter appeared in the midst of the parliament of Paris. Cardinal de Retz has preserved for our use the secret notes by which this party implored these noble auxiliaries; with the recital of the mystification he put upon this grave body, reduced by him to the disgrace of receiving with pomp the vagabond, who had just received his letters of credence at the gate of the palace, from the very hand of this factious prelate. The history of factions is every where, and equally, but the oblivion of country, and an invitation to strangers.

she was on the eve of founding in Europe a general order, retraced in some of its features by the actual times. But of all others the Cardinal de Richelieu gave the greatest extension to the French influence, by his combined action with the Protestants of Germany, and against the Protestants of France. With the former as a politician, against the latter as a priest and minister, he displayed in this double action the sagacity and the compass of views which characterize the real statesman. Inviting from the extreme of the north the great Gustavus, and his illustrious companions in arms, he achieved the creation of a counterpoise to the power of Austria, and thus became the real founder of the European system. For a space of fifty years Lewis XIV. filled Europe with his pomp, his projects, and his enterprises. The genius of William was required to arrest him; and the weight of Europe directed by the hands of an Eugene, and a Marlborough, to make him bend. If he sunk, it was with glory; and even in his fall he endowed his family with the throne of Spain and of America; a great power is not extinguished all at once: Lewis XV. graced by the reflected glory of his predecessor, sustained by favour of this twilight the consideration of the French power. The eclipse was not pronounced till the epoch of the peace of 1763, and was completed amid the quarrels of the Jansenists and of the parliament, and the frantic debaucheries of the close of this reign. The government of that day resembled those men who seek by intoxication to forget the derangement of their affairs. These profligate excesses covered with a veil of opprobrium and impotency the latter years of Lewis XV. During

this period Catherine, Frederic, Maria Theresa, disposed of the destinies of Europe: before these great names all others grew pale; the star of the north alone illuminated the political horizon; and France might have recognised in the partition of Poland, projected, decreed and executed, without her concurrence and before her eyes, a formal proclamation of her nullity and loss of consideration. Never had she been braved so openly. Lewis XVI. had marched in better ways, by improving the French marine; and by contributing to found in America a *redeeming* state for the rest of Europe, against the exclusive domination of the sea by England. But placed on a soil that already began to tremble from the combustion of fires that raged beneath its surface, this unfortunate prince was unable to maintain the independence of Holland against Prussia; or to defend Turkey against the eagles of Russia and of Austria, pouncing upon this ancient ally of France. She was obliged to resign to Sweden, to England, and to Prussia, the honour of reducing the devourers to more moderate sentiments. At the peace of Teschen, which terminated the contests for the succession of Bavaria, France appeared in the attitude she had always maintained, whenever Austria had sought to encroach upon the German powers of an inferior order.

At this epoch the Austrian influence had not yet gained the ascendancy at Versailles it obtained in the last ten years of this reign; abandoned to Austria in a manner to alarm many minds, and to mislead many others. Alliance with Prussia was the ancient policy of France. This union, though resulting from the

nature of things, was the continuation of the work of Cardinal de Richelieu and its transposition from Sweden to Prussia; who filled the place the former had occupied. A mistress, and a favourite raised by the muse of flattery, were permitted to ruin the work of Richelieu and of Oxenstiern. Singular destiny of human works; cruel but inevitable effect of absolute governments, enfranchised from all responsibility; in which resolutions that may involve the destiny of states are seen to depend on the vilest motives; because they are protected by obscurity, and are inspired and executed by men who draw only from corrupt sources. Therein was placed the principle of the inferiority of France in respect to England. How, with plans formed in this impurity, should France have been able to sustain the combat against an order of things which called to the head of affairs a Chatham, and his son, still more illustrious than himself, with a multitude of the most enlightened men of their nation; who kindling and enlightening their own genius by the fire of public discussion, covered with their lightnings, and protected with their force, the country which committed itself to their direction. If for the last hundred years France had enjoyed a government constituted like that of England, she also would have had her Chathams, and her Pitts; she would have had nothing to envy in the glory or in the possessions of her rival. Men were not wanting in France, but the government was wanting to men, who, to serve it as well as England is served, only waited to be employed. The proof has been given of the presence of these men in France by the secret correspondence discovered in the iron archives. The

work drawn up under the direction of the count de Broglie by Favier, proves that political genius was not extinct in France; and, that it only waited for the fetters to be broken which held it in captivity, to develop itself to the world.

The political system of France has taken a new face. It is no longer what it was before the revolution, still less what it was under Napoleon; these grandeurs are to be forgotten; they have vanished; we must learn to accommodate our desires to our means, and regulate ourselves by the latter. The states that environ France are no longer the ancient states which were found at her gates.

The states which might have sustained her are no longer the same in themselves, any more than with relation to her.

Rival states have acquired immense augmentations. Auxiliary states have declined in the same proportions. The moral dispositions of some nations have also experienced a change in their application to France.

All, therefore, is completely changed for France, and, consequently, she finds herself in a political situation absolutely new; which requires to be well observed and well understood to prevent the most fatal mistakes.

The interest of this question is very great. It leaves not the liberty of refusing ourselves to the developments fitted to place it in its clearest light. According to this view of their importance I proceed to give them.

CHAPTER III.

Ancient System of France upon the Continent.

ALLIANCE with Prussia against Austria; support of the German empire against Austria.

Alliance with Sweden and Turkey against Russia; and against her, also, alliance with Prussia.

Belgium and the dutchy of Luxemburgh were under the hand of France, a pledge of responsibility for the conduct of Austria.

These distant provinces could not be timely defended; the succours must have come from afar; one year of war had absorbed twenty years of ordinary revenue. This species of continental colony held Austria in a sort of dependance on France. It was to enfranchise herself from this that Austria projected the fatal treaty of 1756; this act, which was the master piece of Austrian policy, was the last term of the blindness of the cabinet of Versailles. Richelieu, Torcy, d'Avaux, all that had been eminent in the French diplomacy, should have started in the tomb at the rumour of this blunder of their successors in the cabinet of France. Austria, thus liberated from the jealous observation of France, might abandon herself to all the gratifications of a persevering ambition. Sure of the support, or, at the worst, of the neutrality of her ancient rival, she was now at liberty

to apply her entire attention to the two great powers of the north; Prussia and Russia.

Too feeble to counterbalance them alone, as apprized by the disasters of the war of 1756, she began to league with them; and extended them the hand while she concealed the sword. Thence the partition of Poland, carried into effect; thence the meditated and attempted partition of Turkey; which would have been realized but for the vigorous opposition of England and of Prussia. What France, chained by her treaty, had interdicted herself from doing, a feeble monarch of the north, counselled only by his courage and the weight of circumstances, was seen ready to effect. Gustavus, darting with the rapidity of lightning against the insatiable invader of Turkey, had saved Constantinople by the invasion of Petersburg; if manœuvres, too well combined, had not arrested his glorious career, and turned upon himself the weapon he directed against the astonished Catherine, flying in her turn. It was again to Prussia that France, always shackled by the same treaty, was obliged to resign the honour of arresting the torrent that was about to overwhelm Bavaria; so extensive are the consequences of a presumptuous, or inconsiderate engagement. From the treaty of 1756, dates the disorganization of the political order of Europe, and perhaps a part of the revolution; for this great violation of rules irritated men's minds to the degree which, as Burke remarks, caused from that time the word *republic* to be pronounced; so great was the resentment excited by twenty years of declension and degradation of France and of her cabinet. To recover from this disgrace, and to prevent its recurrence, men

were heard to appeal to a name unknown, incompatible and impossible; the excess on one side corresponded to the excess on the other. There are in politics fundamental acts, which, like the key of an arch, cannot be moved without shaking the solidity of the whole edifice.

The distance at which the cession of Belgium has placed Austria, has caused France to lose this mean of repression against that power; there no longer exists any point of contact, any direct interest between them; by a remarkable caprice of destiny, it has happened that Napoleon was the means of terminating the rivalry between the houses of Austria and of France; the care of watching Austria has now passed to Prussia and to Russia.

Even in Italy, France cannot come in contact with Austria; excepting the case of an attack against Piedmont, which would force this state to invoke the succour of France, the gates of the Alps will remain closed against her, and the separation between her and Austria will be maintained. Piedmont will not be seen to open a passage through its territories for the armies of France to march to the attack of the Milanese, and expose itself thus to become the seat of war for both parties; as it happened in the wars of Francis I. and of Henry II.

France has no longer in Italy the interests which, for a long time, claimed her attention there; and that in consequence of the metamorphosis which this country has experienced. The republics of Genoa and of Venice have disappeared; the republican order no longer even exists in this country, so long agitated by a great number of these governments; even Lucca

has become a principality; Parma, lost to the house of Bourbon, will in future swell the domains of Austria; Modena is destined for the dowry of an Austrian princess. Naples, though Bourbon by the males, is Austrian by intermarriage, and also Austrian by its territory, as it is English by its maritime position. France cannot reach it by sea; upon land, Piedmont and all Austrian Italy, are interposed between Naples and France; the latter, indeed, receives ambassadors from the family of Naples; but the representatives of whatever power it has are found at other courts. All dispute, all direct action is, therefore, impossible on the part of France with Austria.

France has long been the protector of the Germanic body. This attribute she has lost; and, after what has past, it is allowable to conjecture, that, for a long time, this body will not again have recourse to France. On this frontier, Germany covers herself with fortresses in such a manner as to hold herself entirely separated from France; and to retrace the times of the campaigns of Louis XIV., in which a whole year was consumed in taking one or two cities on the borders of the Rhine.

The French influence in Switzerland is upon no better footing than in Germany. The mediation of Napoleon has been replaced by that of the coalesced powers; and, for a long time, France will not enjoy any real credit in Switzerland; a circumstance, however, of much less importance than has generally been attached to this influence over the cantons.

France has held the reins of power in Switzerland; she has suffered them to drop from her hands; no more is required to assure us that its gates will here-

after be closed against her with greater vigilance than against any other power. It is the necessary consequence of all political reverses; fear imparts to ingratitude the varnish of prudence. Holland owed to France the conclusion of her painful struggles with Spain, and the acknowledgement of her independence; it was the work of Henry IV. In this policy is recognised the genius of this prince, and the long views of his illustrious ministers, the Sullys, the Jeannins, and the Villerois.

The wars of pride waged by Louis XIV. against this peaceable republic, had deranged all the plans traced by the sagacity of Henry, and thrown Holland into the arms of England.

King William detested Louis XIV. even more than France. The efforts of his genius were directed against the haughty ambition of the French monarch, even more than against the French power. His death did not deaden the effects of his hatred; it passed undiminished; nay, rather exasperated, into the breasts of those high spirited grand pensionaries of Holland, who in Gertruydenburgh so cruelly humbled Louis XIV.; and who, remaining last upon the field of battle, were not to be diverted from marching to sign peace at Versailles, but by the defection of England. If the triumvirate of Eugene, of Marlborough, and of Heinsius, had not been dissolved by men more politic than themselves, Louis XIV. had been utterly ruined, and would have shared, in 1712, the fate that has befallen Napoleon in 1814.

From this epoch until 1756, Holland continued to side uniformly with the enemies of France. This

was the necessary effect of vicinity; at that time, by virtue of the barrier treaty, Holland guarded the frontiers of the Low Countries; and, as war never failed to take this direction, it was natural that Holland should always have been drawn into its vortex. The treaty of 1756 soothed and disarmed her. This is the only benefit it has produced, and the compensation was not too great for all the evils it caused, in other ways.

Holland was so constituted, that the Stadtholder was English, while the chief members of the government, as well as the people, were French. The nobles, some members of the states general, and of the municipal corporations, were attached to the stadtholder. All the rest inclined towards democracy and towards France. This opposition between the nation and its rulers could not fail to produce the most fatal consequences. During the war of American independence, France, under the able direction of the count de Vergennes, had succeeded in detaching Holland from England, and had caused her to enter the maritime confederation, whose foundations were laid at that time. This was a triumph over the personal inclinations of the stadtholder, who favoured England, and who, in the direction of the war, connived openly with her in the affair of sending the fleet to Brest. From that time commenced the divisions which threw this state into confusion.

The embarrassments of the French government were such as to disable it from acting with vigour in the quarrel terminated in 1787, by the intervention of the Prussians. While France presented notes and talked of forming a camp at Givet, the duke of

Brunswick marched to Amsterdam, and restored the ascendancy of English politics in Holland. The French party was kept down till the epoch of the revolution, which offered it the occasion of revenge; when it leagued entirely with France until the time when Holland became a French province. Inevitable effect of factions, who in country see only the means of domination; and who would rather see it destroyed, than governed by their adversaries.

At present, all the elements of these ancient combinations have disappeared, Holland and Belgium are no more: And upon their site a new state has risen, destined to repress France, and to live under the general guarantee of Europe. This change has given an entirely new face to the French policy, on this side. France can no longer look here for aggrandizements; she should think only of interdicting them to others at her expense. For the encroachments upon France of the kingdom of the Netherlands, would not be opposed by England and by Prussia, as those of France upon that state assuredly would be. According to this new order of things, two different relations are established between the new states: neutrality on land:—alliance on the sea. France and the kingdom of the Netherlands stand related to each other, and with respect to England, in the same manner as Prussia and Austria, with regard to Russia: and for the same reason; the excessive power of each.

Prussia was the ally of France. Geography, the mistress of policy, had formed this alliance. They were allied because they were separated: they have approached and the alliance is dissolved. When the

cabinet of Versailles formed the treaty of 1756, it offered violence to nature; by giving to France, for allies, her neighbours in Belgium; and for enemies, her ancient allies beyond the Rhine. The resistance of nature was visible in the disasters which followed; and in the punishment of the fault which was thus committed. The laws of policy like those of nature, cannot be violated with impunity; certain penalties are equally attached to their transgression. But, the congress of Vienna has in this point, renewed the fault of 1756, and reproduced the violation of the natural order of things: it has sanctioned one of the great aberrations of the policy of Mr. Pitt, which, against the same nature of things, tended to approach Prussia to France with the view of opposing them to each other: an anti-social calculation in the political order of Europe, tending to provoke the renewal of wars; and which, by dividing Prussia into many parts, has enfeebled her to a degree that, with respect to Russia, is next to nullity. By carrying one half of Prussia to the gates of France, it is found that this power is made to occupy the same place which was filled during a century by Austria; the same which Spain had held during two hundred years. It is sufficient to look at what passed between these powers in all this interval of time, to be enabled to appreciate the nature of such approaches. The alliance, therefore, of Prussia with France is broken by the nature of things; they are neighbours, they cannot be allies. Prussia wholly exposed on the side next to France cannot but covet some shreds of her possessions, to cover her own nudity. Of this she has given a proof by the appropriation of Saar-

louis. She would infallibly countenance the further augmentation of the kingdom of the Netherlands at the expense of France; because this state is less capable than France of exciting her jealousy: And if then the two states should establish between them the judicious and equal system of proportional aggrandizements; a system which has cost Poland her existence: it will follow that the frontiers of France must recede on one side as much as on the other. Such are the fruits France has to reap from the policy of sentiment and of consanguinity! There can occur but one case in which France would, as it were naturally, throw her weight into the scale of Prussia, that in which the barrier, should be too strongly assailed on her side; every where else there is divorce between the two states. In the event of disputes between Austria and Prussia, all things forbid France to interfere. Prussia, with that part of the Germanic confederation which appertains to her, will be always sufficiently strong against Austria; for Prussia will always have allies in Germany; but Austria never. France has no occasion to move on account of differences that must be decided on the frontiers of Silesia and of Bohemia: And in case one of the contending parties should threaten to oppress, it will remain for Russia to restore the equilibrium.

The actual system of France with regard to Prussia, is therefore no less simple, although in an opposite sense, than was her ancient system.

Then it was all alliance: now it is all alienation; which does not imply that the two states should feel hostile dispositions, one against the other, and as it were, cultivate enmities, Heaven forbid that such

an idea should ever present itself: but only that the nature of things, and the force of interests, do not establish between them any motive of approximation; and on the contrary, that they have created many capable of dividing them.

Thus Prussia in her possessions between the Meuse and Rhine, will be less inclined to favour the French commerce, than were a multitude of petty princes who had not established the imposts, which the more considerable expenses of Prussia will oblige her to exact; who were not exclusively intent upon encouraging the productions of the German soil and industry, as Prussia will not fail to be. The calculations and the administration of a great state, like Prussia, that has need to cherish all the branches of its revenues, cannot resemble those of princes who were too insignificant to have a rank assigned them in policy.

The alliance of France and of Sweden is of ancient date. Its first object was to oppose a barrier against Austria. But how are times changed? The dangers and the enemy are elsewhere. No more in the plains of Germany will the successors of Gustavus meet the French armies in view of Austria; it is no longer on the land that they could act in concert, but their union should be formed upon the very shores of the Baltic. The creation of Russia, and her imposing entrance upon the scene of Europe, have changed all. France and Sweden, having nothing to envy each other; nothing to ask of each other, either in Europe or in the colonies; both abounding in different productions; contain between them no cause of exclusion, and present a thousand of reciprocal amity. The

magnetic needle is not more surely attracted towards the pole than France towards the powers of the north, that are inferior to Russia. The same thing should be said of Denmark, but in the proportion of its forces; which are far from corresponding with those of Sweden. The new maritime system, into which France is forced to enter, inclines her to the alliance of Sweden and of Denmark. These powers are inferior to England at sea; consequently they appertain to the confederation, whose chief approaches nearest in power to the common enemy, and presents the greatest number of means to repress him; and who has better claims to fill this character than France; who being the strongest of the secondary naval powers, is their natural centre, and as it were, the capital of neutrals?

All we have hitherto said relates to the continental division of the north. Let us now see what passes in that of the south, with reference to France.

It contains Italy, Spain and Portugal. France has no longer any thing to do in Italy: the influence she has exercised there, is precisely what causes her to be banished from it, in these new circumstances. The hearts of the people are indeed still devoted to France; but the greater her popularity, the greater the aversion of the Italian governments towards her; the greater the regrets and the recollections she has left, the less can she depend on the affections of those who govern. They would never address themselves to France, but in the case of extreme apprehensions against Austria; a more imminent peril might impose silence on their other terrors: in this case even, it would be wise to examine how far interest would

command France to interfere: for whether Italy be a little more or a little less in the possession of Austria; whether this country number a few useless princes more or less; wherein would it interest France, or even Europe, to the well-being of whom they contribute nothing? For it is the nature of these petty states to be burdensome to all; supports to none. Besides, is it proved how far it would be for the interest of Austria to extend herself in Italy; and whether too great a mass of Italians would be a force rather than a danger?

There was a time when France was charged with the protection of the duchies of Parma and of Placentia, as family possessions of the Bourbons. This little state participated in the effects, and in the affections of the family compact which subsisted between France and Spain; but was never able to render France any service whatever. Naples was equally useless. This state is neither to be attacked nor defended by land; it is by sea alone that dangers or succours can approach it. When a capital, which is almost the entire state, is situated within cannon shot of a hostile fleet, this state appertains to whoever can shew such a fleet in its waters. Sixty years of experience have taught that Naples must always finally abide the pleasure of England; and that there exists between the walls of this city, and the arsenal of Portsmouth, a compact of terror more effectual than all family compacts: the latter will never acquire any real validity till their ratification shall be confirmed in the arsenals of Brest and of Toulon; for so long as these shall remain inferior to those of the Thames, so long the family compact will continue an empty name.

Spain is equally insulated; surely France cannot think of attacking her by land: what has lately happened is the product of extraordinary circumstances: but the system is re-established, such as it existed from the time of Philip V.; and the basis of this system is peace with France. In like manner Spain cannot be attacked by any continental power: France serves as her bulwark and her shield. Spain is a species of continental island; policy has completed for her the work of nature. The example of Napoleon must have taught that if nothing is more easy than to enter Spain, nothing is more difficult than to subsist and remain there, and nothing more impossible than to get out of it. Napoleon took on himself to establish that there existed in Europe two unassailable states—Spain and Russia: the one by its extent and climate, the other from the manners of its inhabitants. It would be as wise to march into Turkey as into Spain.

The enmity of Spain against France extinguished, by the accession of the house of Bourbon to the throne of Spain, had cost them both dear; and what proves clearly that the hatred was not in things but in men is, that the change of the latter has sufficed to obliterate these animosities, after, and in spite of, three hundred years of hostilities. The friendship of Spain has been without utility to France; and the friendship of the latter has been pernicious to Spain; so defective are the elements of this union so much extolled. The reason of it is very simple; it is, that the two states do not touch nor sustain each other but by their weak part; which is contrary to the nature of all good and solid alliance. The strong part

of France is the land and her army; the weak part is the sea and her navy; but it is only upon the sea, and with their fleets, that Spain and France can unite and support each other; it is only against England they can act; and, in this case, their union represents the combination of two that are feeble against one that is strong, and stronger than both, either together, or separately; and who, consequently, can only combine to receive blows together. Sixty years of disasters are the unexceptionable witnesses of this assertion.

In the war of 1740, the united armies of France and Spain took Naples and Parma from Austria, and caused them to pass to branches of the Bourbon family. The alliance was found to have energy, because each of its members acted with its strong part, its army; but, in the war of 1756, the cabinet of Versailles believed, very erroneously, it had re-established its fortunes by forming the family compact with Spain; whereas experience soon proved that it had only associated its unfortunate ally to its own disasters; for neither France nor Spain were able to employ their real force; having nothing to oppose to the strong part of their enemy but that which was weakest in themselves; a conflict was therefore established entirely to his advantage. It was evident, that France and Spain knew not wherein consisted their strength or their weakness; that they were ignorant of the genuine principle of alliances; accordingly it has always happened that Spain has been unfortunate in her connexions with France; and that England would have been much disappointed not to find Spain in an union, into which she could only enter as her prey. Advantage was taken of the profound resentment

Charles III. had retained against the English for the menaces of bombardment, which admiral Matthews had caused him to fear when king of Naples, to draw this prince into an alliance that, evidently, could tend only to the prejudice of Spain.

In the war of American independence, the celebrated junction of the two fleets could neither effect a descent upon the coasts of England, nor prevent the relief of Gibraltar, nor wash out the affront of the twelfth of April. It was not the weight of this coalition, but the nature of things, which decided the independence of America. Without it, there would have been one or two campaigns more; but the result, though less immediate, was not the less certain.

Much has been said of the commercial advantages that have resulted to France from the Spanish alliance. But neither is this opinion well founded.

France has enjoyed no commercial advantage in Spanish America; she was excluded equally with all other nations; for this country was subject to the laws of the most rigid exclusion. Strangers were never permitted to traffic there openly; and the benefits of contraband were then, as at this day, exclusively enjoyed by England.

By the treaty of the Assiento, Spain had ceded to England the exclusive privilege of supplying her colonies with slaves; a commerce of immense value; England also derived the principal benefit resulting from the deficiencies of the tariff of 1778, granted by Spain to her colonies. Thus, France only gleaned, where England was permitted to monopolize the harvest; she gained some trivial profits, where England accumulated millions. If the southern provinces of

France maintained beneficial relations with Spain, they were less the effect of the alliance, or personal favour of Spain, than that of vicinity; and of the difference of the industry, and of the activity of the two people. Nature and interest had formed these ties, and not the preferences granted by policy.

It is natural to procure what is wanting at home in places that are nearest and the least expensive; so, also, it is natural that labour should furnish to sloth, more than it receives from it. These are the only sources of the respective advantages between France and Spain. Cadiz admitted the products of the English manufactures, as freely as those of the French; Cadiz contained ten English houses, for one French; all was therefore equal on the two sides, and the state of civilization will prevent France from enjoying any privilege in future; for, henceforth, there will be no longer any privileged people; privileges passing from men to things, will no longer be attached but to good merchandise and to low prices; and one of the greatest social errors will thus be reformed.

The alliance of Spain, therefore, has been of no sort of use to France; it has not improved the situation of this monarchy; but has on many occasions exposed it to be seriously compromised, as in 1770, for the quarrel of the Malouine Islands; in 1790, for that of Nootka Sound. Twenty years of alliance in the course of the revolution have contributed no service to France; and, if it has been useless to her, in amends, it has ruined Spain, and finally cost her America.

During all this time, the ports of Spain were blockaded; commerce interrupted; all her fleets defeated

or destroyed; insular positions, such as Trinidad, occupied. Spain, who had been unable to defend herself against France, succeeded no better against England; and was, in her turn, unable to defend France against her. Then followed the great catastrophe of Bayonne, which, perhaps, would never have taken place, but for this fatal alliance: which gave France the right to interfere in the affairs of Spain.

The intimate alliance with Spain was, therefore, a very defective article in the French policy; but what has been only superfluous, or faulty, in this policy, in the new state of things becomes incompatible, and intolerable.

According to the ancient system, France was interested to preserve America to Spain, and that in an exclusive manner; at present, the same interest requires that she should labour to effect their separation. At that time America was a Spanish colony; she has now to prevent it from becoming altogether a colony of England.

Spain is too feeble to regain her colonies, as she would be to control, though she were to recover them. She exhausts herself in an unequal contest, and therefore disastrous; she will finally cause herself to be excluded from America; meanwhile, England is gaining an establishment in South America, (not with the succours of government, but with those of individuals,) and forming relations which no course of events can ever dissolve. Individuals in England are doing for Southern America what France, as a government, had done for the United States. When America shall be filled with English commercial establishments: when, by studying its wants, and its dis-

positions, England shall have gained strong hold of the hearts, of the tastes, and of the affections of its inhabitants, who shall attempt to supplant her, to expel her, to deprive her of this cream of the products of America; which she has the art to appropriate, as well as that of every other commerce in the universe?

In this respect the French policy evidently pursues a false route; and follows the aberrations of the congress of Vienna, which led it to prefer useless Saxony to dangerous Prussia. The French policy shews itself averse to the revolution of America; it would combat it in the name of legitimacy and family ties, if its means or the times would permit. France having nothing to demand of Spain, nothing to expect from her, nothing to fear from her, finds herself in the most favourable position to reclaim her ally to reason, on the subject of the great drama of America, which involves the future destiny of the world. None so happily situated as France to act with effect upon the councils of Spain, and cause the light to penetrate them which is wanting in that benighted country.

France should endeavour to make Spain understand how much it is her interest to preserve her own forces; and not to exhaust those of America; as also not to make sterile its fields, nor to alienate the hearts of its inhabitants, and thus give them to England; whom their reciprocal union should serve to repress, at a future day. She should open before the eyes of Spain, wounded in her pride, misconceiving her interests, considering only the past and the present; she should open the gates of the future; unveil it without softening as without fear, (for it is only thus she can be served,) and shew her, in a sacrifice become neces-

sary, the elements of her own regeneration, as well as those of the maritime liberation of Europe; which no longer can come but from America.

Such are the high considerations by which France should seek to act upon Spain, throwing aside secondary considerations which present no resource against the existing evil; such as the mortification attached to the relinquishment of a possession, like America; legitimacy; resentment against the revolution; apprehensions from encouragement given anew to the spirit of independence. It is better to learn to say, that whatever can be felt as man shall prevent nothing, shall change nothing in the political order: that for these forty years England has digested the humiliation and the chagrin occasioned by her colonies in North America; whose independence however reluctantly, she was finally compelled to acknowledge; and, in fine, that when destiny can neither be resisted nor changed, courage no longer consists in continuing to oppose it without reason; but in submitting with a good grace to its decrees; as the man of intrepid heart sees approach and receives unmoved, the blow that brings him death.

Spain should see, that for her as well as for France, this is the only means to enter anew with some splendour the career of high policy; from which the general state of the world excludes them both, upon the continent. Since the war of the Spanish succession, Portugal has become the enemy of France; or at least estranged from her. It was sufficient that the throne of Spain should be filled by a branch of the Bourbons, to dissolve the alliance that had subsisted between France and Portugal. This alliance had been ce-

mented by the opposition of France to Spain when governed by princes of the Austrian family: from the time when France succeeded to their place, she necessarily succeeded to the enmities that were attached to it. This consequence flowed from the general laws of alliances; which reason prohibits when they are not full and entire, and when they do not exclude all the enemies of each party to the compact. It was evident that the house of Bourbon placed upon the two thrones of France and Spain, gave the house of Braganza to England.

In the place of this house, any other had done the same; governed alone by the interests of country. Thus the succession of Spain, attributed to the house of Bourbon, had changed all the relations between France and Portugal. From allies, they had become enemies.

Since this epoch, France, in concert with Spain, has twice attacked Portugal, without any personal interest; and England has been seen as often to fly to its succour.

In 1756, by virtue of the family compact, a French corps was united to the Spanish army which menaced Portugal; not from any displeasure against this state personally; it was however considered as the ally of England; and it was hoped by this invasion to force the latter to give up the colonies, which by means of her naval superiority she had taken, successively. This calculation was attended with no better success than all those that were made at that time; for 1. The English and the Portuguese, under the command of a man of genius the Count de la Lippe, arrested the progress of the combined army of France and of

Spain. 2. In the course of the revolution, France and Spain have invaded Portugal; have forced the sovereign of this country to seek an asylum in America; and although the transitory possession of Portugal became the source of signal defeats for both, it nevertheless opened the way for two important changes, the one in America, the other in Europe; the erection of the kingdom of Brazil; and the loss of its sovereign for Portugal. This state has thereby sustained a complete metamorphosis: it has fallen into an order of things not easily defined: from a mother-country it has become a colony; the tributary of that, over which it was the sovereign; guarded by a foreign army; too strong to be subjected by its new metropolis; too feeble to resist its foreign guardians; regretting the past, dissatisfied with the present, and anxious for the future: if France had no interests to arrange, directly, with Portugal when vassal of England, she has still fewer relations with Portugal, a province of Brazil, and an English factory.

France, as has already been shewn, has no direct interests to cultivate in Italy. The sovereign of Piedmont will be always at his post to exercise, with respect to her, the functions of gaoler of the Alps; he would even, if pushed to extremity, solicit Austria to aid him in defending them. He would do the same against Austria; and would look towards France for the means of resisting the encroachments of that power. Thus he will always act defensively, whether against the one or against the other. France had multiplied intermarriages with the family which reigns in Piedmont. These alliances did not accomplish the political object which had been purposed in form-

ing them, nor prevail against the able and well digested plans which regulated the policy of this little state; such as alone can ensure the safety of all feeble states wedged in among the territories of states much stronger than themselves. Piedmont had been governed with much wisdom and indulgence by a long series of frugal and able princes. In the war of the Spanish succession the duke of Savoy did not hesitate to take part against the two states, in which his two daughters reigned. He was indebted to this measure, dictated by transcendant policy, for the augmentation of his title and that of his domains. At present since all upper Italy has become Austrian, Piedmont is the natural ally of France; because the Alps interpose between the two states a great barrier, which is wanting on the side of the Austrian possessions. The power of taking an inch of ground from Piedmont, would not be conceded France. All would combine to prevent her. But that which would be prohibited to herself, she ought, on her part, to prohibit others; and to oppose the smallest encroachment on Piedmont.

This state, like the kingdom of the Netherlands has, therefore, in the general order guarantees of stability.

France has no interests to discuss with Tuscany, Parma, the state of the Pope; no more than with the kingdom of Naples. The two former are but appendages of Austria; Naples has French affections, and English fears.

France at present, could only communicate with Naples by sea: a costly route, often interdicted, little favourable to the transportation of a numerous corps;

and in which, besides, England would be encountered. The occupation of Malta, and of the Ionian islands, secure to this power a preponderance over Naples; she controls the Mediterranean from three grand points, of which she has providently acquired the possession; Gibraltar, Malta, Corfu. She has possessed Minorca; if it revert to her again, such an augmentation of insular points of support, dependant entirely on the marine both for attack and defence, combined with the increase of the English navy, would make of the Mediterranean an English road.

On inquiring what interests can unite France to Naples, none are discovered. The country presents her only melancholy historical recollections, and examples of domination effaced almost as soon as established. Naples is a stuff on which the French stamp will not remain.

The French influence has always been great at Rome; which place became the seat of three factions; those of France, Spain and Austria, who especially employed their address to obtain for themselves the nomination of a Pope favourable to their views. In this conduct there was more of routine than of calculation; for it is long since Rome has possessed any importance or significance. On considering the object of Rome in the political order, the reason is not perceived of the value that has been attached to her connexion. It has only contributed to give Rome, (flattered by this homage of habit, but mistaking its nature,) an exaggerated idea of her importance, and to render her difficult; a respectful indifference in the political order was the only reasonable conduct in her regard. She was entitled to nothing better. Since

the time of the Julius II's., of the Leo X's. and of the Sixtus Quintus's was past, wherefore continue to cower as if it still existed? Time has sunk the tiara to the level of altars, and below the thrones of the world.

Since Austria occupies all upper Italy, the nature of things would give Rome to France, alone capable of defending her against this powerful neighbour. Upon the banks of the Po, one Austrian, the other Papal, the alliance with France has been signed: but the effects of the sentiment which inclines Rome towards France will be repressed by the remembrance of what has passed in late times; and the terrors inspired by the immediate vicinity of a power of such weight as that of Austria.

In this union all the advantage would be on the side of the Pope; for how does it concern France whether the domains of the church be more or less extensive. The general system of Italy having been frustrated, a few spots more or less are of no importance to the general effect of the picture. The pope, as chief of the catholic ceremonial, is of great interest to France, which proceeds from the connexion of the spiritual with the temporal; but, as a secular prince, he is absolutely null in respect to her.

Turkey was the most ancient and the most faithful ally of France. This was naturally to have been expected, when the latter combated Austria, the enemy of the crescent; while the two states were in contact both in Belgium and upon other points; but, since great distances separate them, the necessity of this connexion is no longer felt. It was possible to be the ally of the Turks, when their civilization had

not remained inferior to that of Europe in degrees that separate Turkey from Europe almost as far as China is distant from this country; at that time the Turkish state had force, and a real, though irregular vigour. But since, from the effects of a stationary order, and of the repulsion of every species of change, Turkey has remained, in the midst of the general movement of Europe, in the state which under the Selims and the Amuraths rendered her formidable, this power has lost all its energy and all its importance. Turkey of the present day is to Europe, what Spain is found to be; Charles V. would be lost in it, and inquire for his monarchy; as would Selim in his empire. At the utmost, should there be necessity for a general league against Russia, Turkey might be allowed to enter it as number; such is the inevitable effect of all delay in civilization, it gives immense disadvantages in regard to those who have been able to guard against it.

During many ages, France attached great importance to the commerce of the Levant, in which she took the lead; and her allies, the Turks, caused her to enjoy peculiar advantages.

This epoch preceded that of the creation of the great naval and manufacturing power of England; but, since both have arrived at a height which commands the world, things have necessarily changed. England has established herself in a manner that gives her the control of the Mediterranean. She guards its entrance by Gibraltar, the centre by Malta: Corfu gives her the Adriatic and all the western coast of European Turkey. The Turks, even more than other men, are guided by fear, rather than by love:

and England alone is to be feared in the Mediterranean; she, who is so far from it, alone has had the art to establish herself there, by her insular possessions, far above the powers who possess its shores. Thus France and Spain, with a great part of their coasts facing the Mediterranean, do not exercise there a tenth part of the influence which appertains to England in the very places from which nature has placed her so remote; but, the art of policy has compensated the work of nature, and filled up distances. The expedition of Egypt had alienated the Divan from France. The enemies of the latter, represented this enterprize as an aggression committed in the midst of peace; and England as a support.

The liberty given by Napoleon to Russia in 1807, to attack Moldavia, finally determined Turkey in a direction entirely English. England interfered to obtain peace for her in 1812; since which time the English flag has not ceased to give law in all the seas of the Ottoman Empire.

This was quite sufficient to annul the French power in the eyes of the Turks; and in the actual state of Europe, it is very evident that France has no influence at Constantinople; which is under the triple yoke of Russia, of Austria, and of England.

But there is another political sphere in which France is invited to play a great part; excluded, except in extreme cases, from the continental policy here, she is found in the foremost rank—what do I say?—in the very centre of the European policy, of which she forms the pivot. It will be understood that I allude to the rank which the nature of things assigns to France in the maritime order of Europe.

She forms its basis, and, as it were, the bond that connects all the maritime states. They are seen disposed by this nature of things, to groupe themselves around France, as around a common centre. From the farthest extremity of the Baltic to that of the Adriatic, there is not a single vessel which is not in permanent alliance with every French vessel; and, though strange, yet true, the combats between the continental armies of different powers, will not break the alliance between their marine; because whatever might pass upon land, the common enemy would nevertheless be found upon the sea.

The superiority of the English marine has created this indissoluble union, and the contrast of these two positions.

I have represented continental Europe marshalled in general opposition to Russia; here, in the same manner, is perceived the combination of all the maritime states against the prepotence of England. These are the two giants, which menace, which chain, and have the power to crush, all.

It is requisite, therefore, to act towards the one, as towards the other; for there is imminent danger from both. It is, however, much the greatest on the part of England; for, after all, Russia may be reached; a conquest may be recovered from her; she can take no colony from any; all her power over commerce is but negative, and singly consists in imposts or in prohibitions. But where to seize England, or how touch the conquests she has once placed under the safeguard of her formidable trident? Does she not dispose of the whole colonial order? has she not the power to interrupt commercial relations, and force them to take the

direction of her ports and of her factories? England, it is true, can do nothing against the great continental masses; but her power is unlimited against that which animates and invigorates them.

Immense and formidable privilege, that of this marine; which confers on him who enjoys it the force to lock in his arms the world entire, though he inhabit an island; from thence he soars over the universe; as an eagle, from the height of his inaccessible aërie, stretches his menacing flight through fields of air, and pounces on his prey! But, against this maritime thralldom of Europe and of the world, France is destined to stand the foremost in resistance; to her is distinctly attached the first link of the union which is to liberate the seas. The pretext assigned to allure France into the treaty of 1756, was the facility it would present her of directing all her resources to the improvement of her navy. The increase of the maritime power of England enforces the expediency of returning to this system; and urges her to concentrate in it. The order of the continent, which condemns her to inaction, forces her into this capital opposition against England.

From her position in the centre of maritime Europe, France is at hand to co-operate with all the fleets of the continent. From Cadiz to Archangel, all, by the force of things, makes part of this confederation: all, like France, have no longer but one maritime interest—Deliverance from the chains of England.

But this grand confederation, whatever its force, would still be impotent, if besides, it were not supported by America: so strong is England from her

position, the number of her ships, her nautical dexterity, the multitude and the strength of the insular points she occupies, as also by the stations she has had the art to provide for herself every where. But in America is found the lever, which, acting with the fleets of Europe, is to burst all chains, and enfranchise every sea.

America is attracted towards the sea by all the circumstances which have invited England herself to maritime pursuits. The extent of its sea coast is immense; its seamen, with English blood in their veins, unite all the qualities which render so formidable the navigators who constitute the force of England.

England and North America form one same family, inhabiting two different worlds; whose conflicting interests place two worlds in opposition, provided with equal means. England has to observe a wary policy with regard to America; for she depends more on that country than it depends on her; the English commerce has more need of the commerce of America, than America has need of the commerce of England; for she has the commerce of the whole world to supply its place; but where would England find another America? This article is predominant in the counsels of England. By her great colony of Canada, by Acadia, by Newfoundland, England touches America, and depends on her. In time she will become unable to escape the influences which will necessarily result from the increase of the American population and commerce. When in fifty years, in a hundred years, the United States shall have acquired a population of forty, of fifty, of a hundred

millions of inhabitants, how will England defend her adjacent possessions?

The alliance of France, therefore, with America, is in her interests pre-eminently; but further, what she cannot fail to do with North America, she ought to extend also to Spanish America, and to Brazil, and always for the same reason and in the same sense; the general liberation of the seas. The force of England consists in only having to act upon points in her vicinity, such as Cadiz, Brest, and the ports of France or of Spain. In this case, it is almost from her own ports that she blockades those of others. But when she shall find herself constrained to scatter her squadrons over all the seas; to watch at the same time the shores of Europe, and of America; this power so formidable by the proximity and concentration of its forces, will become feeble and easily broken, like a bundle of rods unbound. The policy of Europe is therefore to strengthen America as her natural auxiliary. Consequently France, as the head of the European maritime confederation, mistakes her true interest as often as she retards the progress of independence at any point whatever in America; since from this point is to issue a deliverer for her and for Europe. This is what renders so deplorable, and so painful to observe, the actual direction of the French policy in regard to South America; it was not thus that Henry IV. acted with regard to Holland; nor Richelieu towards the protestant league of Germany. In his time, there wanted not men who took offence at the alliance of the most christian king, advised by a Cardinal, with the objects of Catholic abhorrence, and of Roman anathemas; but sound policy triumphed

over secondary considerations; it ought to act with the same force in the new circumstances in which France finds herself placed; whereas by departing from it, she gives a preference to the misconceived interest of Spain over her own; to consanguinity, over the liberty of Europe: to legitimacy, over the liberation of the world; for such is the result of the system which France pursues with a double detriment. In effect, with the power to render America free, she tends to retard her emancipation; with the facility to render her French, she leaves her to become English, by all the means that England finds to establish herself there; by the succours and the merchandise she carries thither; a double motive for attachment to her interests. For such is the two-fold error of the French policy in this important subject; it gives to England both the time and the means to establish herself at once in the counsels and in the markets of America; in the hearts and in the tastes of the Americans; consequently it gives to America the time to become English; whereas, on the contrary, she ought to be rendered European. Meanwhile, it is very evident that, in America as in Europe, whatever communicates with the sea, which is almost all America, from the multitude and magnitude of its rivers; must seek support against the dominant power upon sea; in America, as in Europe, it cannot fail to be recognised, that France is the centre of these partial supports; that the feeble and neutrals, must come towards France as their head quarters: that the prince who in Europe is the ally of England, by passing to America, becomes her opponent; that, though defended by her in one hemisphere, he may be restricted and attacked by her in another.

The European transplanted in America is no longer the same man who inhabited Europe; on quitting it, he has left upon its shores the thoughts and the affections of Europe; he acquires on landing in America the eyes and the heart of an American. It may be conjectured that the king of Portugal, at Lisbon the retainer and vassal of England, in Brazil, will become her enemy. It cannot be learnt too soon, that the European policy has been immensely enlarged by the introduction of America upon the scene of the world. She comes to place in the midst of the ancient actors, and of the ancient interests, new actors and interests, of another nature and of another importance; whose properties should be well studied, to prevent mistakes in the estimation which is to be made of them. No where more than in France is it of importance to know them well; for her futurity is there. The part of this futurity which depends on the European continent is narrow and fixed: but that which relates to America is to be created: it is immense: its elements should be prepared with care, disposed with skill, and cherished with discernment.

Whatever shall alienate France from America: whatever shall cause the smallest part of it to pass into the hands of England, will enfeeble, therefore, in an equal degree, France and maritime Europe. By her affection for Spain, or rather by her complaisance, it will be for England that France will finally have laboured, without other intention than to benefit Spain; for she will not prevent the latter from losing America, and she will cause England to have time to establish herself there. Spain will not have America, less; and England will have its profits,

more; such will be the neat product of all this policy. Each day that France delays to cause Spain to take a decisive resolution upon this great question of America, turns to the advantage of England; and gives her time to supplant all other Europeans in the commerce of that country.

The Americans will not, more than other men, misunderstand the sentiments that shall have been discovered towards them; and those who shall have contributed to prolong their combats, and their sufferings, must not expect to be placed, in the hearts of the inhabitants of America, on a level with those who shall have laboured to accelerate the enjoyment of a good so much desired, and so dearly purchased. Such are the dangers attached to the habit of permitting counsels to be influenced by the affections of person or of family; by remembrances, or fears, relative to things which may have been the source of personal suffering. In the affairs of nations there are no men: but only things. States are always, between each other, in a state of nature. The substantial interests of the families who govern them, can only be found in the most scrupulous cultivation of the interests of the country itself: whatever is at variance with them; whatever wounds them, is thereby at variance with the interest of the prince, and wounds both it and him. The force of princes can be no other than that of their country; in the long run, they are sustained only by the nation; in process of time, strangers cannot but become either useless or fatal to its interests.

The royal houses of France and of Spain relied with confidence upon their family compact, which

united, in the same fasces, the triple sceptre they extended over these countries, and over America. But I would learn from what this parade of power and of union has defended them? Wherein has it served them? In 1763 Spain was overpowered, at the side of France. In the course of the revolution these two thrones crumbled in ruin; that of Naples followed them; and, singular as it appears, the only throne that remained to these four royal branches, was the gift of the French republic; that of Etruria. All this policy of kindred is, therefore, habitually useless, and in many circumstances pernicious; it will become such to France, irremediably, if persevered in. It is certain to direct her from the line upon which her clearest interests invite her to move. Place, for an instant, the English politicians at Paris; and you shall see if they would mistake it. "Give me the king only for twenty-four hours," said the Cardinal de Retz, "and you shall see what I would make of him." In like manner England would say, give me Spain to direct, and you shall see upon what line I would place her: whether I would cause her to combat America, for no other object, but to exhaust herself, and abandon the former to a rival; or whether I would not rather guide her in ways, by which America should find the end of her sufferings, and myself the key of her heart, which would give me that of her treasures; by the sentiment of the service I should have rendered her. It is in this latitude of ideas; in this detachment from all personal affections, which tend to restrict and to bias them; that France will find the only basis of conduct which she can pursue with utility for Europe as for herself.

France no longer has colonies; for this name will not be given to the factories which remain to her, whether in the East or the West Indies. In losing St. Domingo, she has lost whatever in her possessions abroad merited the name of colony. This loss has changed the direction of her military marine. Her petty factories would not indemnify her for the expense of a great naval establishment: She should be aware that her colonies appertain to her only during the good pleasure of England: let England unfurl her sails, and they are hers no longer. It is one bond less of dependance upon England; but this enfranchisement costs dear, for St. Domingo was to her what Peru has been for Spain. At least France has had the good sense never to think of reconquering it.

France has no longer any means of access to St. Domingo, but that of commerce and the remembrance of friendship, in compensation for the sovereignty she can no more exercise. The revolution of St. Domingo is immense in itself, and as it respects France; for, by disinheriting her of her richest possession, it has created for her the need of an indemnification; which she can find only in the enfranchisement of America. This treasure of St. Domingo requires a whole world, and the most opulent part of the universe, as its compensation.

Fenelon gave the duke of Burgundy for a precept, to avoid all contest with England. In this counsel, the painter of the son of Ulysses, seemed to participate in the renowned wisdom of the father.

In effect, for the last six hundred years, England has chased France, step by step, in Europe, in Ame-

rica, in Asia; in India as in Canada. England has stripped her of all; has taken all. She has never quitted the pursuit of her rival, but at the time of her revolution; which, like all civil convulsions, absorbed her entire attention, and fixed it upon her interior. All the deep wounds of France have come from England; Cressy, Azincourt, Poitiers, La Hogue, Hochstet, Ramillies, Aboukir, Trafalgar, Waterloo; all these cruel names were imprinted by English hands upon the ruins of French greatness; and will remain engraven there in characters of blood.

It has always been England who has animated Europe against France; who has designated this country as the object of her umbrage, of her blows, and of her vengeance.

Without ascending to remote times, and looking back no farther than those of king William, England has never ceased to alienate Europe from France, or to excite new wars against her.

Whoever had a mind to quarrel with France, had only to present himself; her treasures were at his disposal; England was the bond of the quadruple alliance against Lewis XIV.; she formed the coalition in the war of the Spanish succession; she allied with Maria Theresa against France; with Prussia, also against France; in the whole course of the revolution, has she done other thing than provoke and support the attacks of Europe, and pay all coalitions; when all others had submitted, she haughtily remained upon the field of battle; and her voice, mingling seduction with terror, invited to an eternal war; of which she gave the signal and the example.

Portugal, Italy, Spain, Egypt, have seen her dis-

play the same ardour, the same activity, and the same profusion of the means of combat against France. From her hand has issued the new kingdom of the Netherlands, of which she is, at the same time, the mother, and the buckler; and of which she has made a bridle for France.

An idea cannot be formed of an opposition more persevering or more methodical.

Preserving for herself the liberty of moving that she takes from others; marching through the universe, while she holds it captive; it seems that liberty is her exclusive inheritance, and that she has reserved it as a privilege, to the participation of which she reluctantly admits others.

The dangers of quarrels with England are, therefore, sufficiently sensible; the point is not to indulge irritation against her; but to ascertain the due line of conduct towards her; and, with this view, learn to know her well. Upon the continent the two adversaries can neither reach nor seize each other. In the colonies, the match is of an inequality which proscribes even the idea of a struggle. In every war with England, France will commence by losing whatever she has left of colonies; and, as she has nothing to give her in compensation, she must seek their ransom elsewhere. In all war with England, France sees her ports blockaded, and interdicted the commerce of the world: her revenues exhausted and impoverishment establish itself within her borders. The chain of posts that England has stretched around the world, embraces France also; and she finds herself caught with all others under the same net; strange state of things! a chain more strong, and of greater

length, than any of those it was ever permitted a people to extend over the world! a power which effaces that possessed by Tyre and Carthage; and which represents universal slavery issuing from one of the smallest countries of Europe, and scarcely composing a part of it.

These griefs of Europe will increase until the desirable epoch, in which America shall be able to accomplish the glorious destiny to which she is called; that of uniting with Europe to enfranchise the seas. Columbus, in discovering it, and Penn, when he peopled it, little thought of the products of the germes which, from two opposite points of Europe, they came to transplant in this new earth; and still less, that it had been reserved for the descendants of England, to break the yoke which the mother country has imposed on the universe. France cannot, single, contend with England; no more than Prussia against Russia. In both cases, alliances are necessary to compensate personal inferiority. Consequently, France can only act with the support of the maritime confederation of Europe, which restricts her to the most rigorous circumspection in the choice of her contests with England; to present none which may cause her to lose the support of her allies. It would be requisite to silence the counsels of self love, and the solicitations of family; and to abandon, in the outset, what could not be effectually defended; as the colonies. France might then restrict herself to two other objects; 1. To observe the most rigid defensive upon her own coasts; 2. To cover the sea with swarms of cruisers; and present them the English commerce as their prey; as the vulnerable side of England; as the

point which would offer some compensation for the superiority of her squadrons.

Thus, in the war of the Spanish succession, the French privateers supplied the deficiency of ships of the line, and caused England to sustain the enormous loss of three thousand merchant ships. France, reduced to her own resources, would have nothing better in her power; but France, combined with the north of Europe and America, would act a part of quite another importance, and might recover the superiority she has lost upon the continent; which leads me to say next what, in future, is the system of France in this part.

CHAPTER III.

PART II.

New System of France upon the Continent.

ACCORDING to the principles previously advanced, the continental policy has its principal seat in Germany and in the North. Its principal object should be, opposition to new augmentations on the part of Russia.

Germany contains two principal powers, who balance each other, by means of many circumstances, Prussia and Austria.

The Germanic body is sustained by itself, and should remain independent both of France and of Russia. France, placed at a distance from Austria, can have no occasions of direct disputes with that power; there no longer exists any contentious matter, between the two states. Prussia has approached France; but, in this approach, nothing is placed within the reach of France. All Europe would interdict France from touching the kingdom of the Netherlands; the latter, whether single, or leagued with Russia, presents no danger for France. The bolts to avenge the temerity of an attack from this quarter are forged in the arsenals of Lille, of Douay, and of twenty fortresses which, on this side, cover the French frontiers.

France has nothing to demand of Italy, neither has she aught to fear from it.

In this position, a system of neutrality and of moderation towards all, is the only policy that becomes her. She is alike too strong and too weak to interfere without damage in the affairs of the continent; it is very evident that she would have to support the charges of it, without reaping any of its profits; for, at the conclusion of every action, she would be reduced to the situation in which she was found at its commencement. Europe has declared her will that France should be great, strong, and happy. She is a principal member of the political body of Europe. These, her acknowledged attributes, will not be contested her; but she will only be permitted to make a defensive use of them; for herself, and for Europe, in case of danger on the part of the two colossal powers that envelop it.

France will always be considered as the reserve of Europe against the one, and as her file-leader against the other. In the case of any movement, which should have only a personal aim, France would find all the forces of Europe marshalled against her. The system of Europe, in regard to France, is established. Lewis XIV. and Napoleon have been the authors of it. By causing her to be feared to excess, they have finally caused her exclusion. They have imposed the necessity of raising around France walls of separation; of pressing upon her; and of fixing plans with regard to her. The latter may be considered as decreed; and of all the parts of the policy and of the ideas of Europe, this assuredly is that upon which there prevails the most uniformity in her opinions.

and in her wishes. Thus will have perished, no more to revive, the great French influences exercised by Lewis XIV. and by Napoleon. The second experience which far exceeded the first, has excited still greater umbrage, and inspired more jealousies: it has created, and will cause to be maintained, precautions still more severe than the first would have done.

Twenty-five years after Lewis XIV. France had already excited Germany to attack Austria; had shared out her inheritance, and disposed of the imperial crown; but Germany will now continue closed against her; and will reject all French influence. It is evidently with defensive and prohibitive views that she forms her army of confederation, and is constructing fortresses. France is therefore excluded from any direct and active participation in the great continental policy: she would be admitted to act as a subsidiary only, and not for her own account: and at the conclusion, assuredly, all would again unite to confine her at home.

From this there results an afflicting change in the affairs of France, and in the rank she has occupied in Europe; it must be acknowledged with grief; but this depreciation is the necessary result of the actual state of Europe: security is guaranteed to France as the price of her insulation: she would provoke exactions the moment she should discover a symptom of personal ambition, or desire to recover a direct influence. She may rest assured that fear and the remembrance of the past will cause her to be watched narrowly, and for a long time.

In this state three things demand the attention of France.

1. To preserve her independence by avoiding all alliance.

2. To strengthen her military circumvallation, and create a defensive to sustain her interior.

3. To form a school of diplomacy.

There can be no doubt that the alliance of France will be courted: each state endeavours to form itself a system; and consequently seeks supports. Diplomacy thus returns to its ancient routine; which always led to this species of connexion: it was one of its principal studies. Already we begin to hear of the Russian or Austrian alliance; of a system with this one, or with that one; in all which nothing is perceived that is not contrary to the real nature of things, which ought always to be consulted. France has now but one alliance to form; that with this nature of things, which will suffice for all, and will never fail to do whatever should be done. Too often things are marred and perish, because men desire to put themselves in their place. To ally with a power is to become bound to its interests, and to its inconveniences; of the latter, one is always sure to have a good share; as for its advantages, this is another affair; herein the participation is restricted, and regulated by the most rigid personal interest. The liquidation of the accounts of alliances, generally, presents nothing but miscalculations of this sort.

There is but one mode of securing our full value, which is to preserve our entire independence; now, to make alliance is to alienate it. When a power is great and strong, as France really is, we have no need of others; while others frequently have need of us. We should therefore remain free; that is. single and our-

selves. If there be occasion to interpose, it should be done, not by virtue of pre-existing treaties, but from a visible and evident necessity. If the nature of things requires that a state should be succoured, the nature of things will bring this succour; without its resulting from anterior stipulations, but simply from the force of things. Then it would be the general order which would regulate the auxiliary movements of France with respect to others; as, in return, it would lend her its support.

The European association, in this case, would have to regard its own safety, and the maintenance of its equilibrium; its succours would be regulated according to the degree of interest it might attach to this maintenance; it would not act therefore for France, but for itself; as France, on her part, would propose to herself the same object in lending it her support.

Thus, on the supposition that Austria should seek the French alliance, as a reinforcement under the burden which Russia is destined to impose on her; there would not be the least occasion to negotiate, in order to be assured of the succours of France; the treaty is found ready made, and as it were written in the nature of things; which will cause France to be always prepared to resist the breach of the northern barrier. France would do the same for Prussia, as for Austria, in her quality of barrier against Russia; for of what importance is it to the final result, whether the dike be broken in one point or in another? Russia would be seen to conduct in the same manner with regard to France, if she were oppressed by a coalition of her enemies. All these ideas are simple,

and flow from an order of things so visible as to render mistake impossible. All the pomp and parade of diplomatists is therefore reduced to a mere trifle; since they can do no more than simply to announce ideas derived from the very nature of things.

It is with diplomacy, at the present day, as with medicine. Professors in the latter, have closed their learned dispensatories, and apply themselves to observe nature, to assist her, and follow her steps: diplomacy should adopt a similar procedure; and, shutting her folios, with her gloomy laboratories, dashing in pieces her old crucibles, the monuments of toils equally irksome as, in our age, superfluous; she should concentrate in the single study of the nature of things. Thus she would find as it were on the surface of the earth, what she had been toiling to draw from its entrails. Such should be the future policy of France. The nature of things has simplified her system; it consists in continuing free; independent; in defending herself from all detriment that may threaten from abroad; and in resisting the derangement of the order generally established.

Lewis XIV. covered France with ramparts in all the part nearest the ordinary seat of war; the frontier of the north and of the Rhine.

This system defended France on the side most exposed to the dangers of the time; executed by Vauban, it answered the exigencies of that epoch. At the same time it left France open in all the part which borders the ecclesiastical electorates; the country of Liege and Switzerland. In 1814 and 1815, we have seen strangers penetrate with the greatest facility, by these two apertures. In 1793, after the surrender of

Valenciennes, the Austrian army marched through Cambray, and was only diverted from the route of Paris by the expedition of Dunkirk. In 1792, the duke of Brunswick advanced by the upper Meuse, without obstacles worthy of mention, to within forty-five leagues of Paris. This was the weak side of France. The system of Lewis XIV. sufficed when France had great influence in Germany; when Belgium appertained to Austria; when a great number of petty princes occupied the space between the Meuse and Rhine; but since Prussia has taken their place, and is found at the gates of Metz; since a compact state, such as the kingdom of the Netherlands, has replaced a feeble division of the Austrian monarchy, and the country of Liege; the inadequate defence of this part presents serious inconveniences, at this day, which were not then perceptible; and renders it indispensable to add to the fortifications which already exist.

The capital of France is too near the frontier: She has approached it, as it were, by all the new force of the neighbours she has acquired. It is of little consequence whether principalities of the lowest order be far or near: but it is not the same with respect to the neighbourhood of great military powers. Besides, here should be kept in mind the system adopted by armies, when superior in numbers, or when victorious, of marching straight to the capital; masking the strong places left in the rear. The French have taught this lesson in the great wars of the revolution; it has finally been employed against them. A decisive success may conduct the enemy to the gates of Paris; in this case, the efforts of defence and of

precaution, should be commensurate with the importance of such a result.

Madrid, Vienna, Berlin, are one thing; Paris and London, are quite another. The affairs of two monarchies are transacted in the two capitals, with those of a part of Europe, and of the world. The fate of such centres of affairs decides that of the empire itself; invasion deranges the immense machines of the government which rules them; and the attraction of these rich spoils cannot fail to inflame the ardour of the enemy. Every thing, therefore, commands France to complete her defensive system in the part of her frontiers it has not yet reached; and to invest it with all the means of defence which art can employ, and which France more than any country can perfect.

In consequence of the former system, the line of the Somme has been abandoned. It should be re-established; the avenues should also be closed which are open from Luxemburgh to Paris; and from Basle and Geneva to Lyons; which cause these two capitals of France to be altogether exposed. It may be recollected that in the war of the Spanish succession, the enemy's partizans were seen to post themselves upon the bridge of Sévres, to carry off the dauphin, at the moment in which general Mercy penetrated by the upper Rhine! But this is not all: to place France in a state of complete defence, her interior must contain fortified points and arsenals. In this respect, the defensive system of France continues to offer a singular distribution of its means. From Arras to Perpignan and Bayonne; that is, in all the length, as well as breadth of this country, there does not exist a single fortified point. An army repulsed from the fron-

tier could retreat to no place of strength, for support or security. In all this space there are but one or two secondary arsenals.

The rivers in France are not very extensive; a part of the year they are no better than channels of sand; —The Loire itself, which is represented as marked by nature for the line of defence, during half the year would defend nothing; for want of water. The country it should protect, that on its left, and which comprehends Sologne, Berry, Poitou and the Limousin, is the most sterile part of France. An army would be unable to subsist there; and to all who were acquainted with this country, the resolution taken by the army of the Loire to defend its banks, must have appeared to be rather an impulse of military enthusiasm—than a deliberate calculation: for it was very evident that, facing an enemy superior in number, without other defence than a sandy beach, at a great distance from arsenals, this army could not have defended the position an instant. This want of arsenals in the interior of France, would render it impossible to sustain a war there; especially, with the present disposition of the roads; which are all in right lines from the capital, and wholly wanting in a transverse direction. With the immoderate use of artillery, as it is employed in modern warfare, an army which should have to combat in the interior would be forced to drag this heavy and embarrassing train from distances which would paralyze all its movements.

This object is all-important for the defence of France; it cannot escape the penetration of its government. All is changed around France. The bases of

her security are displaced; she can no longer repose upon her ancient supports; nor slumber upon her ancient points of repose; for in these are found the actual dangers.

This change in the environs of France has given a new face to her frontiers; and urges her to calculate her defence upon the new probabilities of attack she may apprehend.

From the time of Francis I. French diplomacy has displayed great ability; under Louis XV. it experienced an eclipse in its ostensible part, the ministry; but maintained itself with a distinction, necessarily veiled, in that part which was concealed; this part was directed by the Count de Broglie and Favier. Diplomacy consists of two things, the system itself; and the agents who carry it into effect.

Natural ability will never be wanting in France; but ability, the result of study and of a good school, is not frequently seen there. The French have such an aptitude to know all, to understand all, and to express all, that they supply by this faculty what others only acquire by a long course of study! They may rather be said to create, and to divine, than to learn.

Unfortunately France has wanted stability in her system, and thus has annulled the superiority of talent for which her negotiators have been distinguished. This system was like the government, which had its modes and caprices. Each new minister gave it a new modelling, and the direction that best suited his interests.

A corrupt cardinal, Dubois, at the same time prime minister of France, and pensioner of England, abandons the system to her: another cardinal, attacked by

the timidities of old age, also marches in the train of England; a third cardinal, in 1756, abandons himself to Austria; and, to establish the empire of a woman over insulted France, overthrows in a day the work of Richelieu, so laboriously maintained by Louis XIV. Louis XV. passed the last twenty years of his reign floating at the pleasure of the winds; which pushed him sometimes in one direction and sometimes in another. He left embarrassments to his successor, which condemned him to a versatility not in his character.

The convention embraced the system of conquest; Napoleon had a mind to new model the world; what this has led to, and what it has cost, is known but too well. Example speaks, occasion invites, time permits to resume the work, and to lay solid foundations.

Diplomacy is no more an occult science than the construction of new roads; in every country it admits of principles, of rules and bases; it operates upon a subject that is certain, that contains nothing fictitious. Accordingly, these bases are to be determined, and established; upon which may then be raised an indestructible edifice.

The choice of agents demands equal care. In a diplomatic agent are two men; one, acting according to the instructions of his constituents; another, communicating to them the documents upon which they must, themselves, be regulated; if, in the first case, he is subordinate and almost passive, in the second he is active, and, as it were, superior. In the first, he has a mandate to fulfil; in the second, a watchlight to present. His character, as is perceived, is double; at the nomination of a diplomatic agent, a commerce

of intelligence is established between the representative and the constituent; a commerce which, as it respects an able direction of affairs, places them on a line of equality.

It is manifest how important to governments are those who are to serve them, instead of eyes and of ears, and, often, of interpreters also. A too general practice, excepting in England, has shared the diplomatic parts between two performers, as upon the theatres of the ancients; where some made the gestures, while others pronounced the words.

The diplomatic representation is generally conferred on members of the high classes of society, supported by men experienced in affairs; who gain by them reputation and fortune. The titular ministers are, as it were, the decorations of a diplomatic mission, while the subordinates are its essential. This order is vicious, alike with whatever places incapacity in the first rank, and merit in the second; it also prevails exclusively in absolute monarchies; in England it does not occur, whose representative government admits not fictions with the same facility: and commands the employment of men, not according to their external and conventional qualities, but their intrinsic and absolute worth. Man is weighed like gold; and those who are found to lack weight, are rejected as base coin.

France, after so many toils, having at length acquired a representative government, feels the need of acting upon these principles, and of no longer confiding the direction of her affairs abroad, to men, whose most apparent title, and ground of vocation to

high public employments, are discovered in their names; or in their talents to amuse.

There are countries in which men are so fortunate as to be born ambassadors, as well as colonels, and presidents of parliament; in these countries too, they acquit themselves in one, at least as well as in another of these functions. It is time, at length, to quit these prepossessions for qualities which depend on the chance of birth; it is far safer to cherish those dictated by labour, by merit, by profound knowledge of nations, and their interests; titles which never deceive. France is better prepared than any other country of Europe, to exhibit agents of diplomacy skilled in the direction of affairs, and of men. For in no other government do the second ranks of administration possess men equal to those, who in France have occupied this part of the government. The principal secretaries in the different departments, as well as the secretaries of embassies, were generally distinguished men; many have acquired names no less illustrious than the ministers themselves; and a judgment can be formed of what they would have done, from what those have done, whom the revolution permitted to give full scope to their talents.

France proper has no schools of public law; we must go to Strasburgh for them; as it appears, it is a German institution, of which France has made a sort of conquest from Germany, with the city in which it is established; on the contrary, these schools have become very numerous in Germany. The want of them with us is seriously felt. A man, who wishes to gain instruction, in this part, is destitute of the proper means; he is reduced to resources such as he

can procure for himself. Schools of civil law abound; the Roman law is taught every where; but no where is taught the public law which governs the different countries of Europe in their reciprocal relations; in no place are lessons given suitable to form diplomatic agents; there are many books upon these matters; because they are found abundantly upon all; but schools are absolutely wanting; and men learn while acting, instead of acting, as good order dictates, after having learnt.

CHAPTER IV.

Division of the South of Europe.

THIS division includes all the countries situated beyond the Alps and the Pyrenees; Italy, Spain, and Portugal.

The two first general characters observable in this division are,

1. Its geographical eccentricity to the political order of the continent.
2. The inutility of these three countries, as it respects this order.

The European policy is formed, and will in future be formed, in the north, and among the Germanic nations: neither Spain nor Portugal can reach it in any manner.

Italy could take no part in it, but by overleaping the barrier of the Alps.—To accomplish this would require her to be independent, and incorporated into one free nation. But while she is cut up into many sovereignties; while she appertains for the greater part, to a German power, she has no means of taking a direct part, and for her own account, in the general policy. The Austrian part of Italy holds the same relation to this order, which is held by Bohemia and the other members of the Austrian monarchy: a monarchy formed of the wrecks of several states, and members torn from four different nations; the Germans, the Hungarians, the Poles, and the Italians.

Austria is the monarchy of the four nations. The Austrian power follows not the ordinary rule of formation for other states. In general the latter are formed either of a single nation, or of a principal nation, increased by accessories inferior to itself; whereas in Austria, the parts of the state are almost equal, though foreign to each other; which occasions it to resemble a confederation of states subject to the same chief.

The most considerable state of Italy, Naples, is precisely that which is found the most remote from Europe; as if all had conspired to annul this country. The German nations and all the North were nothing, when Rome and Italy were all: Rome and Italy have dwindled to nothing, since Germany and the North have become all. New actors have invaded the scene of the world, and have remained its masters.—Sad but inevitable result of the passage of the emperors to Constantinople, and the desertion in which it left Italy. Abandoned to herself, she was unable to hold together. Becoming the final stage of the incursions of the northern barbarians, this country fell in pieces, like a brittle glass, in their ferocious hands. Each seized some of its fragments, and was exclusively employed in maintaining what had fallen to his share; without even thinking of the country as a whole, no more than of its harmony with the general order; of which, besides, in these remote times no idea had been formed. The policy of the popes followed to increase the evil, and to render it irremediable. Feeble and unarmed, as they were, the near vicinity of the strong and the armed, little suited their convenience. They would fain have expelled the French and German barbarians from Italy:

as was said by Julius II. : the popes would have been wholly Italians if Italy had appertained wholly to them; but wanting the power to possess it exclusively, they always inclined to see it shared between many; because the partition would prevent there being any stronger than them; the more the sovereignty was subdivided, the more their security and relative power were increased. This uniform basis of the papal policy should be fully discerned; it has had a decisive influence upon the destiny of Italy; and was dictated by the nature of this singular power. Invaded, ravaged, and possessed alternately, during six hundred years, by the Spaniards, the French, the Germans, Italy has closed her career of vicissitudes in becoming Austrian: for such in fact she is, as to the largest and richest half; and besides, she is Austrian, by the influence which the possession of this half confers upon Austria. Austria governs in Italy as in one of her own provinces; and her preponderance excludes from it all manner of balance.

France only would be able to counterbalance it, but she is not in contact with Italy at any point; whilst the whole body of the Austrian monarchy presses directly upon it. France would have to wait for its gates to be opened for her; Austria holds all the keys of Italy, and covers the greatest part of it herself. France would have to operate with, and amongst distrustful foreigners, more impressed by the disgusts a great benefit may leave after it, than by the gratitude it ought to inspire: Austria would be at home in every part of Italy: France possesses in that country not a single point of support.—From Alexandria to Palma Nuova, Austria is supported by a chain of fortresses

and of arsenals, which present her all the means of attack and of defence, and are strengthened by the lines of the rivers which border them.

The Austrian possession of upper Italy has very solid bases. The sea, the Alps, the Po, the Ticino, the Adda, the Mincio, the lake of Guarda, the Adige, the Tagliamento, the Yzozzo, Alexandria, Pavia, Pizzigithone, Mantua, Peschiera, Verona, Venice, and behind these lines of fortresses, and of rivers, the whole body of the Austrian monarchy, prepared to sustain them, and pour upon Italy new swarms of defenders. What has not Austria gained by the exchange of her distant and precarious possession of Belgium, for a property so well secured by its contiguity! Italy can only be considered therefore as an Austrian province; and it is only in respect to the force which it adds to Austria, that it continues to connect with the political order.

Piedmont is an atom, in comparison with Austria. The gaoler of the Alps may indeed place himself in a sort of opposition to France by favour of this barrier; his force is derived from this position, which derives but little from him: And even had he to defend it singly against France, the inequality of the two states would soon have effaced, and as it were levelled, the inequality of the soil which separates them. But, it is not the same with Piedmont in regard to Austria; on this side all is open; here Piedmont is feeble, and Austria impregnable strong: the latter seized one of those decisive moments on which depends the fate of empires, that in which her aid was indispensable, to supply herself with all the objects which she found to her liking in Italy; accord-

ingly she paused at the confines of Piedmont, where it must either have been annulled, or left as it is seen. But she has reserved for herself, a superior power, all the commanding positions, which should have been assigned to Piedmont, as the inferior power. For the latter, they would only have been defensive; held by Austria, they are truly offensive. Thus Alexandria an ancient dependency of Piedmont, was defensive as the appendage of this state: in the hands of Austria, it is openly offensive against Piedmont; in this case there is a manifest error in the distribution of parts. The more Austria extended herself in Italy, the more it became necessary to strengthen the frontiers of Piedmont. To avoid opposing the too strong against the too feeble, Genoa was given to the latter; but the protection of this city and its sea-coast will always absorb a part of its forces. The congress of Vienna has proceeded strangely in regard to Italy. A first fault always draws after it others. It has committed that of abandoning Poland to Russia: this encroachment, offensive against the rest of Europe, rendered it necessary to strengthen Prussia, and Austria, the first neighbours of this formidable power. The firm establishment of Prussia was sacrificed to abstractions of undefinable rights, which were immolated on one side, while on the other, they were maintained at any price. It was seen that the cession of upper Italy to Austria, required that Piedmont should be strengthened in proportion; for this purpose the congress gives to that power the state of Genoa; almost as proper to enfeeble, as to strengthen it; since Genoa cannot supply the military, and continental force, of which Piedmont had need to oppose

Austria, a continental power. Genoa is better calculated to increase maritime force, than to augment continental and military power. Genoa would prove more effectual against France, than against Austria; yet against the latter is Piedmont to be defended. No contradiction of sense, as appears, has been spared in this arrangement. Since the subject in agitation was to arrange Italy; and the necessity was perceived of strengthening the state which bordered on Italian Austria, the material of its establishment should have been extended; it should have been taken from whatever was found disposable in this country. Parma, Lucca, Tuscany should have been annexed to Piedmont, to compose the requisite degree of force. On this occasion, the interests of states were in question—but the aggrandizement of families was only regarded; the safety of Europe was neglected, to serve the convenience of individuals; the Austrian power has been swoln by such accessories as Modena, Parma, and Tuscany.

The house of Bourbon has equally valid rights upon Parma, with those of Austria upon Tuscany—their accession to these two thrones, and their fall, are both of the same date; they had both equally abdicated by treaties.

What right could re-establish the one, and hold the other excluded: in this is aught visible but the decrees of force?

From all these incongruities, dictated by the insatiable avidity of individuals, it has resulted that Italy is null for political Europe; that this country which might and should be a very influential member of the European association, is no better than a recess for

the political order; in reference to which, it is about to become again, what it was before the revolution, a species of museum visited by foreigners; inhabited by men divested of the great motives which tend every where to develop the intellectual faculties, and the noblest affections that can elevate the heart of man. Italy is thus condemned to a political, and her inhabitants to a moral, siesta. Napoleon had begun to rouse her from her long slumber. But how far was he from having laboured with the latitude of views corresponding to such a creation! Like another Romulus, he might have become the founder of a new Rome. But for this, he should have quitted the track worn by the routine of ages, and instead of getting bewildered in the divisions of Italy which shared it in three portions, one French, another Italian, a third Neapolitan; he should have acted with the decision and the freedom authorized by circumstances, and should have cast in a single mould, or at the most in two, but equally Italian, either the totality of Italy, or the two Italies; upper, and lower. Then Italy would have re-appeared with splendour upon the scene of the world; and Europe would have acquired a new member, of great weight in her balance. Napoleon might have endowed Italy with this new life, and Europe with this new benefit; an opportunity single in the world; and the more to be regretted, since ages will not present such another.

The destiny of Napoleon was perhaps decided, with that of Europe, and of France, by the ill choice he made in his Italian establishment. A great kingdom of Italy would have been a more faithful, and more solid ally than a king of Naples; who, in proportion

to the inferiority of his forces, might always consider himself as menaced by his creator; and compelled, even by a regard for his own safety, to combat for him coldly, or, better still, to league with his enemies; the inevitable result of half measures, of half means, this poison of affairs, which the most disastrous caprice could alone have suggested, in a genius whose constituent faculty was the absence of limits. In fine, the evil is done, and Italy has thus relapsed into her palsy of a thousand years; useless to others as to herself; present upon the geographical map of Europe, but effaced from her political map. The Italians would have appeared with glory upon this theatre; for they have all the qualities required to form great actors; with such power in the arts and sciences, they must be equally capable of excellence in other pursuits; and the more extensive the career, the better they would fill it; acute, ardent, active, ingenious, industrious, with sufficient motives, what want they which others possess; and what have others in greater perfection? The degeneracy with which, upon some points, the Italians are reproached, is the effect of their institutions. Degrading and vicious institutions, in process of time, will affect the character of a people, as the water-drop, by its repeated fall, acts upon the stone. They have the same fatal power of obliterating the virtues of a nation.

The restoration of Italy was of but a few years date, and already the Italy of 1814, was no longer the Italy of 1810.

If the glimmer of a dawning day had sufficed to dissipate many clouds, what might it not have produced when it should have enlightened all with its

rays, and warmed all with its fires! Who can contemplate without grief this new eclipse of Italy, and see her sink back into the tomb from which she had enfranchised herself so recently! If upper Italy appertain to Austria, lower Italy may be considered as English. Naples is English; much more, the Italian seas are all English; by the occupation of Gibraltar, of Malta, and of Corfu, appendages of England. From these three stations she controls the two seas which bathe the shores of Italy. Every Italian vessel meets an English barrier both on entering, and leaving these seas.

The passage is guarded, and none can avoid this species of Custom-house, at the same time commercial and military, which England has established upon these three commanding points of the Mediterranean. The petty princes of Italy at Parma, at Modena, at Lucca, at Florence, have no connexion with politics. They are merely great armorial fees of a crown; fair and lucrative endowments for individuals, but absolute nullities, as it respects policy.

The entire history of Spain may be divided into three great epochs.

The first, from the invasion of the Moors until their expulsion.

The second, from the accession of the house of Austria, until that of the house of Bourbon.

The third, from the accession of this family, until the revolution of France, and of Spanish America.

In the first, Spain was exclusively occupied by her own affairs and Africa.

In the second, she menaced the liberties of Europe.

In the third, her entire attention was directed towards South America.

A fourth epoch is approaching, in which she will be relieved from all solicitude with respect to America.

During the reigns of the princes of the house of Austria, Spain, comprehending the domains of the house of Burgundy, possessed Belgium, Flanders, Artois, Holland, Luxembourg, Burgundy, and Franche Comté; in Italy, Naples, the Milanese, with Sicily, and Sardinia.

Also, Charles V. adding the imperial crown as a pinnacle to this immense power; having at his disposal a people steeled by six hundred years of combats, elated by the conquest, and strengthened by the treasures of the New World, lunched into the project of universal domination; to which he felt himself invited by the aspect of this splendid apparatus of power, and by the confidence he placed in the constancy of such a people as the Spaniards. Perhaps he might have accomplished this plan, but for the opposition he found in the reformation; which diverted his attention to other objects, and saved Europe. His successors, Philip III., Philip IV., Charles II., inherited none of his splendid genius, nor of the dark, brooding policy of his son, Philip II. The monarchy was in extremity, when the house of Bourbon came, as it were, to its succour; then occurred a great revolution in this monarchy. The treaty of Utrecht had, indeed, secured Spain to the house of Bourbon, but Spain only; it had retrenched all the possessions by which she communicated with the rest of Europe. From that time her situation was changed; she was detach-

ed, as it were, from Europe, having no other relations in this last epoch, but those with America; as, in the first, she had been restricted to a connexion with Africa.

This state has continued during all the eighteenth century; for this space of time Spain was all in America, and nothing in Europe; a power wholly colonial, and in no degree continental; a canal through which the riches of one world flowed into the other; retaining for herself but the smallest part; having an influence upon the balance of commerce, but excluded from that of power.

At the present day all this is changed; South America separates with violence from Spain: instead of ruling there, she must combat those who disclaim all subjection, inured to war, and inflamed by an obstinate struggle: instead of receiving its treasures, she must exhaust her own to retain these sources of wealth, which tend in all parts to escape her. All therefore is changed for Spain, and henceforth her futurity is covered by an impenetrable veil. France separates her from the rest of the continent; she can neither reach that, nor can it reach her. England with her fleets is her only enemy: and, from before Cadiz she alarms, and governs Madrid. Spain should no longer be numbered among the continental powers. The policy of the continent being transacted in the north, and in Germany, Spain has no means to influence it directly. It would be only in the case of a menacing attack against France that she could shew herself, and take part in a continental transaction; and, even in this case, it is dubious how far her succours could be of any avail. In the state to which Spain

is reduced, would it not be a disastrous illusion to place any confidence in her support? This unfortunate country hastens visibly towards an inevitable catastrophe. The wrong course pursued in 1814 has conducted Spain to the brink of frightful precipices, which deepen every day. It is evident that a great revolution threatens Spain; and considering the elements which compose the Spanish character, it is perceived with an alarming certainty, that it will be terrible. Never has there been assembled more materials proper to kindle and feed a conflagration; discord, foreign war, exhaustion of the revenues, a discredit that cannot increase, the predominance of ideas, and of plans fitted to ruin a country; superstition, exclusion, vengeance, separation of casts; such is the train of perdition, in the midst of which moves, or rather jolts, and drags, unfortunate Spain! She has no money, and she makes war upon the country that would furnish it, had she the sense to leave it tranquil. She is poor in population; and she sends the most robust of her sons to become extinct in the fields, and the fens, of South America; she has the greatest need of commerce, and she exposes it to be preyed upon by swarms of hostile cruisers. Never did there exist a more cruel position, nor one nearer the brink of an abyss. Ages, therefore, must transpire before Spain could become of the smallest utility to France; her alliance could only be an incumbrance for the latter; for it would always be requisite to defend Spain, and always impossible to be defended by her. Spain without France, has no power against any. It was sufficiently perceived, when cardinal Alberoni, lanching into a career the extent of which

he had not compared with his forces, ventured singly to brave England, and the emperor of Germany; in one day his mad projects perished, before Messina, with the ships of Spain. Spain is no longer any thing as to Europe: what she will become without America must be seen hereafter. South America did not enrich her, when she possessed it; in separating from her, it completes her ruin; melancholy but certain result of a government which, like that of the Turks, remains stationary, while improvement is advancing in every other quarter; which occasions the culture of the mind, and of the earth, to be neglected equally; and terminates in establishing a permanent inferiority to the rest of mankind.

Portugal is no less foreign to the general policy of the continent. Such was already its habitual state when the sovereign resided in the midst of it; still more will it remain estranged from this general order while the sovereign inhabits another hemisphere.

It is difficult to speak of a country whose condition is not fixed, and such is the state of Portugal. It cannot be destined to continue what it is, the province of an American kingdom. This would be contrary to the nature of things, as well as to the general order of Europe; which does not permit that one of its parts should be the colony of another world, and have frequent occasion to demand answers at Brazil, relating to the affairs of Europe.

On this occasion it may be remarked that many things in Europe are provisional. The force of circumstances has caused them to be admitted, and as it were, overlooked: the urgency of affairs, the need of rapid results, have occasioned a connivance at these.

defects; but time will bring them again into notice in proportion as the thorns shall become more sensible, and urge a recurrence to amendments. Such is the eternal march of things; let us leave it for time to introduce them. Spain and Portugal, should therefore be brought as accessories only, into the balance of the power of Europe. These states are found between two existences, the one drawing to a conclusion, the other commencing; which forbids us to recognise in them any that is fixed and determinate; but what is not equally forbidden; what, on the contrary, excites a strong sympathy in every feeling heart, is the cruel destiny of these two nations. Behold two nations brave and intellectual, capable of every species of heroism, who have triumphed over the severest trials; who have run the race of glory in the longest, and the rudest toils; who, inspired only by their own genius, have conquered two worlds, and have filled them with the terrors of their name and of their glory; behold them effaced from the scene of the world; abandoned to the exclusive direction of governments, without capacity, as without energy, without foresight, as without conduct, without calculations, as without economy, the sport of courtiers, as of prejudices; abandoned equally to superstition, and to licentiousness. Courts half monastic have utterly ruined two great nations, so illustrious in the past! They have caused them to lose the theatres of their ancient exploits, and the sources of their future wealth. Without carrying admiration of the Spaniards so far as party spirit has made fashionable of late, still, it is impossible not to deplore the fate of a

people capable of displaying so much devotion, and of submitting to such sacrifices. Such a people should be of more importance than what they have been made. The Spaniards, like the Orientals, and the Africans, are never inclined to attack others; but they defend themselves at home with the obstinacy, and the courage of the lion pressed in his retreat; as they mingle not with other nations, whose intercourse they have no wish to cultivate, and to whom, on their part, they present few attractions, their natural aversion to strangers enters for half in their efforts to repulse their attacks; this motive, adding to the natural courage of these people, makes them invincible upon their own ground, and disposes them to the most extraordinary acts to remain its masters. It is plain what might be made of men who unite in a high degree the requisite qualities for great things; vivacity of intellect, ardour of imagination, and, almost always, intense excitement of passion; what rich materials for an able government! Seeing what is done every day with the blocks of marble fashioned in the north, all must be aware what might be obtained from men with souls of fire, in whom the springs of passion are always ready to display their terrible energy. Very superficial observers attribute the actual torpor of the Spaniards to their climate, forgetting what they have achieved in all the past, under the fires of the same sun; that of Rome was not of ice, at the time when the sons of Romulus overwhelmed the subject world; and, at this day, the Orientals, and the Arabs, are seen slumbering in the same regions, where, in other times, and with other masters, they conquered whatever their formidable scimeter could reach. Let

us close this article of the division of the south with a general observation.

Europe contains, less Turkey, 150,000,000 of men. The division of the south has a population of 28,000,000 of inhabitants: thus we see a fifth part of the European association rendered useless to its general action, and, as it were, paralyzed!

ENGLAND.

THIS country, from its geographical position, is, even more than France, eccentric to the sphere of Europe, and is unfortunately, therefore, but the better adapted to control it; since she has nothing to apprehend from that quarter.

England, though separated from the continent, has always endeavoured to govern it, in opposition to her rival France. Continental connexions, though strongly reprobated by one class of politicians in England, are, on the contrary, for the government, the object of a most active solicitude, which would not tolerate the firing of a single cannon in Europe without its permission: it would be seen hastening to arrest all encroachment, which might endanger the equilibrium. Such has been its history for the last hundred years. This policy, it must be confessed, is large, while the first is narrow; the latter re-unites England to the continent, and fills up, as it were, the space which separates them; the former confines England at home, and tends only to render now applicable, what the poet says of ancient Great Britain:

Et penitus toto divisos orbe Britannos.

Forecast and dignity have traced the route which England has pursued: And also, how much has she

profited by having considered objects from this high elevation; and by having duly respected herself! Her last conflict continued for twenty years; what obstinate toil can achieve, has been seen: it has raised England to pre-eminence among European powers; England evidently marches at their head. It was England, who in this long contest, ever resolute in her opposition; while all changed around her; excited to combats, reconciled differences, and filled every hand with weapons and with gold. The empire of England is immense, as indestructible. More than sixty millions of men either in Europe, or Asia, or America, obey her laws. She colonizes the world, and covers it with English population. She girds the globe with a chain of posts, disposed with art around its circumference; thus causing every avenue and every passage from one part to another, to be under her control, and as it were under her key. From Heligoland to Madras, and from the Ganges to Hudson's Bay; at Jersey, at Gibraltar, at Corfu, at Malta, at the Cape of Good Hope, at St. Helena, at the Isle of France, Ceylon, Antigua, Trinidad, Jamaica, Halifax, every where, she is found seated upon rocks, or placed upon inaccessible islands, every where in safety herself, every where menacing others. What arms cannot effect, her commerce accomplishes, abounding in industry no less than in wealth, effect and cause of each other; the English power is employed above all to foster commerce, of which itself is the fruit and lends it a continual support. This power resulting from naval force is immense; and there presents nothing among any people, or in any epoch of history which can be compared to it.

It surpasses all the powers which Europe united could oppose to it: and to shiver this rod of brass extended over the world, will require the deliverers prepared by fate in America to have acquired all their strength; then, but only then, it would be possible to reduce England to proportions less oppressive for the rest of the universe. Till this time arrive there is nothing to resist her, nothing to oppose her: She can receive no laws but from herself. Other nations possess colonies only during her good pleasure: she alone holds them by an inalienable title; since her navy covers them with an impenetrable egis. While Spain in reality possessed her colonies of America, England contented herself with knocking at their gates, and introducing the products of her manufactures; obtaining in return those of its soil, and especially of its mines. But at present she rushes towards these opulent regions; and faithful to her plan, she endeavours to naturalize in them the taste for her commodities. Thus she makes a conquest of whatever is really useful in America, and of that which is likely to attach it to her forever. For her it is an acquisition of the greatest value, and one that will much enlarge the basis of her double power, her navy and commerce. The latter, creating incessantly new bases of credit, imparts to England the faculty to bear without sinking, a burden, the model of which is found in no part of history; and the power of this commerce and of this credit combined is so great, that the revenue of England has been seen to increase, in the course of the present year, more than a hundred millions:* not by means of new taxes, symp-

* Of Frances.

toms and causes of disasters, as they are established and operate in most other countries; but by the sole effect of her increasing prosperity; thus displaying to other nations not only prosperity, but the true source whence it flows.

During the late war, England kept on foot a very numerous army: this army entering the career a novice, required the aid of experience, and of time, to be enabled to cope with the most distinguished troops of Europe; it has finally contributed to renew the cruel days of Cressy, and of Poitiers. It was evident that as it became inured to war, this army would ultimately prove a match for any other. It was sufficient to reflect that diligent and industrious men, upon any point, could not long remain inferior to their fellows; that study and observation would soon approach them, and fill up the distance at first remarked between them.

If the melancholy results of governments without capacity, as without energy, have been remarked in the picture we have exhibited of Spain, and of Portugal; in the greatness of England must be recognised, on the other hand, the effects of the admirable government she has enjoyed; on both sides, the effects correspond with perfect exactness to their causes. This government has done all; from its establishment, the prosperities of England may be dated; they commenced with the complete confirmation of the English constitution; they have developed themselves by its side, and in the same proportions. Credit was born in the bosom of this constitution, and is cherished every instant by its genial warmth: fixed and immutable, it has created a policy immutable, like itself. When

this constitution was misunderstood or combated, Charles II. and James II. were pensioners of Lewis XIV. and demanded the succour of his troops against their own subjects. History has preserved the secret notes of these monarchs. But since in England every thing turns upon a constitution the sole guide of her counsels, all is changed: force has increased with fidelity to law, and stability in ideas: and England always combating, always persevering, supported upon a basis of solid institutions, is arrived at the glorious and triumphant goal; the worthy recompense of great efforts and of clear views; as it is a solemn proclamation of the advantage of a government which keeps the springs of a nation in a continual state of just tension; which prepares all its measures by the fire, and by the light of public discussion; which defeats selfish designs, which excludes caprice, and which imposes a necessity of leaving the helm to the ablest pilot. Though the prosperity of England is already a species of phenomenon, yet we must prepare to see it greatly increased by an approaching event, destined to have a decisive influence upon the fate of all the nations of the world; the liberty of South America. This liberty prepares a new futurity for the universe; and will open to it sources of wealth, as yet unknown among men. England, who with unwearied pace pursues this wealth in every part of the globe, cannot fail to appropriate its largest portion; her industry, her activity, her capitals, give her the first claims at its distribution: South America has become her warehouse, and her sagacity has not deceived her in the choice of means to secure the possession. The government has no oc-

casion to interfere in this affair; perhaps those who administer it are even disinclined towards this great change; to which their personal position may tend to render them averse; it is the body of the nation which acts, and which pursues the direction indicated by its interest. Individuals supply to America—what the government has pledged itself not to give her; it observes a legal neutrality, but allows private enterprize to fulfil the wishes of the nation. It knows that in working for themselves, they must also work for England; who finally becomes the associate of their advantages, and as it were the common reservoir in which all their profits are deposited. In this particular, the address of the government has been admirable. Scarcely are the new governments formed in America, when that of England has already left all its subjects at liberty to turn their speculations in this direction. Though America comes openly in search of succours in England: though enlistments are made for America, with the same publicity as for India; the government sees nothing, hears nothing: it neither participates nor opposes; for it knows that these succours, that these auxiliaries, will act equally upon the affections, and upon the tastes of America, and will dispose her to espouse the interests of England. A sound policy, and not unworthy of imitation. The commerce of America, like all others, will take the direction of the north of Europe; England is upon the route, she must, therefore, participate in it largely.

The British kingdoms contain 18,000,000 of inhabitants; a larger number than they ever had. Commerce and civilization, which have extended all the

arts, and have caused their application to all the parts of human existence, account for this increase. The same causes will continue to act according to their appropriate principles, and this they cannot fail to do with great energy. The English population will increase more from commerce than agriculture; because the spaces are wanting for the extension of the latter, whereas those of commerce are enlarged by its own progress. Agriculture is a limited mean; commerce is a horizon without bounds. The Irish population will increase both by commerce, and agriculture; because there exists in this country a great number of unoccupied places in the two careers. Ireland numbers nearly 6,000,000 of inhabitants; she has room for 12,000,000. Precise limits cannot be assigned to the population of an insular country provided with such powerful vehicles as, a cincture of ports, great wealth, and improved knowledge, applied to the melioration of commerce, and of agriculture. They are the most potent levers which can be placed in the hands of man.

England has in reality but two important interests upon the continent; one of which is direct, the other indirect; the kingdom of the Netherlands, her creation; and Hanover, a dependency of the reigning family. As for the rest, provided nothing menace the general equilibrium, her interest is a mere nullity.

England will observe France and Russia narrowly; she will protect Portugal and Naples; she will make her profit of lucrative Spain; but, in other respects, she will restrict herself to the cultivation of ordinary relations with other states. Having nothing to apprehend for herself, *nor from herself*, nothing to acquire

upon the continent, she will continue indeed to influence it; but her action will proceed from without, by means of her maritime forces, present every where, at the same time. England is to Europe in the direction of the sea, what Russia is upon land. To balance her would require, what we never yet have seen, and what we are not very likely to see, a complete union of the plans, of the intentions, and of all the naval forces of Europe. There is no *salvation* in any thing short of this. England knows it; nor is it Europe any longer that disturbs her repose; the lion is down; France is now nothing more than ancient France; strong at home, impotent against England.

It is North America that England will fear in future; for it is the country where there exists most of the elements which render herself formidable.

North America is a second England; descent, language, manners, natural bias towards commerce and maritime pursuits, all are English in America.

Fable has had its rival brothers; England and the United States will realize the fable. Sprung from the same blood, swayed by the same inclinations, instead of uniting them, these circumstances will tend only to place them in perpetual opposition. Both in pursuit of the same prey, the profits of the world, they will incessantly jostle each other in the same career, and conflicts will ensue; the prolongation of the contest will render them irreconcilable. But the United States engage in it with immense advantages over their adversary. Their territory is boundless; their population can admit of no limits; England has certain limits in both; she can conquer nothing from America; the latter will inevitably divest her of Ca-

nada, of Acadia, of Newfoundland; all that England possesses upon the American continent is destined by the force of things to slip from her grasp. England can never send from Europe armies competent to contend with those of the United States, backed by the affections of the inhabitants, who, like all those of America, incline to detach themselves from Europe.

The United States will take the lead of England in all the commerce of the West Indies, and Southern America; and it is easy to see that this part of the globe must become the seat of the great commerce of the world.

The distance which separates England from America constitutes the strength of the latter; in Europe, the vicinity of England causes the mischief; she is, as it were, the next door neighbour to all; but, with America, it is requisite to lose sight of England; to make a long voyage; and remain very far from her ports, her magazines, and her arsenals.

To put down Carthage, Rome had but one city to destroy; but one point to occupy; but how is colossal America to be put down? *Delenda America*, is a bolder expression than *delenda Carthago*! Nature herself constructs this new Carthage over against England; it may, indeed, have its Hannibals, who, more fortunate than the Carthaginian hero, are very sure that new Scipios can never arrive to subdue their country; which no longer consists in a single city, like Carthage, but in the half of a world; which submits to no such destruction; and is protected at once by its extent, its ships, and its millions of inhabitants.

CHAPTER V.

*Comparison of the Ancient Political Order with the
New.*

THE particular characteristic of the ancient order, was equilibrium between the principal powers. It contained means of repression against such as might attempt to disturb it.

It is not to be understood, however, that a strict equality prevailed between these powers. Policy no more admits of agrarian laws between nations, than between individuals; but if there existed nations possessed of great fortunes, these met with others possessed of as great; who served, at the same time, for barriers against them, and as ramparts for the liberty of others.

These powers presented vulnerable points, and others by which they might be seized. Thus, France and Austria, Austria and Prussia, Turkey and Russia, France and Spain, with respect to England, were in this state of permanent equilibrium, and could reciprocally balance each other.

The particular characteristic of the actual order is, to want this equality, the safeguard of all. Two colossal powers have risen upon Europe, England, and Russia. They press her from two opposite sides; they embrace her; they besiege her, as it were; they

compel her to regulate all her movements by theirs; they will allow her neither sleep nor repose.

Their force is in nature, which gives them all the means to attack others, whilst it renders them inaccessible to all attack; thus the proportional equality is found to be broken by the very hands of nature, and all guarantee destroyed.

There existed, it is true, previously to the new order, preponderant powers, but not powers exclusively preponderant; whose force was so disproportioned to that of others, as to reduce them to a state of absolute vassalage; unable to sustain themselves without a continual league.

The guarantee which existed in things is no more; all actual guarantee exists but in men; and therefore but too fragile! A thousand causes may destroy it—An alliance of policy or of family; an aberration resulting from mistake, or corruption, may dispose of it, and abandon Europe to chains. In effect, Europe has no longer a guarantee but in the holy alliance; for such is her deplorable state. History sometimes presents the picture of states that have acquired a very considerable preponderance by, what may be termed, the sudden eruption of princes endowed with extraordinary genius.

Thus Gustavus Adolphus, Lewis XIV., Frederic, have given for a time to their countries an importance superior to the natural means of their states; but this splendour was only a transient meteor, for the very reason that it proceeded from man, and not from the essence of things: it disappeared with those who had caused it; the absence of these men of genius was sufficient to establish an equality, and sometimes in-

feriority with regard to other states; as in the example of Sweden, or of Prussia. But as it respects Europe, things are much worse. Here the inferiority has deeper roots; they bury themselves in the nature of things. The question no longer turns upon the fortunes of a man; our business is now with this nature of things, against which nothing ever prevails. Men appear, rise, sink, change, and disappear. The successor often delights to move in a route directly opposite to that of his predecessors; but who can thus turn things from the course assigned them by nature? Gustavus perishes at the plains of Lutzen; the Swedish greatness is eclipsed at Pultawa, for this power was created as by the hand of man; but when power is cemented by the very hand of nature, what term can be assigned for its duration? In all political constructions this should be well considered; once erected they produce effects according to their nature. If they repose on a grand basis of power, ambition will desire to employ it:—for this is its gratification; none becomes powerful but for the purpose of command; and giving the means of oppression, gives also the desire to employ them.

The evil of the actual order consists, therefore, in the erection of two powers disproportioned to the rest of the European force: There lies the capital defect of the present and future policy; a defect which leaves the other powers not a moment of security, or of genuine liberty. Thus on every occasion, all must travel to Petersburg and London to take the word of command: it was more convenient to receive it at Paris. Europe has taken a general attitude of vassalage in the political order. After

having made trial of the French supremacy, she has now, very innocently, resigned herself to the chains of Russia, and of England.

Laws of steel command Prussia, and Austria, to continue in the strictest union; let them look beyond them, and they will see that if petty interests may divide, an interest of the greatest possible strength bids them to unite; on one hand there is a few villages more or less; on the other—existence: The independence of one will follow that of the other; what would enfeeble Prussia, would equally enfeeble Austria; each blow aimed at the one, will be felt as much by the other. Austria can now take nothing from any member of the Germanic body: all the petty princes and ecclesiastical sovereignties have disappeared: She could therefore, only encroach upon the great states; but there would commence resistance, and combats. The same is the situation of Prussia; she can achieve nothing against the Netherlands, nor against France; the latter of necessity would sustain the former. In all the zone bordering on Prussia, there exists not a state but what is covered by the Egis of the Germanic confederation. Austria would defend Saxony: England protects Hanover in a special manner. Near home, therefore, Prussia can accomplish no object of ambition. She is a definite power, though her limits are very ill-chosen: She will be found to waste much time in attempting corrections, and in overtures for exchanges; but, in future she is restricted to this: not liable to be conquered, but under an absolute incapacity, to conquer.

Every continental war will resolve itself necessa-

rily into a war of alliance: for the principal weights are too great to be balanced otherwise than by coalitions: And the dangers are too manifest, and too serious, not to indicate coalition as the only means of salvation.

Here it is the combat of the Horatii; we perish fighting one by one: we may sustain each other, and perhaps escape, under the same shield. The old grudges which, in the times of the revolution, prevented the German powers from uniting with sincerity, have gradually worn away. At that epoch, the same men who for so many years had met upon the Oder and the Elbe, encountered upon the Meuse and the Rhine.

Astonished at their new ties, embittered by inveterate resentments, rejoicing more at the disasters of their auxiliaries, than at those of their enemies, they were found rather in presence, than alliance. No considerations of a higher order had, as yet, required of them the sacrifice of their prejudices, and the abjuration of their hatreds; they had not then felt the stings of adversity; impending dangers were not before their eyes: but here they are visible, they are palpable, they appeal to all the senses. Consequently, the alliance of the great German powers is irrevocably, and eternally, decreed by the bare spectacle of the power which has sprung up under their eyes; and whose weight will not delay to make itself felt. Under this head, the new system of the continent is of extreme simplicity. It consists in two points; for each to defend what he has, and to fix a watchful eye upon Russia. With respect to the sea, the system is equally simple, one only is strong, all others

are feeble; they should therefore be united, in order to be the least feeble possible, and approximate to the force which is opposed against them.

France, as we have already had occasion to remark, is the nucleus round which this maritime confederation will always groupe, because she constitutes its most powerful part. The formation of alliances resembles that of animal bodies, where the heart is the first to partake of life, about which all the rest approaches to seek it. France is no longer fitted to inspire any with distrust. Let her situation be well considered, and none surely will suspect her of brooding projects against Spain, more than against Germany; and still less against Italy: and if, besides, the supports are considered which are always ready to fly to the succour of the Netherlands; it will be seen that she might as well dream of the conquest of Europe, and of England. France, therefore, can now have but one principal tendency, that of the sea; upon which she will recover all the superiority refused her by the continental order. A maritime confederation in the policy of Europe, in general, is like the German confederation in that of Germany, in particular; these are, at present, the two elementary pivots of all political order.

Several things, hence follow;

1. That the actual system leaves less liberty than the preceding.

2. That the political order is simplified.

3. That no secondary power has either the means or the interest to encroach; as we perceive from the state of Sweden, that of France, of the Netherlands, of Austria, of Piedmont. The division of the south

of Europe will scarcely be suspected of harbouring tumultuary projects. Consequently, all the powers are found in what may be termed a state of self-preservation, adverse to wars; and which simplifies the movements of the political machine. On recollecting the principles of the continual wars, which have agitated Europe since that of the Spanish succession, nothing is recognised in the actual state of Europe, which exposes her to the return of similar conflicts. There no longer is, as at that time, Spanish domains to share out, nor throne of Spain to excite the ardour of competitors. This long and cruel war was the effect of the dispersion, over the surface of Europe, of the members of the Spanish monarchy; nothing so encouraging to ambitious projects; when each sees the means of aggrandizement, each also is tempted to employ them. The richness of the spoil therefore is what causes the duration of wars, and their intensity. Thus in the war of the succession, the *stakes* consisted of the Netherlands, (then Spanish) the Milanese, the kingdom of Naples, Sardinia and Sicily; there was something for all tastes, and for all appetites. We shall never see another Spanish succession!

The first war against Maria Theresa, with that of 1756, its consequence, are not of a nature to be renewed; there is no longer an Austrian inheritance to be shared; no longer a Silesia to wrest from Austria, to defend against Austria; there is no longer a Poland to divide, a Bavaria to be invaded. The feeble crescent will reign peaceably within the circle traced about him. All the causes, therefore, of the wars of the eighteenth, are wanting in the present century:

the *contentious matter is exhausted*. The fixation and simplification of interests have drained, as it were, its source; and political projectors must submit to the despair of being unable to disturb the immense mass of interests reciprocally interwoven; which it would be necessary to shake at the same time, in order to produce a perceptible agitation. Consequently, Europe is devoted to a state of fixedness, and of permanent immobility; it may be said of her with the poet:

Stat mole suâ.

Only the two great masses that press upon Europe, can produce any sensible shock; for they only have weight enough, and present dangers enough to excite and to justify a movement, which the moment they are concerned, must become general; for every partial movement would couple imprudence, with inutility.

Here another question presents itself. Is the order just described more compatible with the interests of Europe, than that we may presume to have been conceived by Napoleon? We have seen that which exists; let us now consider that which, we may suppose, would have existed.

France, from the Yssel to the Alps and to the Pyrenees; the Germanic confederation of the north, from the Rhine to the Elbe; that of the south, from the Rhine to the Inn, and the mountains of Bohemia.

Without this grand limit, which was a species of outwork to France, Prussia, the dutchy of Warsaw, Austria, and Illyria; on the three northern sides, Russia, Denmark, Sweden. Italy, forming a single state, or, at most, divided into two. The Hanseatic cities

were not destined, more than Rome, to continue dependant on France. All these places had been occupied rather *against* England, than *for* France; these extensions of territory were not of a nature to be durable. In making them, Napoleon conducted like the architect, who assembles materials on the ground-plot of the edifices he purposes to construct. The dutchy of Berg would inevitably have been melted into the monarchy erected in Westphalia; sooner or later, this arrangement must have been realized. What was seen to exist, proceeded, in some respects, from circumstances; or, perhaps, from irritations; none of which were of a nature to endure, but all such as time would have reformed. An edifice cannot be judged until it is completed; that in question was merely commenced. The architect was master of his ground; he felt himself bound by no precedent; he was accountable for his works to none but himself. Free to apply the faculties of his mind, as well as the immensity of his force, to perfecting his work, he would have amended until he had effaced its defects, and heightened its advantages. In this plan, it is true, the supremacy was on the side of France; but, however mischievous be all supremacy, this was, at least, less menacing, and more remediable, than that of Russia.

Wars against the Russians, and their terrible auxiliaries, the rapacious tribes who follow their armies, are incomparably more desolating than wars waged with the civilized nations of the west. For barbarism comes from the east. All this supremacy, for which Napoleon is so much reproached, would have come to an end; himself would have found the same which

nature assigns to all; then would the usual order of societies, that is, independence, have resumed its ordinary course; whereas, in the actual state, dependence is established by the very nature of things. But what was found especially more European in the order we analyze, and which resulted from the system of Napoleon, consisted in the union it compelled of all the maritime forces of Europe in a single mass.

Hatred, and limited views, have exposed only the odious part of the enterprise against Spain; they have emulously kept out of sight the part destined to give new life to this languishing monarchy: more durable relations with France, and a uniform direction towards maritime emancipation. Consequently, the confederation necessary to effect it was found ready made, and united, as it were, in the same hand. What, in future, must be sought, and almost implored, was then in actual possession; Spain, France, Holland, and all the shores of Italy, presented in this uniform direction a mass of forces which would not have been braved with impunity. Napoleon, to crown this confederation, gave it the alliance of the United States.

This was a trait of genius, indicating in its author the vast and judicious idea that the navies of Europe, by themselves, are not in a condition to balance that of England; and that they must be supported by that of the United States, or succumb in every conflict with this formidable adversary. Napoleon would not have committed the inexcusable fault of resisting the emancipation of Southern America; in which he would have perceived the same principle of succour, he had already discerned in the maritime energies of the United States.

These grand results, so formidable for England, certainly did not escape the penetration of the ministry of that country; and, because it knew all the extent of the effects of this system, it has pursued its author with so animated, and so persevering a persecution; it felt that, on pain of death, it had become requisite to triumph over the sole enemy England ever had, who was capable of appreciating her position, her vulnerable points, and the means of wounding her. The ministers assumed an air of sympathy for the fate of Europe, but they were only solicitous for that of England; they appeared in the attitude of extending the hand of protection towards the oppressed, touched with a sense of their woes; but it was for themselves they invoked succours, while clamorously vociferating for union against the common enemy. Fully apprized there was no salvation for them but in the safety of all; that by the succour of every hand could only be broken the rod under which Europe bowed, they successfully duped her into an interest for the safety of England. But since their efforts have been attended by a too happy success; now England reigns over those she has enfranchised, there is ample leisure to feel what this marvellous deliverance has cost; to judge what has been gained by changing the yoke; and perceive what motives dictate the resumption of the plan destroyed, so far as circumstances still admit of its execution.

CHAPTER VI.

Spirit of the actual policy.

THE time of agitations is past. The European tempest is appeased: an irresistible force assigns to each whatever he may have rescued from its violence. The contented and the discontented, the rich and the poor, each must keep the place he occupies, and which the force of things assigns him. The new destinies of Europe chain him there. Whatever has been aggrandized, will continue more great; erected on the pedestal of necessity, and of fortune: whatever has dwindled and bent, must derive its consolations from the same sentiment of necessity, and of association with the common good. Become all equally stones of the edifice, they should remain in the place where the hand of the architect has placed them; chained by prudence, as well as by weakness; to five and twenty years of agitations, long days of tranquillity are about to succeed.

Two things produce troubles, and prepare political storms.

1. Rights and political calculations, constitute the material of these troubles.
2. The private dispositions of the directors of policy, influence their peculiar character.

In the actual state of Europe all rights are established. We perceive none of the plausible pretexts

and subjects of litigation which the diplomatic art was employed to discover, to cultivate, and lead from afar to an object foreseen, and, too often, realized by injustice amidst the general surprise. Ancient diplomacy lived too much upon surprises; the effects of crooked calculations, which displaced in a moment all the bases of the system in being. Thus by the treaty of 1756, the French policy was wrested with violence from its old foundations, to be transplanted in a direction contrary to that which it had ever followed. And France with astonishment beheld herself transported in a day to the side of those against whom she had combated three hundred years, and in view of those with whom she had shared many battles. The partition of Poland also exhibited the union around a common spoil of those, who till then, had been occupied in despoiling one another. These abrupt changes, happening in the conduct of states, tend to shake them, as earthquakes shake cities placed on a violently agitated soil. But at this day, all the elements of these commotions are dissipated; they are not to be discovered in things, more than in men. When the division of power is equal between many, conflicts are more easily set on foot than when the number is more restricted. Thus, in the actual state of things, two powers predominate. Great distances separate them; they are of different natures; they have nothing to envy, nor directly to take from, each other: the principal force of Europe is therefore in a natural state of reciprocal peace.

The secondary powers may indeed be compelled to observe a continual defensive against these two superiors: but they have neither the means nor interest

to attack them: the great powers will prevent, or else arrange the differences which may arise between the little states, and will not allow them to issue in a disastrous eruption; and this from a regard to their own security; for it would prove impossible for them to avoid taking part in these debates, in the end. From that time the war would become general: and, under the actual system, nothing is easier to perceive than that every war in Europe, becoming necessarily a war of alliance, will terminate also in a general war. The weight of this consideration will obstinately contend for the preservation of peace.

The states of Europe, plunged in debt by their late wars, will not for a long time be able to support the expenses of new conflicts. Credit would vanish at the first stroke of the drum, and its absence would complete their ruin; already too far advanced.

With the immense expenditure which all war occasions, it can no longer be made with the ordinary revenues of states; these are mortgaged for the regular expenses of administration. It would be requisite, therefore, to have recourse to loans; means ruinous in themselves, and never so little at disposal as when most wanted: for credit is no friend to war, and does not easily consent to become the author of that, which is calculated to destroy itself. The credit of states has been established by the two things which seem the best adapted to prevent its birth, dilapidations, and wars; the fable of Saturn has been realized by this singular procreation.

Governments would therefore be reduced to the necessity of making war by the ways of extortion, requisition, and seizure: as was the case in France

after the fall of the *assignats* and *mandats*, as all nations make it who have only real finances, and are ignorant of artificial finance; as the Turks, and the Spaniards. They would be compelled to seize things, as they were of late years to seize bodies, to supply the expense of the loss of men, and give them substitutes. The more destructive the nature of the war, the more necessary it became to squeeze the human species, to make it yield a quality equal to that of the troops destroyed. All states, therefore, equally need a long repose, to repair the losses of blood they have sustained, that it may return with abundance into the canals which it formerly filled; else, like bodies deprived of their ordinary refection, they must sink into marasmus, and languor. This subject is too important, too capital, to be refused all the developements it presents.

England supports the weight of a debt of twenty thousand millions.* In the conflict of the wants of states, against their resources, England is still the champion who supports the burden the least awkwardly, and promises to sink the latest. But meanwhile, this debt is such that it excludes all idea of mortgage, as of purchase; it has no vendible, or acquirable value; it has no point of comparison in history; *it is the fable of the public debts!*

The tributes of the world must be appropriated for its liquidation; it demands that from Canada to Calcutta, Europe, India, Asia, Africa, the globe in fine, should be submitted to the press, to yield the juices which feed, and fatten this blood-sucker of the universe. In every place, in every country, in every

* Of France.

climate, they toil, they traffic, they sweat, to sustain the honour, that is, the credit of the treasury of London. Six hundred and fifty millions, of annual interest, must be deducted before the nation has a right to touch the fruits of its soil, or can proceed to defray its current expenses. The creditors of the state are served before the state itself, before the producer; peace suffers all the effects of war, and a general ruin, a perpetual constraint prevails every where, not to lose the privilege—of plunging deeper in debt. Severe privations must be endured, not to disgust new swarms of devourers; and to keep some members in reserve, whose apparent succulency may favour new calculations, and satiate new hunger! Such is the whole secret of the art of public credit; to be faithful with a view to future necessity; to raise altars to the fear of want, served by the priests of fidelity. This management forces England every year towards the abyss, of a new loan: to obtain the means of paying at the same time the interest of her debt, and all her ministerial departments: objects her ordinary revenue cannot completely effect. This conduct is not unlike that of the hopeful economist, who adds every year to his debt, to discharge the interest of his borrowings, and his family expenses!

The English debt annually absorbs three fifths of the revenue of Great Britain.

France is indebted three thousand millions, or there about;* the annual interest of which, costs her two hundred millions; this single article consumes a third of her revenue; and if we include annuities and pen-

* Of France.

sions, *half of her revenue* is found to be thus appropriated.

Prussia is a borrower; this state is poor, and her new formation empoverishes her in many respects; for it compels her to keep on foot a strong army, and to incur heavy expenses in acquiring the points of support she needs. Prussia has much to do, in order to establish herself firmly in her new position, and in front of her new neighbours; Russia and France. Her finances will long remain, therefore, in a very straitened condition; she would not be able to sustain war by her own means. Prussia will feel, still more than she has ever, the need of subsidies: She could only receive them from France or England, and, in abundance, from the latter only. It will be long before Prussia will see the treasures of Frederic again; these transient treasures, painfully amassed by forecast;—and wantonly squandered by prodigality: which encourage ambition, wild projects, false confidence; and leave a frightful void in the hand which lets them escape, with sterility in the very places they would have fertilized; if a better direction had applied them where they would have become imperishable sources of new riches. Thus it happened with the treasures of Henry IV. those of Frederic, and of Napoleon. The first, melted in the hands of prodigal courtiers; Sully expired of grief at seeing consumed, with such facility, the fruits which his frugal hands had gathered; ministers lavished with smiles on worthless, and insatiable favourites, what the minister with *face of denial** had rescued from the avidity of mistresses. All this gold amass-

* *Au front negatif*; name given to Sully.

ed in the coffers of princes, though, it come there by torrents, is wasted by imperceptible means, without utility for the state, or the prince, unable to retain it. It has contributed to mad enterprises, and senseless expenses: it has inspired presumption; a taste for profusion; and shortly, nothing has remained but the fatal traces of its passage; whereas had it been spread over the fields, and the manufactories, it would have produced an imperishable, and ever increasing opulence. From what have the millions accumulated in the vaults of Potsdam, or the Thuilleries, defunded the successors of Frederic, or the sceptre of Napoleon? They have all equally vanished; ruining their masters, dazzled by the splendour of this false wealth; and tempted to engage in adventurous projects, by the aspect of means at their disposal, presenting facility of execution.

Austria has nothing abundant, and regular, in her finances, but disorder, and embarrassment: She sustains herself in the midst of this chaos; but she must plunge in it, without ulterior hope of rising, if to these causes of penury she should superadd those which are inseparable from war: For the high price of the objects which constitute the aliment of war, renders it very costly; their value becomes enhanced to such degrees as, without great efforts, cannot be attained by the actors in these bloody scenes. And, the more to condemn war at the tribunal of humanity, it is found that the cheapest part of it—is always human blood! Doubtless we ought to bless a penury which produces a fruit so inestimable, as the maintenance of peace. It compels governments not to deviate from the ways of peace, into which they have en-

tered. Thus it may be conjectured with confidence, that, for a long space of time, the European powers will be weaned from all propensity to war, by the difficulty itself of making it. The proof of this assertion is seen at the present moment. The conclusion of the war has compelled each to cast up, and adjust his accounts. The burden which France must take on herself is well known. Her debt in the space of five years, has mounted from a sum of eighty-four millions of perpetual rents, to that of two hundred millions: to which, if we add annuities, pensions, and appointments of retreat, for services ancient, or modern, real, or supposed, this expense exceeds three hundred millions annually; or two-fifths of the revenue of France. Russia has lately been forced to negotiate a very considerable, and extremely burdensome loan. Prussia has not been able to avoid the same shoal. The kingdom of the Netherlands has experienced a similar necessity: this country is also loaded with a considerable debt. Thus all the governments of Europe have been seen, at the same time, exposing their ulcers upon every public place; there suing with importunity for the last dollar: alluring gamblers by the bait of exorbitant interest; and out-bidding each other to attract all that part of the precious metals, which throughout the continent, discovers a tendency to seek either a safer, or more lucrative place of deposit. In the midst of peace this spectacle of general distress is exhibited; what shall we behold, should war arrive, and scatter its cries of alarm in the midst of all these necessities?

The personal dispositions of sovereigns to maintain a constant peace, have been proclaimed in the

most solemn manner; these dispositions are of a nature to preserve the system established; that is, to continue peace.

The concord of opinions and of intentions, on the part of the most powerful princes, excludes all possibility of tumult on the part of others. For what other powers would possess the weight requisite to shake this determination, and to change its direction? Since Europe was destined to submit to a sort of tutelage on the part of the great powers, it is consoling that the tendency of the present should be altogether pacific, and that its continuance should depend on the preservation of that which is; not as the means of the greatest good, in the abstract; for it cannot be disguised that the whole of this system is not good; but only as the means of repose, and stability in the allotted system. Europe no longer discusses upon what she has done, nor upon what she ought still to do; but, taking things as she finds them, she assigns this system as her point of departure, and regular state; for the preservation of which she purposes to employ all her efforts. Such is the *statu quo* for which she has declared her devoted affection. Thus, nearly, was the procedure after the peace of Westphalia. If many wars nevertheless followed it, the reason is, that Europe of that day, bore no resemblance to Europe of the present. The powers who then occupied most room, and figured most, appear not among the architects of the new system; Sweden, and Spain, rank in the third class of the powers of the day; they shone in the first at the time of the treaty of Westphalia. England made not her appearance there; fully occupied by the storms which, for half a century, con-

vulsed her interior, she was eclipsed, as it were, to the eyes of the continent; at present, she shares in its empire. Prussia of that day resembled Wurtemburgh of the present; Russia had still to wait a half century, to introduce into Europe her formidable name; this name of its new master. Poland then defended the approaches of Europe against the Turks, and against the descendants of the Scythians; it is now on her frontier that Russia has placed her foot, to spring upon Europe; France was the soul, as it were, of the great transactions concluded at Munster; now she has been the object, and no longer the regulator, of the measures ordained by others; then she exercised a splendid protectorate in Germany; at present she is the object of her umbrage and exclusions. But more, the arrangement cemented so painfully at Munster was only partial; it had reference only to a part of Europe; at present it is the very body of Europe which decrees for itself; and receives a political charter from the hands of the principal powers. The habitual interviews between the great sovereigns have co-operated to confirm this establishment, more effectually than the ordinary relations between their ministers could have accomplished.

The good fortune of Europe has given the most distinguished of these sovereigns a character which unites, in a high degree, the principles of modern civilization, with a personal elevation of sentiments corresponding to his rank. A distinct part in history seems reserved for the emperor Alexander, the second founder of the Russian empire, by the completion and consolidation of its limits; he has now only to embel-

lish the interior of the frame he has traced. Peter less civilized the Russians, than rescued them from barbarism; he compelled them to change the manners of the East, and of Tartary, for those of the West, and of Europe; he rather made of them men different from what they had been, than men altogether like others. The combat was then against barbarism, subsisting in all its horrors; it was requisite to subdue it. This war has been brought to a successful conclusion; and Peter came forth from the conflict victorious, dragging Scythia, chained as it were, to his triumphal car; and, according to the fine expression of Frederic, having *wrought upon his people, as aqua fortis acts upon iron!* By this victory civilization has been introduced; it only remains to give it extension; and to this end the emperor Alexander labours with a zeal that claims the gratitude of mankind, as well as that of his people. To measure the extent of such a benefit, it is necessary to consider what will be the effect upon the human species of civilization propagated over vast countries, where it had never yet penetrated; as well as that, which, as a necessary consequence, will be produced upon the universe by the introduction of arts, of sciences, of industry, of agriculture, into the heart of immense countries, hitherto unknown to the rest of the world! It will be the same with Russia as it has been with America; who, by the appearance of her smallest, and least favoured part, the United States, has already brought a preponderant weight into the affairs of the universe.

Russia must be considered as a land of discovery; as a creation to be completed, whose perfection will be felt every where. This is sufficiently apparent by what the mere outline has already produced. Scarce-

ly has an extremity of this empire entered upon civilization, and what commerce; what social relations; what throngs of opulent travellers; what a new world, in policy, in commerce, in industry! See cities rise in the midst of savage regions! The most exquisite art has presided at their construction; they put the ancient cities to shame! population springs as from under the earth; all becomes animated; all things kindle into life! The child is initiated in arts, into sciences, whose existence was never even suspected by his father: improvement is propagated, is confirmed, and behold a country, entirely new, connected in all its parts with the rest of the world, which it comes to enrich, and astonish with its new life! The work is to be extended over immense spaces, and will require time for its entire accomplishment: but it tends every day towards the object; and urged with more activity, perseverance, and means, than hitherto has been possible, or perhaps customary; it will arrive at its perfection, with the aid of the great master, Time. This leads to remarking the difference between the sovereigns of modern times, and those of the remoter epochs of history: some few among them have deserved to see their names decorated by the most glorious titles, since they attest the gratitude of the human race. But how few are found, even among these, who have laboured to civilize the people they governed! I see it is true, the Roman emperors extend the power of their arms over Germany, Sarmatia, Britain, Armenia, in fine, over all the parts of Africa, and of Asia, they were able to approach; but I do not see any of them employ themselves in the moral improvement of the people they have subdued. The Syba-

rites of Rome go to reign, indeed, over all the barbarians of the world; with great dexterity they render them subservient to the gratification of their own pride, or cupidity; but they contribute nothing to the education of these savage tribes; they become enriched with their effects; but they enrich not them, in return, with better manners; with a better administrative, or intellectual direction. A few traits of good nature; a few of those expressions which discover a heart, whose luxury is benevolence, obtain for Titus the most flattering title man can receive; the *delight of the human race*. He owed it, in great part, to the weariness produced by the crimes of his predecessors: he gleamed a star of beneficence in that deep night of atrocities, which from the time of Tiberius had enveloped Rome; the Romans astonished to find a man in their master, set no bounds to their grateful admiration! But it is not seen that he made any effort to purify manners, to found institutions, to diffuse over the surface of the empire germes fitted to drain the source of the calamities, whose ravages he arrested. Such is the difference of our epoch from those which have preceded; a difference which proceeds from the four great elements of modern civilization, unknown to the ancient; the press, the great maritime commerce, the reciprocal intercourse of nations, and that which will prove more, even more powerful than all these, the formation of representative governments.

But there are besides some singular circumstances which furnish, as it were, happy corollaries to the pacific tendency of the new system of Europe.

There prevails among the pacificating sovereigns a double conformity of age, and of past fortunes;

three of them are still in the middle of their career. The long days which heaven, no doubt, has reserved them, and which every consideration invites us to wish them, will contribute to the confirmation of their work. The workman who has conceived and executed, is better qualified to preserve, than he who only receives a thing ready made. The first is attached to his work by a greater number of motives. Besides, the frequent interviews which have taken place within the last five years between these princes, will likewise tend to the maintenance of their work. The more glorious, and painful it has been, the more will it be the object of their care; and their forces in their extent, as in their duration, will be employed to sustain it.

It is also quite remarkable that among these princes there are four, who, by a sudden return of fortune, have recovered the power which had escaped from their hands, or which they had reason to fear would be very greatly diminished. Omitting what has occurred in France, have we not seen the occupation of the capitals of Russia, of Prussia, and of Austria? Have we not heard the echos of the sinister words; *such a house has ceased to reign?* In more places than one was there not good reason to fear possessing nothing, but what it might please the generosity of the conqueror to leave, or suit his convenience to restore?

England herself, though protected by the elements, has not felt herself always in safety behind this barrier; for her enemies sallied from her own bosom; and, for a moment, her floating ramparts were seen preparing to unite with her adversaries. What les-

sons of moderation are inculcated by such great misfortunes; and enforced by the example of what intemperance may cost by seeing him fall its victim, who in other times had made all bend! Nothing has ever passed before the eyes of men more strongly characterized. Men with extreme reluctance, when just escaped from the tempest, commit themselves again to the mercy of the storms: rescued from past disasters, secure of the present, the future only is to be consolidated by all the temperaments fitted to disperse the clouds, which have obscured the course of the last six lustres. The example of the principal sovereigns will serve as a lesson, and a model to others; and their united efforts will be seen directed to the confirmation of peace. It is probable, therefore, that political affairs will, for a long time, be determined by arbitrations, and friendly mediations. Diplomacy is preparing to resume permanently its ancient routine of negotiation, and secresy.

The procedure was similar after the peace of 1763; for then commenced a general state of pacification, which continued for a period of nearly thirty years, and is the most durable epoch of peace presented in modern history.

From which time Europe threw aside her military habits, and ceased to delight in war. All affairs were adjusted by arbitration or interference; as was seen at Teschen, at Reichenback, and upon other occasions. It is, therefore, allowable to hope, that in future the same spirit of conciliation will preside over the counsels of Europe, and realize the consoling and solemn declarations they have announced to its inhabitants; who embrace with joy the certainty, after so many agitations, of being permitted at length to respire.

War is for bodies politic, what fever is for animal bodies. Though it be impossible to extirpate all its germes, to destroy all its principles; we may at least prevent the return of its paroxysms; diminish their duration, and severity, and allay them by palliatives, judiciously chosen, and skilfully applied. A language all of peace, and of peace eternal, may shock the noble ardour of some bold spirits, and terrify, with the prospect of long inactivity, men for whom repose comes like a palsy in the vigour of life, and condemns them to a calm, so opposite to the agitations which constitute the food of ambition, and the warrior's delight. But let those who are affected by this decree, remember there is a time for all things; that the epoch of rapid movements in the heart of polished societies is of limited duration; and that the honours they procure are acquired at a price too high to be regretted. These bloody lotteries, where these great prizes of glory may still be gained, are now only drawn in America; and those who are chained by repose, find themselves between two great principles of consolation, the glory of their recollections, and the barriers created by necessity. But what, more than all, guaranties to the world a long duration of peace, is the direction it has universally acquired towards commerce, and the mutual intercourse between people and people. Peace is the vehicle of these lucrative, and social communications; war is their enemy; from the moment of its eruption, all ties are severed. Consequently, war restricts the generality of nations in their dearest affections, and most important interests. Prior to this epoch, in which civilization exercises so extensive an influence,

the same relations, and the same interests, did not exist, or were not felt; for, nations living in a state of reciprocal insulation, never approached each other, except to combat.

But, since the social vehicles have brought them together, and caused them to intermingle, the face of things is entirely changed; and human societies with these new principles of existence, can no longer be directed as they were when *found absent* from the midst of themselves. A proof of this appeared in the irritation excited by the prolongation of the wars of Napoleon. How was he pursued by the imprecations of the inhabitants of Europe; how severely were felt the privations; how were seized the smallest glimmerings of peace; how were the regrets of all renewed, by the delay of this object of universal solicitude. What a cry of triumph, and of joy was heard when the spring relaxed, or broken, permitted men too long separated, to meet again, and embrace. The long cramp which Napoleon had caused Europe to endure, was what most contributed to his downfall, because it was that which most shocked the manners of the age; and of all the burdens that can be imposed on men, the most oppressive is that which clashes with their civilization. Napoleon himself confessed it, when too late; by saying, at the moment of his fall, "I cannot re-establish myself; I have shocked the people of Europe;" a tardy admission for him, but not for those, who, having to govern the same people, are thus apprized of the shoal which a man, in other respects, of so vast a genius, was unable to shun.

The domestic concerns of states will, for a long

time, absorb the attention of princes; and will turn towards their interior the restless, or offensive glances they have heretofore fixed on their neighbours; which provoked the storms that have commonly ended in wars. When the principles and routine of governments were stationary, the attention of princes was left unembarrassed; the interior of their states occupied its smallest proportion. The heads of governments were, regularly, more busied with what passed among their neighbours, than at home; Lewis XIV., Lewis XV., Frederic, Maria Theresa, the Austrian, or French princes that have reigned in Spain, had merely to continue a movement already given, long established, and unresisted; but, how remote from us are these placid times! Europe resembles a machine, which having been broken, has undergone repairs; and the workmen are attempting to set it again in motion; this is its first trial. In one place a sovereignty, which has been effaced, has disappeared for a long course of years, is to be consolidated; in another, an existence which has experienced reverses, or interruptions, is to be confirmed; elsewhere, a new domination is to be made palatable; ties must be strengthened between the newly assembled parts of a state, and their interests, jarred by an unexpected approach, are to be reconciled. In all these cases, the machine must be organized anew; and the inconveniences remedied, which its action will always detect in the construction. Every where, as we see, there is much to be done; till each has firmly established himself, he must abandon all thoughts of attacking others; thus common embarrassments, are the source of common security. As, therefore, all the go-

vernments of Europe were more or less involved in the revolution, they still deeply feel its imperious effects; it has subjected them to restraints from which, in times past, they were free. It is one of the consequences of these grand convulsions, called revolutions, that they leave nothing in its place; nothing, far or near, escapes their effects. Such is the actual picture of Europe. She resembles a ship in which, after a tempest, every one is employed in searching for his effects.

All the governments will have the same subjects of attention, and those of too deep an interest to leave them much time for the intrigues, from which political tempests too often proceed. Thus, by a re-action as unexpected, as improbable, the longest peace ever enjoyed by Europe will owe its origin to the most extensive, and the most sanguinary war she ever experienced. The establishment of representative governments, will prove another powerful agent of peace between nations.

Consider how few real things they have to envy each other; recollect the subjects of the wars which have so cruelly tormented them: in what intrigues, in what private interests, in what vile, or false combinations have originated these dilapidations of the fortune, these frightful libations of the blood, of men!

Almost all the wars of Europe have hitherto resembled those of which the East is the theatre: wars proceeding from the caprice of princes, whose lives resemble a uniform study of surprises against their neighbours, and of aggrandizements for themselves. Custom has rendered war the ordinary state of humanity; an occupation for princes, of pleasure, or of

vanity, like the chase, and other pomps of royalty: *Tempore quo solent reges ad bella procedere*, saith the scripture. All ancient history presents the same picture; and such is the uniform colour of modern history, till the close of the nineteenth century; for the war against Maria Theresa of 1740, that of 1756, that of Bavaria, in 1778; the partition of Poland, the attack upon Turkey, combined between Catharine, and Joseph; were so many dashing strokes copied after the oriental manner, which can neither be excused, nor even interpreted, by any rule of justice, or of reason.

And wherefore these sudden eruptions of ambition, this perpetration of projects, conceived in darkness, and nursed in the shades of mystery? What gave them birth, and facilitated their execution, but that their deliberation was secret; that perverse men, in the absence of all responsibility, skreened from all control, arranged at their leisure these sanguinary plans, and subscribed to these grand assassinations of nations, having the temerity to smile upon their own interests? The parliament of Paris, subordinate to the court as it was, still formed an obstacle to the turbulent fancies of ministers; such is the efficacy of the *shadow* even of public discussion! How much greater, when instead of magistrates with powers not very exactly defined, unsupported by public opinion, who did not address themselves to this authority; at that time, not even in being; how much greater will be the restraint, when governments shall have always before their eyes an authority, flowing from the very bosom of the nation; from the purest sources of opinion, thus become the strongest of powers?

To obtain the means of paying for war, it would be requisite to commence by saying, why it is made. If Louvois waged war, to divert the attention of his master from the embellishment of his palaces, to more elevated objects; if the palatinate was devoted to flames; if, for thirty years, an unfortunate man, for the tomb has closed over his name and the story of his woes; if he dragged his hapless existence from dungeon to dungeon, without accusation, without trial, without communication with human beings, if a word from his lips, plunged a dagger in his heart; if he was during all his life, invisible, and at the same time present to the eyes of all; placed between the services, and the poniard, of the same domestic, nourished, and menaced by the same hand; if all these horrors, worthy of the palaces of the East, or the *Inferno* of Dante; have existed in France at the distance from us, of an age; (a) if 500,000 Frenchmen were forced from their natal soil, impoverished of the industry, and the treasures they bore to its enemies; to what must all this be attributed, if not to the absence of the protecting institution which presides over the new destinies of France; and which tends to become the uniform constitution of Europe? She will find these institutions guarantees of peace far more durable than all the transactions, and associations formed by diplomatists; things by their nature variable as the thoughts, or the interests of their authors. But institutions have duration for their effect, as they have light for their principle. An unexampled concurrence of circumstances, which merit the appellation of imperious, impose, therefore, on the world the salutary law of a solid and durable peace.

Princes and people, men and things; all tends to it: all contributes to it: all invites to it: all guarantees it: none has the power to disturb it: and the affairs which present themselves in the distance, are not of a nature to restrict the enjoyment of this good, so ardently desired, *and so inestimable to preserve.*

NOTE (a.)

Within a few years, as a late French writer remarks, the reign of Lewis XIV. has been the subject of much attention in France. The epoch of its history is referred to by the writers who defend the dogmas of absolute power with singular delight: it is the ground on which they most willingly meet the advocates of popular doctrines. The latter, after examining the field on which they are challenged to combat, find no reason to shrink from the contest. The hope of triumph must animate their efforts, while the happiness of nations, is deemed preferable to the dazzling illusions of military glory; and while the interests of humanity, are in higher esteem than the brilliant creations of imagination. At our distance from the age of Lewis XIV. it is not easy to guard our thoughts from a sudden surprise of admiration. At this period, we see only the splendour of its monuments, and the master pieces of its genius. The groans of the victims of ambition, interrupt not the silence of ages; the tears of the oppressed water the earth, without leaving traces; and blood unjustly shed, disturbs not the quiet of the tombs! Even history learns to flatter the power which is past: all speaks aloud of the grandeur of princes; while of the miseries of their people, all is silent.

Consider Lewis XIV. in the midst of his court, nothing can be more magnificent than the spectacle; surrounded by the prodigies of art, all talents conspiring to his glory, he is present at his own apotheosis. Like a deity whose volitions are laws, nature bows before him; forests disappear at his nod, mountains are levelled, waters are elevated; the seas approach, and unite; the world is filled with his renown. But leave not this court so brilliant, and so polished; trust not your eyes beyond these sumptuous palaces, these marbles animated by a creative chisel, these breathing bronzes, the faithful image of courtiers. Enter not the straw-roofed cottages; for there dwells nought but servitude, and despair! The walls of these palaces have been cemented, by the tears of a people; this groupe of bronze has devoured, the subsistence of an hundred families; to excavate these canals, and to suspend these aqueducts, whole provinces have been ruined! The monarch himself, amidst these deceptive prosperities, is the victim of chagrin. Fortune soon teaches him that he is separated from human destinies, by one of those fictions only, which evince the infirmity of our intelligence; he dies, and the public joy insults, and disturbs his obsequies! Such, in a few words, is the history of the most brilliant reign of absolute sovereignty! In some of the biographical romances of Madame de Genlis, much read in this country, and, in the age of Lewis XIV., by Voltaire, the dazzling parts of this reign only are presented; the foregoing portrait is a less flattered likeness.

CHAPTER VII.

General Affairs to come.

FROM the orderly state in which the affairs of Europe are found, there is nothing perceptible in her bosom of a nature to disturb the peace she enjoys.

To find her a subject of general occupation, we must quit her sphere, and turn our eyes towards America. This country is shared in a singular mode; peopled by Europeans, one part has escaped from their domination; the other is struggling to withdraw from it. The part enfranchised has become strong, powerful, rich; it takes an active part in the affairs of the world, and participates in all its profits by an ever-increasing activity of commerce. Its example is before the eyes of the parts of America still subject to the bonds of Europe. There rises, beyond the seas, as did Carthage opposite to Rome, a power which tends to form an *American system*; exclusive of all European influence. This system is evidently that of the *United States*. It cannot fail to become that also of all the states, which strive to form themselves throughout the extent of this country. This plan leads America to two things.

1. To abstain from all participation in the affairs of Europe.

2. To prohibit Europe all participation in the affairs of America.

This is a primary, elementary *datum*, destined to form the basis of American policy, and to keep it separate from that of Europe. It consists in reciprocity of independence; and merely signifies the intention to abstain, that others may abstain; to respect, in order to be respected in return.

This species of independence is the completion of that already enjoyed by the United States of America.

Surely this *march* will not escape Europe, nor deceive her sagacity. An occasion has recently occurred which places this disposition in a strong light. Events have introduced what it was natural to foresee.

The *Floridas*, locked in between Louisiana, and the original possessions of the United States, have been, as it were, abandoned to the latter, by one of those chances which have so much influence upon human affairs. The possession of this country completes for the United States, that of all the sea-coast which reigns over the immense extent, comprised between Mexico, and Acadia, the two extremities of the American possessions; but, besides, it gives them the exclusive control of the bay of Mexico; in which the United States will find establishments, and stations for their marine of the highest importance. But, greatly as this acquisition favours the American navigation, it is equally inconvenient for that of England; the course of which is from the north, to the south of America, and towards the West Indies; which form, as it were, its centre. England has large possessions

in the West Indies, in Canada, in Newfoundland. All these points must correspond together; she has, besides, established great communications with the Spanish main, opened by the revolution to all flags. It is, therefore, for her interest that the bay of Mexico, and the Floridas, should not be in the power of the United States; who will find in them such commanding points, as she herself occupies in so many places. England is well pleased to possess points of this nature, but she does not care to find the like in the power of others. In the affair of the Floridas, the United States have intimated their intention to decline all mediation, and all interference of Europe, in their differences with Spain. It is evident that this aversion from all participation with the European policy, is an axiom of conduct for the United States, and is destined to become that of all America. The enfranchisement of the latter, approaches every day nearer to its accomplishment; and the state of debility into which Spain has relapsed, removes all doubt as to the issue of this event. Spain, conscious of her inability to realize, unassisted, her projects against America, knocks at the gates of all courts, to implore a helpful interposition. She colours her demands with the most specious pretexts she can imagine; disguising the enormity of her faults, the abyss of her calamities, the horror inspired by her transactions, and her opposition to the general spirit of Europe; she pursues with importunities whatever has power in Europe. However inconsiderable the interest she had hitherto inspired, she has succeeded to extinguish it completely by her late ministerial revolution; which has removed men that may be considered as her

planks of safety; if she might still hope for safety. Behold her again plunged in the route of perdition, into which she is hurried by the prejudices, and the interests of certain classes, who, there as elsewhere, conceive that all should be governed either by them, or for them.

All sort of consideration and of credit, has abandoned this power at her utmost need; reduced to her individual resources; impotent to pursue the contest; incapable of embracing the only resolution which reason indicates, that of acknowledging a system she can no longer prevent; Spain has become a source of perplexity, and of impoverishment for the rest of Europe. The latter cannot dispense with America; and America is disturbed by the prolongation of a war, which holds a part of the world in an equivocal state. America may be driven by this series of attacks to the adoption of resolutions, whose repercussion Europe will feel. It may be supposed that America, bursting, in the violence of her resentment, the ties of ordinary intercourse between nations, will interdict these relations at once to her enemies, and her gain-sayers; and only remain open to those who shall have favoured her. What an immense advantage for the latter; the English, for example, who not feeling bound by the forms, and regularity of proceedings which shackle the French, take a much greater part in the affairs of America, than a severe delicacy, and a greater reserve, have permitted to the latter. On the other hand, the continuance of the war between Spain and her colonies, occasions a scarcity of specie in Europe; the inevitable and foreseen effect of this war! A cry of distress is heard from one extremity

of Europe, to the other. At the moment the events of late years have increased the wants, the resources are incessantly diminishing: the European commerce is extended, and the means of liquidating its definitive balance are shortened: the war of America arrests the working, and the transportation of the metals. They dare not adventure upon seas swarming with insatiable enemies: it is calculated that half the Spanish merchant vessels, going from America to Spain, become prizes to the independent cruisers. Europe is deprived, therefore, of all taken by them, as well as all they prevent to arrive. Accordingly, a general stranguery in affairs prevails! Spain pays for war twice: first for her own, that which she wages: and also for that which is made against her: for with what her enemies take from her, they combat her: this state is ruinous for her, and irksome to the rest of Europe. Europe suffers, because Spain can neither release nor retain her colonies; can neither detach herself from the past, nor bring herself to a level with the present. Herein is found the real source of the penury, which is felt every where. It will terminate, the day in which the affairs of America shall be arranged as they ought. It is probable, that as the evil increases, Europe will be finally induced to take up this important subject; she will not always be free to turn it aside. Each day may cause her to see, more clearly, the necessity of taking it into consideration. She would have done this at an earlier period, under greater advantages; and when she shall find herself in sight of a throng of republics, she will perhaps regret having delayed to oppose their establishment: they will form a singular contrast, with the mode of government most fashionable in Europe!

There exists in a very different order, and as it were, in another sphere, an interest highly deserving of the most serious attention. It arises from the relations which the greater part of the European nations are obliged to cultivate with Rome. The latter is, perhaps without suspecting it, in the midst of a revolution enveloping her on all sides; she knows not its principle; she suspects not its consequences; she pursues the routes traced by habit, in which time has, as it were, settled her. Meanwhile she must negotiate with all the courts, a great part of whom she has not known long, and who feel no very intense interest in her old rubrics. The subject is of vast, and primary importance to societies: it concerns religion. Rome, by pursuing her habitual march, without regard for the spirit of the times, has brought religion to the verge of ruin, 1, by the extinction of episcopacy; 2, by the contempt, and irritation, which have been generally produced, at seeing the interests of religion, sacrificed to the rules of the Roman chancery. Men guided by reason, and animated by truly religious sentiments, cannot be reconciled to an order of things equally at variance with both. How can religious, and enlightened minds be brought to believe, that religion must perish, waiting for the conclusion of treaties, for its better support; or that these treaties ought to be such as to constitute, states in permanent danger, and princes in a state of permanent inequality with the court of Rome; that every contest with her may resolve itself into a suspension of the functions of religion; and thus lead to the ruin of religion itself? The religious situation of Europe has been rendered, to the last degree critical, by the difficulty of transactions with Rome.

It is quite time this chaos should be reduced to order; and, since the relations with Rome are extended to a number of princes, and states, heretofore strangers to that court; it becomes highly requisite to arrange a uniform system of relations, and to establish at length in concert with her a public law; which has always been wanting in the social system of modern Europe: it should contain whatever is truly useful, and necessary; whatever is applicable to the times: it should prune, and reject whatever is superfluous; whatever refers to private interests, and is contrary to the manners, and to the genius of the age. There is but one god, but one faith, but one pope, why should there not be a uniform system of religion?

CHAPTER VII.

Declaration of the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle.

A GERMAN publicist has been cited as authority for the following assertion: "that which is clear, is French; that which is not clear, is German." In what language are the declarations of the congress conceived? In that of peace, as well as that of moderation; its surest guarantees. I am far from denying them this character. But, this is not all: the question relates to policy; to a treaty of union; to a supremacy of power; therefore should be stated clearly.

By the treaties of 1813, 1814, 1815, four powers united to put down the domination of France; to assign her limits, and to confine her within them. Thus also at Chaumont, they pledged themselves anew to remain united; stipulating the duration, and the expenses of their alliance. At Vienna, at Paris in 1815, the treaties had a fixed, and determinate object. They nearly resembled diplomatic acts, in their nature and clauses. But here the same is not perceived.

These declarations contain nothing positive: they express devout wishes; encouraging indeed for the general tranquillity, but destitute of the precision and

the foresight, which generally are found in acts of this solemn character. (1) The four first, add a fifth member to the quadruple alliance, existing since 1813. The French plenipotentiary is invited to a seat, among those who had heretofore decided, upon the fate of his country; he enters, at length, the senate which had so often sentenced it. He comes there to receive the tribute of homage which the sovereigns are so fond of paying, to the wisdom of the king, and the effects of constitutional government. It is consoling to observe that this word contains nothing terrific for princes, still enfranchised from the restraints of the constitutional system within their states. What is so good for others, would not be an evil with them. But after this first cause of satisfaction, some points present themselves less easy to explain.

What is this new tribunal which erects itself over Europe? Is it an amphictionic tribunal, like that which existed among a celebrated people of antiquity? What is the principle of its authority? Where will be its limit? Who will put it in motion? To whom will it appertain to do it? Upon what could it act, except upon itself? For it is Europe; all the rest is nothing, when compared with these five powers. If differences happen between them, how will the divided, remain united, to restore themselves to concord; and how without concord, can they remain united? All this, it is perceived, wants precision, and perspicuity; the two elements of diplomatic language.

The French has been made the language of treaties, and of mathematics, by reason of its perspicuity: its direct construction excludes the ambiguities, so frequent in languages which permit inversions, and fixes with precision the sense it would indicate.

But, the most important article of these declarations, that which would have excited the greatest umbrage, is precisely that not found in them, and which for this reason, we are tempted to seek there. It is that which relates to the possible interference of powers, in the internal commotions of a country. How far will these commotions give the right to interfere? will a part have the right to authorize interference? It could not be applied equally to all; for England, certainly, would not be seen to invoke the interposition of foreigners; as would be done elsewhere. The condition, therefore, is not equal between the contracting parties. The Russians, and the Prussians, would not arrive at London, as at Paris. If the permanence of this union may affect the independence of sovereigns, in the political order; its ambiguity may, in the civil order, affect also the independence of nations. Each people has a right to regulate its internal affairs, independently of all others. If it were otherwise, none would be independent but the strongest: for he only would be able to interdict the knowledge of his own affairs. If a great change had just taken place in the government of a country, would it make an opening for interference? Must a people be compelled to continue attached to things, or even to persons, with whom it shall have pronounced its incompatibility? Here, it is perceived, are more questions than one upon a subject which, at the first view, appeared very simple. It is also true, that public opinion believes it has discovered, behind the veils which have been drawn over it, a secret league of princes against nations. It has been the more confirmed in this belief, because many phrases

of these declarations are cited from the holy alliance; an act which, at its publication, was considered as the *apocalypse* of *diplomacy*. The English ministry refused to adopt it; fearing the vigilance inherent to a representative government. The same obstacle prevented it from taking root in France, where the public favour would not have attended its reception. It will be well to observe how the English ministry will reply to the interrogatories, which will doubtless be made respecting these acts, and relative to their connexion with the holy alliance.

We must wait for this information from England, condemned, as we are by the charter itself, to endure all the effects of treaties, without being admitted to discuss their clauses.

It is singular that when the legislative body controls the most trivial duty upon salt, or tobacco, its jurisdiction should not embrace objects, which may affect the very existence of the nation.

The present observations are not meant to diminish the sentiments of gratitude, and confidence these declarations are calculated to inspire.

Deplorable would be our situation, if they did not exist; for since Europe is found to be destitute of a real equilibrium, it is fortunate that we discover in men, what is wanting in things: and since peace can no longer proceed but from the former, we must learn to content ourselves with the holy alliance, for all guarantee; and in fact it would be a most holy alliance, which should guaranty to Europe long days of peace, morality, and moderation!

In the general tone of diplomatic acts there seems a tendency to *Mysticism*; which in policy produces

the same effect as *Ossianism*, in literature; in both the style is false; for neither behind the clouds, should be placed the scene of the world; nor above the clouds, should its theatre, and its actors, be established. The perspective is too distant, from the eye of the spectator, to distinguish with assurance the nature of objects; the basis too shadowy, and shifting to inspire confidence; the great interests of nations are not to be negotiated with phantoms; policy loves solid bodies, and leaves to *Ixion*, deceived in the object of his ardours, to embrace a Cloud!

(1)

Extract from the Protocol of the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle.

The ministers of Austria, of France, of Great Britain, of Prussia, and of Russia, after the exchange of the ratifications of the convention signed the 9th of October, 1818, relative to the evacuation of the French territory by foreign troops; and after having addressed to each other the notes annexed in copy, have met together in conference to take into consideration the relations which in the existing state of things ought to be established between France, and the co-subscribing powers to the Treaty of Peace of 28th of November 1815; relations which, while they secure to France the place which appertains to her in the system of Europe, will bind her strictly to the pacific, and benevolent views which are shared by all the sovereigns; and thus consolidate the general tranquillity.

After having maturely weighed the salutary principles of the grand interests, which constitute the order of things established in Europe under the aus-

pices of divine providence, by means of the Treaty of Paris of 30th of May, 1814, the recess Vienna, and the Treaty of Peace of the year 1815, the Courts subscribing the present act, have unanimously acknowledged, and declare in consequence, that they are firmly decided not to depart, either in their mutual relations, or in those which connect them with other states, from the intimate union, which has presided hitherto over their common relations and interests: a union become more strong and indissoluble by the ties of *christian fraternity*, which the sovereigns have mutually formed. That this union, so much more real and durable as it depends on no insulated interest, on no momentary combination, can have no other object but the maintenance of general peace, founded on a religious respect for engagements consigned in treaties, and for the totality of the rights derived from them: that France, associated to the other powers by the restoration of monarchical, legitimate and constitutional power, engages to concur henceforth in the maintenance, and confirmation of a system which has given peace to Europe, and which alone can assure its duration. That if, better to attain the above expressed object, the powers who have concurred in the present act, shall judge it necessary to establish particular Conventions, whether between the august Sovereigns or between their respective ministers, and plenipotentiaries, to treat in common of their own interests so far as they relate to the object of their present deliberations, the epoch, and the place of these Conventions, shall each time be previously appointed by means of diplomatic communications; and that in case these Conventions shall have

for their object affairs especially connected with the interests of other states of Europe, they shall not take place till after a formal invitation addressed to those of these states whom the said affairs shall concern, and with the express reserve of their rights to participate in them directly, or by their plenipotentiaries: That the resolutions consigned to the present act shall be conveyed to the knowledge of all the European courts by the subjoined declaration; which shall be considered as sanctioned by the protocol, and making part of it.

DECLARATION.

At the epoch when the pacification of Europe is completed, by the resolution to withdraw the foreign troops from the French territory; and when the measures of precaution cease, which deplorable events had rendered necessary: the ministers and plenipotentiaries of their majesties the emperor of Austria, the king of France, the king of Great Britain, the king of Prussia, and the emperor of all the Russias, are commanded by their sovereigns to bring to the knowledge of all the courts of Europe, the results of their convention at Aix-la-Chapelle; and to this end, to make the following declaration:

The convention of the 9th of October, 1818, which has definitively regulated the execution of the engagements consigned in the treaty of peace of 20th November, 1815, is considered by the sovereigns who have concurred in it as the accomplishment of the work of peace, and as the completion of the political system destined to ensure its solidity.

The intimate union established between the Monarchs associated to this system, by their principles, no

less than by the interests of their people, offers to Europe the most sacred pledge of future tranquillity.

The object of this union is as simple, as it is great, and salutary; it tends to no new political combination, to no change in the relations sanctioned by existing treaties. Calm, and constant in its action, it has only for its object, the maintenance of peace, and the guarantee of the transactions by which it has been founded, and consolidated.

The sovereigns in forming this august union, have considered as its fundamental basis, their invariable resolution never to depart between themselves, nor in their relation with other states, from the strictest observation of the *Laws of Nations*; principles which in their application to a state of permanent peace, can alone effectually guarantee the independence of each government, and the stability of the general association; faithful to these principles, the sovereigns will maintain them equally in the conventions, in which they shall personally act, or which shall take place between their ministers; whether they may have for their object to discuss in common their own interests, or whether they shall refer to questions, in which other governments shall have formally claimed their intervention. The same spirit which will direct their counsels, and which will reign in their diplomatic communications will preside also at these conventions, and *the repose of the world* will be constantly their motive and their aim.

In these sentiments the sovereigns have consummated the work to which they were called. *They formally acknowledge that their duties towards God and towards the people they govern, prescribe to*

them to give the world, as much as in them is, the example of justice, concord, and moderation; happy in being able, henceforth, to consecrate all their efforts to the protection of the arts of peace; to increasing the internal prosperity of their states, and awakening those sentiments of religion, and morality, the influence of which has been weakened but too much by the misery of the times.

CHAPTER IX.

Spirit of the People of Europe.

It is altogether constitutional,—that is to say, directed towards the establishment of solid institutions, and the extinction of absolute and arbitrary government; a thing which appears insupportable to the people of modern times; because it is incompatible with the degree of civilization to which they have arrived. Such is the general object towards which this spirit tends. The modifications of this government may be numberless; but the object is determinate,—that of being governed regularly; such is the general will. And this explains the facility with which nations accept of constitutions, which have not been submitted for their deliberation; for, even without finding them entirely in conformity with principles, we see they accept them without hesitation, and without discussing the question of authority. And this because they perceive in them a passage from a decrepid, and detested system, to an order of things fondly desired, and permanent in principle. Thus a first wish is accomplished; and patience is supported by hope. These constitutions, offspring of necessity, are a species of bridge, thrown over the abyss which separates the past from the future; they facilitate the passage from one bank to the other. The Past, like an imperious master, ever tends to dispossess the Present; its com-

bat is against Time; the latter will prevail, and finally perfect what in this first epoch can merely be sketched. It will continue to act as when the kings of a former epoch began to enfranchise the boroughs; on the faint gleamings of the light which began to dawn. Such was the first effect of light; as it has increased, others have been produced, which have gradually caused the enfranchisement of modern societies. The latter would be constitutional, as the boroughs aspired to be enfranchised. The state of the two epochs produced the exigencies which, in the two circumstances, constituted the spirit of the age; for the spirit of a time is but *the expression of its wants*, and *the measure of its forces*. It *wills* what it *knows*, and what it *can*.

When the boroughs were enfranchised, they disputed neither the principles, nor the accidents of their liberation; they eagerly accepted its declaration, and entered upon its possession. By such means was gradually formed the assemblage of rights, and privileges, which constituted the general liberation. A captive escaped from long imprisonment, Europe at this day pursues a similar course. She has done with the arbitrary, absolute and despotic system; always contrary to her interests, and now contrary, also, to her knowledge. Discredited in the minds of all, this system must of necessity fall. Princes, aware of the existence of these dispositions, accommodate their conduct to this general movement of opinion, even when it opposes them; so imperious is its manifestation. If they make a sacrifice to the necessity of granting constitutions; the people, also, sacrifice to the need of having, the right of discussing them; they

accept the plank of safety which is presented them; without questioning its length, or its thickness, they seize it and float. Such is evidently the sense of all that is passing in Europe, as of all that has taken place in France.

The concession of a *Charter*, might well fail to accomplish her entire wishes; but, in the peculiar situation to which the caprice of fortune had reduced her, it became her duty to accept it; she accepted it at once as a shield against the ancient system, and a guarantee of the new. This double character has prevented the opposition, which it otherwise would inevitably have experienced.

Nations without fixed institutions, or even with institutions which they have had no voice in forming, are no better than monstrosities; compelled to be the subjects merely of these institutions, they find them no guarantee; continuing strangers to their maintenance, as they were to their establishment; while others, without responsibility, interpret and apply them.

Thence arises the necessity for the intervention of nations in their government, and consequently that of a constitution; for, without this personal interference, always judged by an assumed right, nations will find their rights written, as it were, upon the sand; or upon the leaves, driven before the wind.

It is curious to observe the two-fold movement, distinguishable in the establishment of governments; the one arbitrary and despotic, the other constitutional. We seem to behold order, in conflict with disorder, in a state of flux and reflux; similar to that which at sea opposes one wave against another, and

lanches them, alternately, from one shore to the other. Absolute power, taking departure from the East, advanced, gradually propagating, towards the West; its progress may be traced. It has lost its intensity, in proportion to the distance from its cradle. Its complexion, like that of colours as they are spread, has experienced a progressive softening; the further it has advanced towards the West, the more it has faded; Asia is more despotic than Russia; Russia more than Poland; Germany more than France; France than England; England than America. At this distance, the tint is found to be nearly effaced. From regions where the day springs, from the very gates of Aurora, the night of despotism has invaded the universe; by an opposite order of march, from that part of the West most enveloped in murky exhalations, the new Day has proceeded, which repulses, towards the places of its origin, the institution which had enthralled Europe, and the rest of the world. England gave the signal, and lo! at the end of a century, the rout has become general; and the light flashed from this luminous focus, has diffused itself at once every where. Each day sees new states form themselves in constitutional order; *which has already the majority in Europe*; for, out of one hundred and fifty millions of inhabitants (which it contains, exclusive of Turkey) the constitutional order governs, more than eighty millions.

The establishment, it is true, is not yet completed with perfect regularity; in this respect, Europe resembles new cities, in which the buildings are erected on spaces detached from each other; but which every day approximates, till they finally join, and

every void is filled. It will be the same with constitutional Europe; there exist voids between the parts regenerated, and those which are not; time will fill them; it has filled up the *Pas de Calais*, very constitutionally; it will fill up many others. Europe could not escape the *rostrum* of England, when it existed alone; and shall she resist the effects of those, which spring up every where! This is impossible; it involves too formal a contradiction, both to the nature of things, and to existing facts. The delays still existing, in some places, present nothing to alarm: perhaps we should even congratulate them; a better formation will be their indemnification. Advantage may be taken of the surprise, of the necessities, of a people, of a thousand incidents, to slide, as it were, amongst them a constitution; but this becomes more difficult when example, and internal tranquillity furnish the means of reflection, and of comparison. We may, therefore, depart with security from this point, that constitutional order, wafted, as it were, on wings, by the wishes of Europe, will arrive to form the general, and uniform system of government in this part of the world.

Europe will produce this fruit, also, among the new products with which she has enriched her cultivation. It will be as impossible to eradicate this new plant, as to extirpate the vines, and the trees, which cover and fructify her soil. It has penetrated the earth with its roots; nothing can prevent its branches from overshadowing it. The countries which continue to resist the introduction of this system, are precisely those which need it most. The delay proceeds from abuses which die a lingering death; but they

are also the places which will most feel, the severity of its benefits. When we examine the state of the world, and that of humanity, it is distinctly perceived that this result is inevitable. How, in fact, is it possible, that half of Europe should be constituted upon one model, and the other half in a manner entirely opposite? It might as well be said that half the Roman empire could have remained Pagan, when the other had embraced Christianity; but Christianity reposed after it had invaded all. It will be the same with the constitutional order; men see it, and *understand* it. Can they be deprived of their senses, which, every moment, offer it to their notice? Men witness the spectacle of happiness it procures; who shall extinguish in them the intense desire of well-being, which goads them to pursue, and embrace all that can serve them? Who would wish, or be able, to constrain their understanding to retrograde so far, as to divide against itself;—as to interdict itself improvements in the intellectual career, while making them daily in mechanics, and physics? Who can avoid being struck with the eagerness to know all, to appropriate all that is useful, expressed in the earnest solicitude of every people to attend the spectacle of their political representations; which seem no less indispensable to their gratification, than those towards which they are attracted by the pleasures of taste, or of society. Accordingly, in Europe, as in France, during the legislative sessions of the two countries, an increase of life, an augmentation of existence, is remarked; which evidently droops during their suspension. But, even then, how many secret, and unperceived movements; how many weapons are sharpened in silence, against

the renewal of the day of combat? Greece was not more enamoured of her *Olympic Games*, Rome of her *Campus Martius*, nor Athens of her *Lyceum*, and her *Portico*.

Here we must be frank; there is still more of interest justly appreciated, than of merit, in speaking truth: for all is soon known, and whatever has been disguised, is exposed, and reproached. We must not fear to say, therefore, the world changes its face; that the question is not of a revolution in such, or such a place; it concerns the revolution of the world entire. Against the world it is directed; the world is its subject: the combat is not between men, but between institutions: it is a combat of principles, of creeds, of ideas, combats of this nature are never partial: they embrace the world; none can escape their action.

The change has many, and remote sources: Printing, the discovery of the two Indies, the commerce and intercourse between all nations, as between men of all countries, have opened the breach; the reformation, the revolution of England, that of America, have enlarged it: the revolution of France has now completed, the destruction of the ancient social edifice. (*b*). Thus the world is found to be changed, and carried back to these great epochs which give it a new face. The emancipation of America prepares for it another, and a final change; which can no more be arrested, or diverted, than those which have preceded: no more than the Roman world could escape the effects of the introduction of christianity; than nations, those of the extinction of slavery; than feudalism, the enfranchisement of the boroughs; which con

centrated in the hands of one, the power which had been astray in those of many. This was the first sketch; the constitutional system was necessary to its perfection; the tendency, accordingly, is general to this order of things. The asperities which our first tottering steps may encounter, ought not to discourage; the voyage is commenced; as in long voyages, there are straits celebrated for shipwrecks, and difficulties of navigation; so in the passage from the ancient system to the new, there are shoals which inexperienced navigators may dread; but skilful pilots can easily avoid. A new system requires skilful direction: a new system must encounter opposition: both result from the nature of things; interests by their collision create tempests; and European aristocracy, like the giant who defended the shores of Aurora, and opposed the landing of the adventurous navigators who first approached them, this aristocracy defends, with desperation, the throne she feels sinking under her. Such is the cause of all the agitations which are still felt in Europe. Aristocracy never dies, nor retreats, nor capitulates, nor takes repose. Temperaments are not in her essence; nothing enters it but power, and domination: She must always have the sceptre, and all the sceptre; she neither conciliates, nor shares. It is true she admits the necessity, of using it well; but she stiffly contends, that to her alone, it appertains to use it. At Rome, at Athens, at Venice, at Genoa, in France, whether monarchical or republican, aristocracy has been always the same; ever true to her principle, which is superiority: she is not aristocracy to be second, but first; to share, but to exclude. Without surprise, or irritation at these

pretensions, we should learn to resist, and restrain them, by means of the elements which flourish in our age. She has been long in possession; for riches, and dignities have been her exclusive inheritance. At the present day they are divided; and this partition excites her special indignation: she still occupies the approaches of thrones, the high ranks of society: her means are organized; in many places, she disposes of the public force, and threatens to employ it in her own favour, against her competitors. She terrifies thrones: incessantly representing the hydra of innovation, always ready to devour them.

Aristocracy attempts in whispers, what the ejected princes of Germany strive with vociferation, to effect; each of them endeavours to animate and to arm, power against the people. If the echos of Aix-la-Chapelle could repeat, all they doubtless have heard, we should probably learn that she was not there sparing of inflammatory pictures, and cries of alarm; and that she would fain have persuaded those for whom she painted, to follow the regimen of her own terrors. A dethroned sovereign, she rambles about exhibiting the spectacle of her own ruin, as a warning to others: dethroned kings have always been supplicants, for aid to reinstate them; have always sought to persuade, that in their downfall was involved the ruin of all. Vain terrors! on the extinction of slavery, did the return of liberty render man furious; bent, like a maniac, on the subversion of all? When the boroughs were enfranchised, did their hands, unchained, offer violence to thrones; or rather, were they not raised towards them, in demonstrations of gratitude? When England recovered her rights, did her throne

become less stable, than that of the *Stuarts*; victims to their incurable chimera of power by divine right; the disease of which they *expired*? On the contrary, must we not date from this epoch the greatest power of the state, the greatest purity of manners, the greatest vigour of the social order, the most real authority of the throne, the most constant security of the monarch? nothing has been denied him, since his power has been established upon law: life was a continual combat, often mingled with catastrophes, for those who held themselves above the laws. Like monuments formed of bronze, at a single melting, must not thrones, cast as it were in the same mould with the laws of a country, have more stability than those, which being formed piece by piece, and of different metals, are destitute of the same adherence in their parts? The stability of thrones, as of all institutions, like that of aristocracy itself, has no sure basis except, a conformity with the times.

History presents entire epochs, and vast spaces without thrones; who knows but their last hour may be now tolling in America? Thrones have sprung from the earth, and the bosom of societies, for their benefit: They descend not from heaven, like the rays of the star without which nothing would fructify; they are but artificial combinations, adopted by societies for their own advantage, for their greater well-being; which in fact constitutes their solidity; for they must endure so long as these advantages continue;—a refutation of the vain terrors with which it has been attempted to environ them. Thrones are institutions, which may always be useful; whereas, aristocracy is only so according to the

time. Time supported her, while there existed any correspondence between them: this support having been withdrawn, she has fallen, as fruit drops from the tree, when the sap retires from it; no longer recommended by the circumstances, which had given her birth, and importance, she now stalks a mere *phantom*. She owed existence to comparative superiority; she bore the burdens of society; she occupied the fields and the surface of the territory; at present, she is equalled, or surpassed in all these points; she no longer supports singly the burdens of the state; far from this, she feels but the smallest part of them; of the domain of the soil, she retains but a limited portion; that of industry, she has lost entirely; talents are not less common in other ranks, than in her own: what is there left then, of the attributes on which depended her power? Such is not the condition of thrones. Their beneficent attributes have remained, the pledges of their immortality; better known, more felt, better appreciated, they will become every day more dear to the people of Europe; who desire only the retrenchment of what is superfluous, and therefore prejudicial, even by its inutility.

Thrones, therefore, repose always upon the same basis—the utility of nations; but aristocracy, useful to herself only, and burdensome to others, now rests upon nothing; or rather, deprived of her ancient foundations, she has no true support. Finding herself destitute of roots in the nature of things, or in the minds of men, she solicits the support of thrones, and invokes them in the name of common dangers. But let governments not be deceived; *Aristocracy is an emigrant from the social system*, who, feeling her-

self separated from the soil which had sustained her, goes in search of allies; to whom she can bring no succour, but in requital, may involve them in many dangers; for, let it not be doubted, her allies will infallibly share in the odium which attends her; and even in case of victory, they would find in her imperious masters, who would command them to follow her, as she did the unfortunate Lewis XVI.; as she has also done since the 5th of September: for aristocracy is imperious, even in her respects. She spoke, by the mouth of the nobles of Arragon, when they dictated to their king, the conditions of their obedience; and annexed to the crown the haughty formula, *si non, non*. It was she also, who, by the organ of the *Magnates*, menaced, as much almost as consecrated, the sovereign of Hungary; it was she who rent in pieces, shared out, and sold Poland: it was she who answered by the voice of the noble Pole, urged to arrest the Turks in their pursuit of Sobieski, "*after this king ceases, we will make another.*"*

Though aristocracy be not always a good servant, she is always, at least, a very bad master. Reduced in number, in great states, it is no more than a drop of water in the ocean, a grain of sand upon its shores.†

There no longer exists, therefore, any real aristocracy, except that which results from the constitutional system. The latter, reason adopts; the nation has embraced; not for the sake of aristocracy itself,

* See the history of King Sobieski, by the Abbe Coyer.

† Before the revolution, the number of noble families in France did not exceed 17,500. Reckoning five individuals to a family, there might have been about 90,000 nobles. The disasters of the revolution must have reduced them to less than 40,000. It is doubtful whether there are 500 nobles to a department: a great many of them number fewer than an hundred.

but for her own; finding it a necessary machinery in her new political organization, and that the maintenance of this machinery is requisite for her government.

The new, is a legal substitute to the personal, and feudal aristocracy; which the nation had supported, in like manner, so long as it sustained the burdens of the state. To the support of these social burdens her obedience refers; to the same object, in a new form, she directs her affections. But how does this substitution of one order to another, lead, as some pretend, to social disorder? Is the exchange of a worn-out institution, for institutions full of life, and energy, the destruction of all institutions? Should we assert, that even thrones themselves, must submit to modifications; institutions which have sprung from the bosom of societies, can they not follow their progress, and participate in their improvements? Has heaven created for thrones, as for humanity, a common type from which it would be impossible to derogate, without subverting the laws of nature?

Thrones, like all other human institutions, are variable in their signification, and application, according to the times, and to the countries in which they exist. But what have thrones to lose in becoming identified with societies, instead of reposing upon the clouds? What have they to lose by acquiring the signification of *guarantees*, of *social stability*; instead of purporting *phantasmagoria*, *Iris*, and other *chimeras*? In what has the house of Hanover been a loser, by acknowledging in its throne a signification, different from that given by the house of Stuart, to the throne which sunk under it?

Attributes of beneficence will always prove a surer guarantee, than the creations of prejudice, and imagination; and, for a thing to have *any sense*, its import must be general, and understood by all. Aristocracy has required equality in submission; want of reflection has made submission, to consist in abjection; the constitutional system, coming to establish all things anew, has replaced respect in knowledge, and in gratitude.

By these titles, it teaches men to love thrones; and thrones to obtain these claims to their affection. Such, at the present day, is the spirit of the people of Europe; their spirit is formed; it is constitutional, in the sense we have just explained. A thousand things may, in private, divert men from an object; nothing can divert nations from theirs; to oppose them, but makes them desire it the more; to refuse their desires, but adds to their violence; and governments can do nothing better, than to yield with discretion, and a good grace, whatever is demanded with unanimity.

Extinguished at once, every where; or else every where established, such, in the present state of the world, must be the fate of the constitutional system; but, to arrive at this extinction, it will be requisite to commence by another; and the former will ever happen the last; *the extinction of nations themselves.*

NOTE (b).

The revolution of France, according to Madame de Staël, is one of the great epochs of social order; those who view it as an accidental event, blind to the past, and to the future, mistake the actors for the drama; and impute to the agency of men, who have

figured but a moment on the stage, *that which ages had been preparing.*

Many are incapable of seeing a more remote cause for the events of the day, than the chances of the foregoing evening.

If, say they, such a partial movement had been prevented, nothing of what has taken place would have happened. By repairing the disorder of the finances, the convocation of the states general might have been rendered superfluous. By firing on the multitude, who crowded tumultuously around the Bastille, the insurrection might have been prevented. If the votes of the commons had been rejected, the constituent assembly would not have been factious; and if the constituent assembly had been dissolved, the explosion of the revolution would never have taken place.

What blindness! not to see, that disorder in the finances was not a cause, but an effect; that the same form of government which had produced this *deficit*, would soon have created another; because dilapidation is the inseparable concomitant of an arbitrary system; that the destruction of the Bastille was not a sudden caprice of the inhabitants of Paris; that if preserved to-day, it would have been menaced to-morrow; for, when the hatred of vexations have created universal disgust, it is not by protecting vexations with cannon, but removing them, that a durable tranquillity is re-established; that the admission of the commons merely added a few more organs for the expression of an opinion, which, deprived of these organs, would have created others, still more formidable: that, by dissolving the constituent assembly,

they could not have extinguished that thirst for liberty which agitated every mind, and fired every breast; that the power of the unprivileged class would have remained, and must have received, or would have taken, satisfaction; that the true authors of the revolution were not those who, being its instruments, appeared its leaders. The true authors of the revolution were the Cardinal de Richelieu, and his tyranny, his sanguinary commissions, and his cruelty; Mazarin and his artifices, which rendered contemptible, the authority his predecessor had made odious; Lewis XIV., his ruinous magnificence, his useless wars, his persecutions. and *dragonades*. The true authors of the revolution were absolute power, despotic ministers, insolent nobles, greedy favourites!

CHAPTER X.

Armies.—Public Debts.

WE have now to treat of two great burdens, or, rather, of two great ulcers that afflict Europe; scourges unknown to antiquity; Permanent Armies, and Public Debts, as permanent as the first. Europe, in peace as in war, is a camp; in peace, also, as in war, she tends to ruin; in peace as in war, there are soldiers every where. There is no difference between war, and peace, but that of dwelling in barracks, or under tents; their effect is the same, to engulph states, in the one case as in the other!

Descended from the nations of the North, and of Germany, warlike savages, always under arms, sacrificing upon altars streaming with blood, seated in council on piles of arms, referring all questions to the decision of force, despising all civil occupations, the Europeans have inherited the military habits of their ancestors; as well as their political and social institutions. From them the two great scourges of Europe have been transmitted; the continual bearing of arms, and *Feudalism*; the latter was the natural support of the former.

To have armed men in its constant service, it was requisite to have vassals: it was necessary that three-

fourths of the population should be born, and live conscripts, to furnish the remaining fourth with means to sustain its warlike habits.

The earth must annually produce a crop(*c*) of soldiers, as of its other fruits; and man was born to be harvested by the sword, as wheat by the sickle. By means of this native, and always certain reproduction of recruits, war might become permanent between city and city, village and village; and each castle might always pour forth its armed, and destructive swarms upon the surrounding country. All honour was found, accordingly, on the side of arms; all nobility was of the sword; all science was despised; all professions, not military, were held in little esteem; the sword curbed all, commanded all, judged all, in fine, it was all; without the sword, at that period, no rank in the social order. There were no regular armies; for nations themselves were armies, and were always armed. The division of sovereignty was an obstacle to the establishment of permanent armies; armed tribes combated other armed tribes, and thus generalized the state of war. What ages of pain, and of conflict preceded the union of this assemblage of weapons in the single hand of the prince; before this terrible right of the sword, which had appertained to all, was restricted to the sovereign alone! This aimed a mortal blow at Feudalism; deprived of arms, she resembled a city whose ramparts are destroyed. Carthage after yielding to Rome her ships, her elephants, her engines of war, was not more completely subdued, than Feudalism was subjected to the throne, her ancient rival, when arsenals became its exclusive possession: an exclusive arsenal would be the master

of the world! Feudalism, the smaller sovereign, fell, from that period, at the feet of the great sovereignty; that exercised by kings in the name, and for the interests of nations. These, being entrusted with the defence of the state, which always has, or which always may have enemies; were bound by this consideration, to keep on foot corps of permanent troops. Their origin, and gradual increase may be traced from the reign of Charles VII, the epoch of their establishment down to our own times: but how unlike have they become to their original! They resemble each other in one point only; troops caused the establishment of permanent taxes, as they have never ceased to require their continuance. The one is a necessary consequence of the other. Permanent Armies and Finance have sprung from one stock, and form two trees proper to blast with sterility all places their destructive shade may approach: and in creating finance, the permanence of armies has more than effaced the benefit resulting from the destruction of Feudalism.

When a state supports the number of defenders required by its exigencies, it then merely applies to this part of its preservation, the means it employs also for the maintenance of all other parts of its existence. The evil is, therefore, in excess; but there is always excess whenever there is inutility, danger, and oppression. There is inutility, when the power to imitate exists every where. You raise vast armies, but there are men elsewhere; and as many of them will be armed, as you have given the example. From Xerxes, down to Napoleon, great armies have been seen to meet their equivalents, prepared to oppose

them. Are these great armies more rapid in their motions than small? Assuredly not: little machines are more moveable than great, and play with more facility. Are they more decisive? Not any. Twenty-two thousand men give Cesar, at Pharsalia, the empire of the world; against forty-four thousand who served Pompey. Perhaps great armies, by prolonging the contest, might have given it to neither. Alexander triumphs over Asia, with thirty-three thousand men; the clouds of combatants assembled by Darius, are unable to defend his throne. The Macedonian hero achieves, with a handful of men, what the Tamerlanes, the Gengiskans, must drag in their train whole nations to effect. Ten thousand men in the plains of Ivry, decide between Henry IV. and the Catholic league. Cromwell commanded less than thirty thousand men, when he remained the master of England. Condé at Rocroy, saved France and humbled Spain, with fewer than twenty thousand combatants; and Turenne acknowledged that he began to feel embarrassed when he had more than thirty thousand men to command. The number of armies is not therefore a force; is not an absolute, but only a relative power. If they can be opposed by others as numerous, what will their augmentation have produced, except the ruin of both parties? Then the victory may be claimed by the last half crown; and such a triumph flatters courage, as little as the understanding! Henry IV. never maintained a permanent force of more than twenty thousand men; he was respected in Europe, and was about giving her a new political code. Sully was grand master of an artillery, consisting of fewer pieces than are required for a division of modern armies. Lewis XIII, during his

wars, which were of long continuance, kept up a force of eighty thousand men; it is true also that his finances felt it severely; when, lo! at the end of thirty years, Lewis XIV. presents to Europe, panic struck, armies of four to five hundred thousand men, drawn from a population not exceeding eighteen millions of inhabitants; an enormous burden, and more oppressive than that imposed by Napoleon for his army of eight hundred thousand men; since the latter has numbered forty-two millions of subjects. Lewis XV, in the war of 1740, and of 1756, kept on foot armies of four hundred thousand men. And what was its result at the two epochs? a proportionate increase in the forces of the enemies; impoverishment in the population; ruin in the finances; the peace of Utrecht, and the peace of 1763, both dictated by these enemies. Under Lewis XIV, towards the close of the war of the Spanish succession, women became the cultivators of the earth; under Lewis XV, in the senseless war of 1756, the grave Rollin, rector of the university, was carried off by one of those brisk movements which substitute the seizure of men, to voluntary enlistments; and which recruit armies, as in Holland it was customary to provide troops for Batavia. At that time also Prussia was seen to become a barrack; Austria was not slow in presenting a similar metamorphosis; and Russia, answering the signal, hailed her undisciplined hordes, bidding them form in battalions, rivals to those of Europe, in readiness to become their masters. Napoleon had founded his power on a basis of bayonets, and spears; a hurricane of bayonets from the North has subverted it, with the throne it supported.

What is the use, therefore, of these gigantic armies which crush states, but defend them from nothing? What is their use? I reply without hesitation, to render princes enterprising; and the people slaves. But I claim too much; for these are the words of Frederic, not mine. When this prince, in one of his works, a monument of his ability to wield the pen as well as the sword, details the motives which induced him at first to declare against Maria Theresa; after a studied enumeration of many pretexts which we are at no loss to appreciate, he concludes with the avowal that the aspect of his fine army decided him; and that he had a mind to play on the instrument, which he found in such excellent tune! Thus he was lanced into the career of conquest, by the possession of means to conquer. Thus at the dawn of the revolution, the storm was clearly seen gathering which soon burst upon Europe, by the armament of the entire nation.

Ignorant of the human heart, you give means, and you trust that their aspect will not excite a desire to employ them; you add arms to arms, for armies are nothing else, and you live in confidence that they will remain always folded: that a thousand passions, a thousand interests, a thousand irritations, will not put them in movement! Wait a moment, and you will see whether you can arrest them. You are unapprized then what motives of pride, of confidence, of ambition, result from the possession of arms: place a sword in the hands of any man, and you will see if he shall believe it is always to be kept in the scabbard. How often have kings been forced to yield to the wishes of an army, weary of a long peace;

as generals are sometimes compelled to lead into battle their imprudent soldiers, inflamed by the presence of the enemy!

In 1806, Prussia owed her disasters to the ascendancy over the government acquired by the army; war proceeded from the barracks of the life guards and dragoons; and not, in its natural order, from the cabinet. Likewise in France, the armed multitude in 1792, had declared war a long time before the legislative assembly; which merely served it as a herald of arms. Great armies therefore are not reprehensible for their inutility only; they are besides the efficient principle of wars, by the excitement they bring with them: but, which is still worse, what encouragement do they not present to despotism? Of what must he not feel himself capable who disposes of such a force? how its aspect must speak to the eyes, and appeal to the heart of a young prince, impatient of the control of laws! Armies are therefore, in the very nature, in the essence, of despotism. I. By the effective power they place in the hands of the prince: II. By the nature of the military profession.

It is all obedience to the chief. To multiply the bonds of this passive order, is to withdraw as many supports from the civil order; and to furnish so many means to prevail against it. The soldier, a machine under arms, little enlightened by his education, is not the judge of the orders he receives; he has more learnt to obey, than to question; he may be led towards an object he knows not; and thus become the destroyer, of what he should be the preserver. In civil discords, he cannot but be a very ill judge of

the controversy; he sees the ensign, he has sworn to it; honour chains him to it, he follows it, the blind instrument, and the victim in turn of the hand that guides it. All probabilities, as well as all his apparent and perceptible duties incline him to side with his chiefs; and these have more military interests, than civil affections; it is the common position of the warrior. The soldier absorbs the citizen. How many places are there in which the army is educated, and organized with patriotism enough to defend the country, and the laws against an usurper; or an *extender* of his power? On the contrary, have not armies, from Cæsar down to our own times, decided upon all civil controversies, and cut all the Gordian knots of policy? A thousand are known to have taken side with their chiefs, against their country; one only is known, the English army in 1688, which has taken the side of country, against its chiefs. In Sweden, Gustavus subverts the constitution with a few regiments. In England, Cromwell dissolves with his red brethren the formidable body which had subverted the throne; he closes against it the gates of parliament; he orders away, as a vile gewgaw, the mace which had shattered the sceptre.

In Russia, Catharine receives the throne, from the hands of those who, twelve hours before, had been her husband's guards!

May heaven ever avert from England the divisions which might lead the prince to employ the interference of the army! Perhaps this would offer a last, and irreparable example of their dangers; perhaps it would prove Madame de Stael to have been flagrantly mistaken in the confidence she reposes in the patriotism,

and intelligence of an army composed of the descendants of the oldest, the most fervent, and the most enlightened, votaries of liberty: perhaps England would be compelled to bid a last, and an eternal adieu to this divinity; whose worship, ever contested by thrones, and those nearest to thrones, appears little adapted to be celebrated by the soldiers of Waterloo; dazzled by the fires which flash from their arms, proud of their waving plumes, and flattered by a sentiment of superiority, which the soldier affects over the citizen; led by a Chief more schooled in fields of Mars, than in the forum of Westminster. It is to be feared, they would more remember the laurels they have acquired, than their duties as citizens; and lest they may celebrate the obsequies of liberty with peals from the same clarions which elsewhere have announced their legitimate victories! for the last agony of public liberty has always been sounded by military flourishes. In a single day, the pretorian bands trampled into the city the inhabitants of Rome, over the dead bodies of twenty thousand of their fellow-citizens. In all times and countries, it has been observed, that the soldier engages the citizen with more unrelenting fury, than the enemy himself; the death of the latter contents him; but the former he must insult, as well as massacre. The question of the civil superiority over the military, is not sufficiently clear in the eyes of the soldier, and too often he would rejoice to refer it to the arbitration of force.

Great standing armies are in themselves so great an evil, that they form the obstacle, or the pretext for an obstacle, to the establishment of the greatest good a nation can enjoy: that of a free constitution.

England, it has often been said, may have a good constitution, because she has not a large standing army: but France, a continental power, and therefore compelled to maintain a very numerous army, is unable to adopt the same mode of government. Excellent! but of all that could be said against great armaments, could any thing be conceived to condemn them more effectually, to plead louder against them, than this interdiction of what they most need, fulminated against every people. What, forsooth! a people must want a constitution, because it pays a great army! it must endure this positive expense, and the privation of all the benefits this army prevents! because it maintains a numerous army, it can neither have good laws nor extirpate the vices of its institutions! it must be utterly ruined because it contributes the pay of numerous troops! it must be a slave, because it has many defenders that are such! But nay; it is precisely because a great army cannot be dispensed with, that a strong constitution is of absolute necessity; because the prince possesses great means to raise himself above the laws, barriers must be erected which he cannot overleap; and thus, in all this question, the attempt to raise an obstacle, has only created a motive. England already complains that a long war, the multitude of grades, the glare of arms, the illusion of military decorations, have infected the public spirit of her people; she fears it may become obliterated by this new direction; thus estranged from the civil order by the seduction of arms; always irresistible when addressed to the young. Young men, like the Achilles of fable, are always ready to seize upon arms; and of all the objects that can be offered them,

they will not be seen to balance in their choice; it will always fall in favour of arms. If from considerations of Social Order we descend to those of Finance, it will be found that the mass of taxes and of debts which crush all states alike, proceeds I. from the maintenance of too numerous armies; II. from wars, waged with these armies. The military department of each state, absorbs nearly half its revenue; including pensions for services of ancient date. The army, the fleet, the military pensions and others amount, in France, to an entire half of the revenue; the same calculation is applicable to the other states of Europe. Suppose war to arrive. The expenditure must be doubled, trebled, quadrupled: but, where are the means to come from? The ordinary revenues will no longer suffice: loans are therefore, the only resource: and what loans! Behold future generations mortgaged, and, as it were, devoured in advance. Behold also, the condition to which loans have reduced all the states of Europe. At the approach of war, a part of the objects of ordinary consumption in Europe, advance to prices which exceed the faculties of the greater number. We commence with being ruined, with the prospect of being conquerors, or conquered, or perhaps defended: and the preludes to *Te Deum*, are groans and bankruptcies. To follow the rules of reason, must not states commence by regulating their armies according to their revenues; and the number of their bayonets by that of their crowns? For in the final analysis, in politics, as in economy, we must always have reference to these.

A state of general and durable peace appears to result, 1. From the general system of Europe; 2. From the union and intentions of the principal powers; and ought it not to be the first fruit of this peace, so much desired, and so long delayed, for all to lay down arms at once? By disarming with common consent, all would find themselves upon the same ground, as if equally armed; for power results not from armies in themselves, but from the relative force of armies. By disarming at the same time, all would find themselves equally strong. And short of this, how can it be thought, how can it be said, we are at peace? If each continues to maintain all the troops he can support, it is little better than being at war; and to call it peace, would be an error. One power keeps on foot three hundred thousand men: I must have an equal number, says a neighbouring power. Not for any exigency of his own does he require this army, but on account of his neighbours armament; the evil entirely consists, therefore, in comparison. Let one disarm, all are ready to do the same: the example only is wanting. We argue not against a necessary force; our objections apply merely to what is superfluous: for in this superfluity is the source of the mischief.

And as if permanent armies were not enough, Europe superadds a new establishment, designated in each country by different denominations; *militia, national guards, fencibles, landwhers, landsturm*, in a word, whatever is not regular army. Thus entire nations are transformed into armies; an immense fund, always ready to feed the already overgrown scourge of standing armies. These succedaneous

armies compose the great mass of the European population. The result of peace for Europe is, therefore, to render her exclusively a *soldier*! Where will this military mania stop? What will be its result? It impels each state to maintain, at the same time what ruins itself, and also ruins its neighbours; by the terror resulting from this hostile vicinity.

The number of soldiers in Europe is immense; they must be counted by millions of men; we must count also by millions the expense of their daily maintenance; they devour all.

The people, every where, exhaust themselves in toil and sweat, to sustain, very poorly, these millions of soldiers.

Russia has formed an army of more than eight hundred thousand men; in this we perceive the very source of the evil.

This armed mass intimidates all states; each deems it necessary to answer with an army as equal as possible. Austria, and Prussia will keep on foot, therefore, all the troops they can support; and, besides, all their population will live under military laws of precaution. The king of the Netherlands seeing with solicitude the great armaments of France, and of Prussia, will likewise arm all he can; the Germanic confederation, in its turn, will raise a formidable force; Bavaria, Wurtemberg, Baden, will make great efforts to give themselves an attitude worthy of some attention; and Piedmont himself, placed between France and Austria, will believe his security, on either hand, attached to an army, such as never was possessed by the princes who founded, or have maintained this state. Thus fear, precautions, and example, spread

ing from one to another, Europe, in the midst of profound peace proclaimed with solemnity, will find herself armed as in the time of a desperate war.

The Europeans have not learnt to do like the Romans; who, returning from war, laid aside the military habit and resumed that of citizens; in modern Europe, on the contrary, men sleep mounted, as if the enemy were at the gates; their helmets on, their lances couched;—accosting each other as allies; and leaning on swords, they embrace. By peace, as in war, the sword is always present; ever menacing to imitate that of Brennus, weighing the tributes of Rome.

In the actual times this unfortunate necessity of maintaining a numerous military, proceeds, chiefly, from the injudicious arrangements of the congress of Vienna; which are always in view. In placing Russia above and facing Austria; by separating the different parts of Prussia; the congress imposed a law both upon Austria, and Prussia, to remain strongly armed. Their armies, these living citadels, must serve them instead of ramparts. Prussia is equally destitute of frontiers on the side of France; and here, also, she must make front with soldiers. By applying the same principle to other states, we find them all compelled to remain armed, and ruined on account of their great armaments. To all these scourges, another still must be added; for, the series of evils once commenced can never be arrested. We no longer see the prince surrounded by guards—but armies. The object is no longer the security of his person, or the decoration of the throne; here all limits are exceeded; and no pretext of utility can be assign-

ed. Meanwhile, it is a service which presents many attractions. Access to the prince, residence in capitals, privileged promotions, liberal appointments, splendid uniforms, precedence over other corps of the army, jealous with reason of so many prerogatives, all are found united to render these troops the object of every wish, and the aim of all ambition. What mean around the throne these numerous battalions, glittering with all that is most brilliant in art, or dazzling in war; this splendour, which becomes, among citizens, a motive to emulate military luxury? Are they assembled for the safety of the prince? But is an army the only means to secure his safety? and from what can one man be defended by an army? As prince, an army assembled about him is, therefore, an avowal of fears and suspicion; the thickness of the rampart only betrays the intensity of terror; it resembles the offerings *ex voto*, whose magnitude is rather an emblem of extraordinary panics, than of grateful piety. But, in case of division with a nation, (for against nations these guards are intended,) from what would a guard defend? Would it not finally act with the nation? Securities must be sought elsewhere; they are found in good laws; in the love and gratitude of nations; in their attachment to the prince, as the source of their prosperity; as the first link in the whole chain of their interests. These are solid guards, which can never be shaken.

Hume remarks, that the Tudors, the most despotic of the English sovereigns, had no guards. Augustus walked the streets of Rome with the simplicity of a private citizen: his successors of the lowering brow, their breast covered by the terrific head of the

Gorgon, ended tragically. The poniard of a resolute man easily cleared its way through their Cohorts; while the Titus's, the Antonines, tasted days of tranquillity, abandoning themselves to the guard of a people who watched to preserve its protectors. History makes no mention of the guards of St. Lewis; Charles V., Lewis XII., kept only a small number about them; by degrees they increased; and Lewis XIV. no longer deigned to appear, except, like the monarchs of the East, in the midst of a golden cloud, which gave to all his excursions the appearance of a triumphal march. Europe has to thank this prince for a two-fold pest, the luxury of armies, and of courts; they both date from him; and, however destructive and ruinous may have been his wars, his pomps have cost Europe still more.

Superficial observers have attributed the ruin of the monarchy to the diminution of this guard; as if a few thousand men, more or less, would have been able to prevail against an entire nation; and suffice to arrest it in the career it had commenced. They would have been crushed and overwhelmed by the *avalanche*,* with what they attempted to defend.

The impressions of the Czar Peter will be recollected, at the aspect of these troops resplendent with gold, and composed of men whose faces were exposed to the fire of the enemy; while their coats would have perished by exposure to the rain.

Napoleon had formed of the guard a real army, the glory of the French, and the terror of the armies of Europe. Honour be rendered to this phalanx,

* The fall of a mountain-crag, or of a glacier; common in the Alps, and other high mountains.

which had never its equal; and of which it may be said, as Corneille says of one of his heroes, the last —was an illustrious, sigh. A sublime expression, which will never be forgotten, which Greece and Rome would have envied France, signalized the close of its career, and affixed the last seal to its glory! This corps had nothing in common with its predecessors. The luxury of Darius glittered upon the guards of Lewis XIV. The imperial guard was the phalanx of brass which, under Alexander, marched to the conquest of Asia.

But, in the victorious hands of a chief, such a corps, the ardour of whose affections equals that of its achievements, which breathes only combats, and lives only by obedience, is as dangerous for liberty as a social instrument; as, against the enemy, it is admirable as an engine of war. Accordingly, as it won for this chief many laurels, it added, also, much to his power; and would, alone, have maintained it; if, in the nature of things, its continuance had been possible.

A state of continual war may endure a corps of this nature. Its dangers are compensated by its mobility; by the distance of the places it then inhabits; by its occupation in the business of war; but returning to reside in the interior, soldiers of the capital, infected by the voluptuousness of modern Capuas, often, at the instigation even of their chiefs, claiming to interfere; they would be seen to mingle in the debates and interests of the city, and take a part in them which can never become those who bear arms in the name of country; it would necessarily become a party in political debates; it would be introduced into them

by the different factions, who would seek to gain it to their support; its first corrupters would be its own chiefs, and it would be always from the midst of this corps, that other armed corps would receive the signal to interfere in political debates. A too striking example has been presented in the revolution, to leave any doubt as to what must be expected in regard to this. The establishment of these permanent armed corps, about the persons of princes, introduces an embarrassing complication in governments, extremely difficult to direct.

It has been remarked, at the commencement of this chapter, that the permanence of armaments was an importation from the north, made by barbarians.

There exists a second, which claims a similar origin. I allude to the military costume, and occupations, become general among the Princes, and the Great of Europe. We are indebted to Germany for this change; which represents princes as military, rather than as civil chiefs.

In times anterior to the revolution, as well in France as in all the south of Europe, neither princes nor others put on the military costume excepting at particular occasions; *civil forms* were alone admitted, and received; all images of war were concentrated at the frontiers; all images of peace were seen in the interior, and filled it exclusively. Military men laid aside all marks of the profession, on their return to their families and home. The Germans and people of the north, stamped with rudeness of manners, devoted to the life of a garrison, alone passed their lives in harness; alone still resembled the old paintings of our ancestors, which present them grasping a dagger, and

all their limbs eternally imprisoned between walls of brass.

Free England, enfranchised from so many other restraints and prejudices, was never infected with this military mania; with her, a military parade is never permitted to mingle its dread with the pleasures which assemble peaceable citizens: all joy would disappear at its aspect. But, at present, the manners of the North have completed the invasion of Europe. Courts, private habitations, have become a species of tents, where all has taken a military appearance; the military coat, happy usurper of the civil dress, is even displayed upon forms for which it seems to have been least intended; and wherever the great, and authorities are seen to repair, it is always among soldiers they take their seats and are perceived.

Let homage the most just, be rendered to defenders of country! Let their services be honoured, and their blood revered as it deserves! Who would think of retrenching the smallest part of this hard earned tribute of gratitude! But what has this in common with military appearances, and the continual rehearsal of *acts* from the military profession? Does it even tend to enhance our consideration for the military, to see its gorgeous apparel assumed by all without distinction; when it equally designates and confounds him who has united the reality of war to its image, with the pacific hero who has only achieved—its brilliant appearances? For the man whose martial exploits have raised to distinction, it may be considered as a species of endowment; while in him who has ever kept at a prudent distance from the

stock of arms, it can only be recognised as a vain parade, and a caricature. Thus multiplied reviews in the midst of peace, must appear but the parodies of those required by the nature of things, when Europe was one field of Mars. Other times, other cares.

The diffusion of the military spirit is opposed to that which discovers itself in Europe, and which inclines her towards the establishment of representative government, as her uniform mode of existence. Now, the nature, tendency, and effects of this government are so many contradictions which clash with the military spirit. Opinion is the soul of the former; force, of the latter; liberty is the aim of representative government; passive obedience of the military; the civil order, is the object of representative government; to which the military is foreign, or rather hostile. For the good order of the state, therefore, a just proportion must be established between the two, that the state may be defended, and, at the same time, liberty preserved: To produce this harmony between them, is the chief excellence and the greatest difficulty of governments.

It follows from these considerations, that Europe suffers greatly from the excess of her military establishment; that she derives from it no utility; that the disarming of one, would cause others to follow the example; that great armies are contrary to her general spirit, which disposes her to civil occupations; and that a happier occasion could not be offered to realize a wish, equally sanctioned by reason and humanity, than the epoch in which the hand of the most powerful princes of Europe, closing at length the

temple of Janus, has sealed under its bolts the monster of war; and when their voice has proclaimed that all their forces shall be employed to retain him in captivity. By their means will be realized what the poet has said,

Et centum vinetus alienis
Post tergum nodis, fremet horridus ore cruento.

But there is still another scourge, which remains to be considered:—the public debts of states.

At this sinister name, I see all the fortunes of states disappear, and all their virtues. These debts are of two natures; funded, and floating. In the first case, their malignity is restricted; they simply overwhelm nations: in the second, they also vitiate their morality. As they have multiplied, they have, necessarily become floating, for the greater part; there are more *rents* for sale, than persons disposed to buy them, for the purpose of permanent revenue. All that part not thus constituted, floats, passes from hand to hand; circulates continually in quest of buyers and loss or gain, never reposes. Its price is a deceitful thermometer of the public fortune; for the state owes not the capital, but only the interest; there is no fixed term for reimbursement. The accidental value of these effects resembles that of commodities, which are valuable according to the competition of buyers. The purest diamond without buyers, has no more value than the most common stone;—wares left upon the market, have no value when all wants are satisfied. It is therefore, the satisfaction of the wants of all, which fixes the price of public debts; when these wants have absorbed what is required to supply them,

the residuary part of the debt, has only a conventional value; for it may happen that a purchaser cannot be found, and its possessor, who bought it originally as an article of commerce, is reluctantly compelled to hold it as a *rent*.

His situation resembles that of a man, obliged to receive the interest of a bill of exchange, the principal of which he should be unable to realize. In times anterior to the revolution, almost all the debts of states were funded; a thousand circumstances have caused, at present, that the smallest part of them only takes this direction; all the rest floats, encumbers the markets, and constitutes the *glut* of public effects, which compose the exchequer balances offered for sale in all the exchanges, and in all the gazettes of Europe.

But whatever the nature of these debts, they have general and common effects, which demand our notice. Under one form or other, they absorb the revenues of States.

They deprive governments of their independence; whoever wants, whoever owes, is not free; governments commence with the alienation of their fortune, and end with that of their liberty. At their side start up rival powers, nay more, superior powers, who command them in the name of an irresistible authority; that of their wants, of necessity; they ultimately decide upon peace and war, upon all. Where is the prince who would dare to engage in an enterprise, opposed by the great bankers of Europe? It would be necessary to have made peace with them, before any thoughts of making war upon other sovereigns; the colossal fortunes they possess, make it necessary

to propitiate them; lest they should throw all into confusion, by too sudden operations on the medium of circulation. A signature on their part has power to raise all the billows of financial tempests, as the trident of Neptune could appease the angry ocean! The wants of states are immense; they are numbered by thousands of millions; but these thousands of millions come not to offer themselves; they must be sought for. The species of agents familiarized with the pursuit of this treasure, accustomed to follow it through all its ramifications, must necessarily be in high estimation; it is at the same time very precious, and very dear. They are indispensable, consequently, in final analysis, they are the real masters of the state. The scene of Lewis XIV,* with Samuel Barnard is renewed every day. All governments wear the chains of their servants; and far from aspiring to break them, ambitious of captivity, their sole study is to increase the number. Priests of Plutus, and magicians, armed with a wand which riches have learnt to obey, they pursue gold and silver from country to country; they displace and

* Desmarets, minister of finance, from 1709 till the death of Lewis XIV. in a very critical state of the exchequer invited Samuel Barnard to Marly, while the court was there. The king perceiving them together, said to the banker, "You have never seen Marly; you shall see it as I take my promenade; and when I have shewn you the place, you shall return to Desmarets." Barnard followed; and during the walk he was held in conversation by the king, who carried him to see every thing; and entertained him with the attention, and the graces which he so well knew how to employ, when he felt inclined to *overwhelm*.

This conduct of Lewis XIV towards Barnard was an expedient of Desmarets to procure money. He succeeded beyond his hopes. Barnard returned from the promenade enchanted with the king; he said he would rather incur the risque of ruining himself than to leave such a monarch under embarrassment; and although much was already due him, he offered to lend the minister a larger amount than he had purposed to ask of him. See *Mém. Duc de St. Simon*.

transport them; at their voice these treasures approach, retreat, multiply, retire, appear or vanish; to day in one place, and to-morrow in another. All the treasure of Europe is attracted towards these great reservoirs; and when private men would approach them, the high prices condemn them to want, or else to be crushed. The interest of sums obtained in this mode, form enormous burdens; corresponding taxes are required; and following generations, devoured before born, find themselves loaded with the sad inheritance of the errors, or profusions of their fathers. The sudden transportation of riches from one country to another, keeps all fortunes in a state of suspense, and baffles all calculations; cupidity is inflamed by the spectacle of rapid fortunes, than which nothing acts more powerfully upon the mind of man; labour and industry fall into contempt, as means of wealth too slow, and too limited: the world is soon changed, as it were, into a gaming table, around which desperate gamblers are reciprocally occupied in taking advantage of each others errors, and ruining themselves by transfers of conventional values. In a moral view, public debts have become horrible scourges; real cancers, which corrode the hearts of men, and the fortunes of states. Europe at this moment offers a memorable example of the danger of opening this field to financial speculations. This is the third time in the space of an hundred years, it has been presented: the bank of Law, the *assignats*, and the great Loans of 1815 to 1818. In a part of Europe the public fortune has been seen to collapse, like a balloon in which an aperture should release its gaseous contents. It has been seen to decline towards the point of greatest de-

pression, in the most disastrous epoch of war; we have seen all calculations disappointed, embarrassments propagated from one country to another; and a simultaneous effort to escape from the wreck, but increasing the number of victims.

We have seen fortunes, which towered like mountains, sink and crumble into grains of sand; the irregular ebb and flow of this sea, has overwhelmed the colossal masses which had been constructed upon its treacherous surface; leaving to the stings of remorse and despair their deluded possessors.

Then the secret was known which had veiled all these operations; towards the conclusion of the game, the parties interested in its chances were all of one mind to offer each other, mutually, what they all had bought to sell again. The remedy has aggravated the evil, in a two-fold manner; 1. It has tended to increase the quantity of the species of property thus offered at a sacrifice; 2. It has proved, that after this remedy, no other was possible, and that this was the last relief. The government, individuals, societies, have made sacrifices; what have they prevented? They have expended their money to no purpose; they have put themselves in the place of the speculators, and the speculators have taken theirs; the proposed relief has had similar effects to what would be produced, if a commercial house, in the midst of a general suspension of payments, should announce that it would pay all its notes on presentation; is it not evident that all the paper of Paris would be offered it; and that before the close of day it would not have a crown left; but, besides that, effects to the amount of millions would have been attracted and remain depre-

ciated before the door, again closed, where, at the commencement of the day, such punctuality had been observed?

The succours once given are not of a nature to be renewed; and the public, impressed with this idea, has a full view of the evil, in all its extent; aggravated by its known incapacity of remedy. And a clear proof that this evil proceeds from no real distress, that its source is not in the nature of things, arises from the consideration that it exists at a moment of increasing prosperity in the finances; of abundance in the harvests; of a diminution of burdens by the evacuation of the territory, and the confirmation of peace.

Such an order of things is evidently incompatible with the return of morals, which there is so much apparent solicitude to procure. Every thing should be done that may tend to close this abyss, from which so many malignant vapours arise; and though altogether impossible to effect it at once, yet reason dictates that nothing should be neglected to accomplish it gradually, by applying all the means which states can dispose of to this object; principally by the retrenchment of a vain luxury; by the prompt dismissal of foreign troops; and by the sale of all the crown lands, and immoveable property remaining at the disposal of the state.

NOTE (c).

The constitutions of the greater part of the states of Europe are founded, even at the present day, on *the Code of Conquest*. "Without doubt," says M. Constant, "and this explains why so many obstacles

to the establishment of liberty are encountered in our own times." The political writers of antiquity commit power exclusively to the hands of the higher classes.

Aristotle makes this condition an essential part, even of a well constituted Democracy. On the contrary, since the revival of letters, the advocates of liberty have never thought *its establishment possible without the abolition of predominant casts*. They have seen enemies in the class, considered by the ancients as guides. Is there not an historical cause for this opposition of views? Among ancient nations, the inhabitants, if not all indigenous, were so confounded with the colonies which had, not conquered, but civilized them, that it was impossible to distinguish the heterogeneous parts in the same community; the inequality of ranks always originated in a moral or physical superiority; *slaves are to be accounted as cyphers in the ancient social system*, and therefore make no exception.

Nobles, among the ancients, were fellow citizens enjoying superior opulence, and consideration because their ancestors had deserved well of society in its infant state. In modern Europe, on the contrary, the inequality of ranks proceeds from the most revolting origin, from conquest; the civilized inhabitants of the Roman empire were shared out like herds of cattle among their ferocious conquerors. The institutions of Europe have retained for ages the impression of military force. Vanquished by the sword, and, by the terror of the sword continued in servitude. Their masters have not even deigned to disguise by ingenious fables, or to render respectable by

pretensions, well or ill founded, to superior wisdom the principle of their power. The two races have been long perpetuated without other reciprocity of relations, than *subjection* on the one part, and *oppression* on the other. All, even the names of the conquerors, retraced to the vanquished the invasion of their wasted possessions, the massacre of their unfortunate ancestors, and the humiliation bequeathed as their eternal, and almost only, inheritance; or, if these haughty masters substituted, in place of their original and barbarous appellations, names more familiar and known—they were the names of provinces become their prey! All things, from the fourth to the thirteenth century, reminded civilized but conquered Europe, of the scourges she had suffered from the North. The human species has been long in recovering from this horrible degradation! Long, indeed! since the writers of *Europe* still find it necessary to continue the war against the *chimeras* of absolute power; the *phantoms* of Feudalism or Aristocracy; and the substantial grievances of great standing armies, and the prodigal expenditure they involve.

The preceding observations are from the pen of M. B. Constant, member of the French Chamber of Deputies; the colleague and friend of the Marquis de la Fayette. If destitute of other interest, in a country whose soil has never been trampled by the haughty foot of a conqueror, these sketches of the deformities which have existed, and, some of which still exist, in countries where knowledge and refinement have made great advances, and are extensively diffused, will, at least, present the attraction of *contrast*; and serve as a foil to enhance the lustre of the *gem we possess*.

CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION

Upon the Evacuation of France.

THE occupation of a country may be of two descriptions; temporary, or permanent; made by foreigners for their own account; or by foreigners as auxiliaries, paid by the country itself, and serving in its name.

A permanent occupation by corps of foreign troops, would be an actual division of the sovereignty, and a direct interruption to the liberty of a nation.

It would no longer command wherever these foreigners should be found; on the contrary it might find itself commanded, and, virtually, would be so: it would experience constraint in its resolutions and in the exercise of its rights, from the fear ever inspired by an armed corps at another's disposal. This consideration, in all times and countries, has been the motive of jealousies and precautions against any foreign troop, which presented itself under whatever pretext. The same motive of liberty and security, has caused to be regulated with precision, whatever relates to the passage and admission of any description, conceded to foreign troops. Nations, like families, are bound to defend their interior from the introduction of whatever makes not a part of it. They

are sacred asylums which ought not to remain open except for their members, or the directly interested.

On the other hand, corps of foreign troops in the pay of a country, may be considered under many relations essentially different.

Whether more or less numerous;

Whether the country be a republic, or a monarchy;

Whether they approach the prince, more or less:

Whether they can participate, or even be invited to participate, in the affections of the inhabitants; whether they may be at once to some the object of complacency, and that of jealousy to others.

Whether the country be or be not sufficient for its own defence.

Whether these troops are employed only in case of war, and for the time of its continuance.

The subject, as is seen, presents a great number of relations and views.

In two particulars, France has suffered much from the presence of foreigners, money and honour; but especially the latter; the money would have been doubled and carried to the frontier, if that would have prevented its violation. After so many years of triumph, how is it possible to become accustomed to see at home, the standards and uniforms of the enemy, not brought there by victory: the national pride must have suffered a martyrdom of every day, of every moment at their presence, by any other title than that of capture. Europe has justly appreciated the degree to which this pride was wounded; and has regulated her measures by the dangers of an increasing irritation, in the breast of a great people. Prudence is sometimes a sage counsellor for gene-

rosity; and the well-advised eagerly offer, what they would be unable to withhold without danger.

Europe has restored France to herself, and freed her from the embarrassing burden of her troops. France cheered their departure with a cry of joy. Behold her, therefore, evacuated by all that has entered her territory, against her will; let us now consider what relates to that which has entered, and remains in the midst of her, *without her will*; let us see how far this evacuation can be deemed complete, so long as there shall exist in her bosom a permanent foreign army, unknown to the legislature. It is perceived, that I refer to the Swiss army residing in France. France also possesses a German corps, which has no other title for this admission into her bosom, except having constituted a part of the corps denominated the army of *Condé*.*

Here a serious question presents itself; and one that certainly appertains to the constitutional system. It follows:

The introduction of a corps of foreign troops, subject to laws of internal discipline, of formation, of recompense, of appointments peculiar to itself, is it legal without the sanction of the three branches of the legislature; or whether does this right of introduction result, necessarily, from the right to conclude treaties attributed to the prince by the constitutional act? Is it a necessary derivative from this right to treat with foreigners? To treat with those who remain without, for the interests of a nation; or to introduce foreign troops, and permanently establish them?

* The legion of Hohenlohe.

within; are these similar things, or do they flow one from the other?

Such is the question, which arises upon the introduction of these troops by virtue of the right to conclude treaties; for no other origin can be assigned it; a question which has not yet been examined by these principles. A few words have been thrown out, rather as hints, than grounds of reasoning; as provocations to the immediate action of opinion, rather than appeals to reflection; as incitements to discuss, rather than discussions purposed to connect with the constitutional system. This order of constitutional ideas I purpose to lead to the present question, and to examine it by their application. As this order is all of calmness and of reason, they only should be employed in the inquiry. The object is not to irritate; nor to constrain; still less to excite tumult; but simply to enlighten, to class, and to convince. The greatest of all known forces is light generally diffused.—Enlightened opinion, is the soul of representative government; the force of all government is in conformity with its principle; and the most perfect conformity with this government is found, therefore, in light communicated to public opinion. It is accordingly sufficient to elucidate the question of right to introduce a foreign armed force, as a consequence of the right to conclude treaties. If the connexion between the two things cannot be assigned it will follow,—not that these troops must be dismissed immediately; but that their presence must be authorized by the three branches of the legislature,—before it will be legal.

When the prince comprehended in his single per-

son these three branches, he was under no obligation to demand the consent of any other. But, since the division has been made, it is evident the procedure which, in the first case, was allowable, cannot take place in the second. Now such is the state of things in France. The legislative power is divided. Consequently, the same action as when concentrated in one only, is inadmissible. In our constitutional system, the mode of recruiting and of promotion is subject to the regulation of the legislature; and there shall exist a permanent, foreign army, not subject to this control! The legislature, then, does not rule all the parts of society, of the territory, of the powers exercised upon its surface; there are, therefore, two States in the State. To conclude from the right to *treat*, the right to introduce permanent foreign troops, is to draw a conclusion from a principle with which it has no correspondence. Treaties are made for the advantage and in the interest of nations. Rights, and especially such as imply serious consequences at the expense of third parties, must not be supposed; if they cannot be supposed, as it respects individuals, how much more should they be scrutinized, when nations are interested! rights only exist according to the sense in which they were understood by the parties contracting; now, the nation certainly never understood that the right given to conclude treaties, made in its interests, would include that, of concluding treaties from which such a burden should result, as the maintenance of a foreign army. This construction evidently combines surprise, ambiguity, and reference to the past. Now the affairs of nations can be negotiated by neither of the three: nor can all of

them constitute rights. The constitutional system has been more anciently, and better established in England than any other part of Europe; in that country the introduction of foreign troops is always the object of a positive law; the legislature would not tolerate any deviation in this respect, more than any other irregularity; nay more, the national troops themselves are also placed under its control, for the bond of discipline and military authority must annually receive a new sanction from the legislative body. Because in England liberty is the chief concern and principal aim of government; and they *know* in that country how fatal to it the interference of the military may prove.

England is the only country of Europe in which all is transacted civilly; elsewhere all things are performed in the military style; not even the public amusements escape an interference of the military; upon the continent, even *pleasure is courted at the point of the bayonet*; and temples, too often, as if consecrated to the god of war, resound with the din of arms, and instruments proper to inflame the desire of carnage! The prince, as he ought, is the chief of the army; none but him can be such; but he commands only the legal army; he cannot create one for himself. If the legislature have no voice in it; if, especially, the prince be permitted to introduce foreign troops, then he becomes both prince and conqueror of the same state; he can impose laws upon the state, by the hands of men who are destitute of its affections; and herein consists the danger of foreign troops. National troops present not the same inconveniences; and, accordingly, absolute princes

have always been over-fond of foreigners. The military profession of itself abounds with inconveniences to the civil and political order of a country; they are tempered by the sentiment of country; this is the soldier's pledge, and every military man has need of it. But the foreign soldier offers none; he can have no affection but for him who employs, pays, and rewards him. The right to introduce foreign troops would be less dangerous in a republic; because the people have less to apprehend from their magistrates, than from a prince; the power of the first tends less to usurpation than that of the second; and therefore this establishment presents fewer dangers under the republican, than under the monarchical system. By introducing foreign troops into France, therefore, without the consent of the legislature, the new system has been concluded from the old; and the application of what took place in ancient times has been made to the time before us. This irregularity has proceeded, 1. From habit, a power whose empire few can escape; 2. From our inexperience in the legislative career. We still dwell, as it were, upon the frontiers of two countries, foreign to each other; and when we build, we seem to delight in replacing some stones from the ancient, in the modern edifice.

It would be very captious and very idle to say, that whatever is not abolished by the charter, the immediate work of the prince, must be preserved; this allegation would scarcely be tolerable for secondary objects; but assuredly it never has been, and never will be understood and pretended in things of a primary and elementary class, like the subject we treat.

All power emanates from the charter; if nothing can be retrenched from it, neither can aught be added, especially in favour of power; the charter supposes no ancient rights, nor derivatives of rights; regularity is the essence of representative government. It allows no discords, no contradictions, no fancies. Nothing can enter it, nothing can be maintained under it, but that only which the order of principles permits to be introduced and to remain. Whatever is foreign to it, or contradicts it, must inevitably fall.

The Swiss have been recalled into France, as the household troops were re-established, in 1814. How often was it asserted that this marvellous corps had been the support of the throne; and that the dissolution of the one had caused the ruin of the other? To create anew, therefore, this support, was the object of first attention.

For a time, there were no other topics of conversation but the reds, the blues, the greens. All the young were seen crowding to be enrolled in these party-coloured squadrons. The 20th of March arrived to teach the value of this *support for the throne*. The walls of Jericho fell not more easily at the first bray of the trumpet, than these frail ramparts at the first explosion of the tempest of that day. Truth demands the avowal that the Swiss army has not found much more favour in the minds of the French, and that it has taken no invincible hold of their affections. This arises from many causes. 1. The French, and every people should do the same, cannot, but with anguish of heart, see the throne surrounded and guarded by foreign soldiers. Thirty millions of Frenchmen will always believe themselves sufficient-

ly capable of performing this duty, without the necessity of demanding the succour of any in its accomplishment. But the custom is of ancient date; the inveteracy, I had almost said, the opprobrium, of the disease, is not its cure. The French of the present day are no longer the French of other times. They see, they feel and know things upon which the minds, and the eyes of their ancestors were never fixed. That, which at one time, did not even shock, appears to them now an intolerable deformity.

Besides, the moment of their introduction, was very ill chosen. An hundred and fifty thousand foreign soldiers loaded the territory with an oppressive and shameful weight; and, as if it were too little, a rear-guard of ten thousand Swiss must be sought for them, and a German regiment, whose acquaintance France is doomed to cultivate to eternity. The French know how to count; and finding themselves thirty millions of inhabitants united within the same borders, they naturally demand how much a few thousand men, invited from abroad, can add to their real force! (*d*).

There has been time in which states have sought foreign troops for certain qualities which appertained to them exclusively; thus, the lansquenets, the English archers, the French *gens d'arms*, the Swiss infantry were in request, as, among the ancients, the Cretan slingers, and Numidian cavalry were much sought after. But, the French have sufficiently shewn that they had no need of succours, or of masters; and that, on the contrary, they could serve for both upon many occasions. Besides, in our own times, there prevails very nearly a military equality

between all nations: and the cannon has placed all upon a level.

On seeing France filled with veterans, struggling with the wants of fortune and the weariness of inactivity, their brethren who have so often admired their exploits, cannot but resent with great emotion, that posts they have filled so well should be occupied by others.

The Swiss army is too numerous for a state of peace, and too costly for the finances.

Under Napoleon, a Swiss army was but a grain of sand, lost in the armed mass of which he disposed; incessantly occupied in war, France was ignorant even of its existence, because, she did not perceive it in the interior.

But, as things are now, it is a real army of the interior, in which every Frenchman beholds an army of *compression*. In fact, how is it possible to consider them in any other light than as men who are strangers to the affections of France; understanding her interests, no better than her language; executing with rudeness, orders given with severity; and ever ready to signalize their fidelity, at the expense of French liberty! The use for which they seem reserved, is sufficiently indicated by a thousand indiscretions of men, who appear impatient to see them employed with promptitude and severity, and designate them as an arsenal erected against the nation. Hence much hatred and umbrage; which cannot be charged with injustice.

Unfortunate events sometimes raise walls of separation between men, and dissolve ties, which time had cemented. It is a wise and prudent policy, not

to precipitate the moment of reconciliation; for in this case, hands are more surely reconciled, than hearts, and the employment of the first is not safe, while the second are still ulcerated.

Honourable titles appertain, without doubt, to foreign corps; but this is a question of rights,—not of titles, it is a question of national rights, and of national property. If glory gave rights to nations over each other, who would be independent at home? and the French would surely have more right to guard the Swiss, than the Swiss can have to guard France. Some persons are not yet weary of repeating that, although England can dispense with foreign troops, it is otherwise with France; as the same personages maintain that England is well adapted for a good constitution, but that France is not: we may postpone answering them till they shall have proved that thirty millions of Frenchmen, are of less worth than eighteen millions of Englishmen; that honour and justice may be due to the one, and not to the other; and in fine, that there are two geometries, the one English and the other French.

Two things follow from these considerations:

1. That the question of the introduction of a corps of permanent foreign troops, appertains to the constitutional system.

2. That the evacuation of France by foreigners, seems to be the most seasonable moment to examine it; and that this evacuation will not be complete, until the retreat of the Swiss; a retreat pressed from no motives of hatred on the part of those who demand it; but which implies merely, 1. A return to the constitutional system, that every people has a right to

establish and maintain. II. A return to the law of nations, which is the safe-guard of all, because it closes equally against all the doors of their neighbours, and causes each to be independent at home; which, assimilates the state of each nation to that of each family, for nations are only larger families, and govern themselves by the same laws, which regulate private families. The principle is the same; the only difference is the scale upon which it is applied.

NOTE (d).

In the preceding note, it has been said that, "the constitutions of the greater part of the states of Europe, have been founded upon the *Code of Conquest*." An Italian author, not so well known, in this country, as some who have treated the same subject without equal simplicity, gravity, exactness, or attraction, gives the following account of our origin; and the foundation of the *Code of Independence*. America, and especially some parts of it, having been discovered by the genius and by the intrepidity of Italians, received at various times as into a place of asylum the men whom political, or religious disturbances had driven from their own countries in Europe; they postponing the endearments of country and natal air to the security these distant, and desert regions presented to their minds.

Here they exerted themselves with admirable dexterity, and fortitude, according to the custom of those whom the fervour of opinions agitates, and stimulates, in subduing the wild beasts, dispersing or destroying pernicious or importunate insects, repressing and bridling the barbarous and ferocious tribes that inha-

bited this new world; draining the marshes, controlling the course of rivers, clearing the forests, furrowing a virgin soil, and committing to its bosom new and unaccustomed seeds, and thus prepared for themselves a climate less rude and hostile to human nature; more secure and more commodious habitations; more salubrious food, with some of the conveniences and enjoyments proper to civilized life. This multitude of emigrants departing principally from England in the time of the last Stuarts landed in that part of northern America which extends from the forty fifth to the thirty second degree of north latitude, and there founded the colonies of Massachusetts, of Newhampshire, of Connecticut, and of Rhode Island, which acquired the general name of New England; and at successive epochs, those of Virginia,* of New York, of Pennsylvania, of Delaware, of New Jersey, of Maryland, of the two Carolinas, North and South, and of Georgia. Nor must it be understood that because they departed from the land in which they were born, to seek in foreign regions a better condition of life, they abandoned their country on terms of enmity, dissolving every tie of early attachment; but that, on the contrary, besides the customs, the habits, the usages, and the manners, of their common country, they took with them privileges conceded by the royal authority, whereby their laws were constituted upon the model of those of England; more or less conformed to a liberal and enlarged government, or to one more restricted, according to the character or authority of the princes who granted them; and also according to the greater or less authority which the people, by means

* Virginia was founded, as is known, a few years earlier than Massachusetts.

of their organ the parliament were found to possess; for in those times of civil and religious discord, when English blood was shed so profusely, these things often varied surprisingly; thus each province or colony had both an assembly of persons elected by the people, which under certain limitations exercised the authority of parliament, and a governor who under certain restrictions also, exercised the power of the king, and represented him to the eyes of the colonies. To this was added the trial, which is called, by Jury, not only in criminal matters, but also in civil causes; a thing of the highest importance, and corresponding precisely with the Judicial System of England.

But in point of religion they enjoyed even greater latitude than in their parent country itself; not retaining the hierarchy, or system of ecclesiastical government and dignity established in England; having even bitterly opposed it, and this contest having been the primary and principal occasion which had inclined them to this long and perilous peregrination.

It can, therefore, excite no surprise that this generation of men should, not only have had their minds imbued with the maxims which constitute the basis and principles of the English constitution, but that, not content with this, they should have been disposed to establish a mode of government more liberal, and a liberty more entire. Nor that their minds should have been inspired with the fervour, which is naturally kindled in the hearts of men by obstacles which oppose their religious and political opinions, and still more by the privations and persecution they have experienced on their account.

And how should this ardour, and this excitement

of exasperated minds have been appeased in the vast solitudes of America, where the amusements and the diversions of Europe were unknown; where their continual occupation in manual toils must have rendered their bodies like steel, and their minds invincibly resolute? If in England they had been averse to the royal prerogative, how, as to this, should their opinions have been changed in America, where none, or few vestiges were seen of the royal presence or splendour? where the same avocation being common to all, that of cultivating the earth, must of necessity have created in all the opinion, and the love of a common equality? They encountered exile in times when the war raged most fiercely in their native country between the king and the people, the latter contending for the right to resist the will of the prince, whenever he should usurp their liberty; and also for that of changing the succession to the royal crown. These rights were believed by the colonies; and how should they have been refuted; finding themselves, without the present protection of royal authority, to lead a tranquil and happy life in their new country, although in a state of infant, and scarcely yet organized society? The laws observed, justice administered, the magistrates respected,—offences rare or unknown; persons, property, and honour, protected from all violation? They *believed* it the unalienable right of every English subject, whether freeman, or freeholder, not to give his property without his own consent; that only the house of commons, as the representative of the English people, had the right to grant their money to the crown; that taxes are free gifts of the people to those who govern them; that princes are bound to

exercise their authority and employ the public treasure for the sole benefit and use of the community. Now, this right the colonists had taken with them; since the privileges of Englishmen could not be forfeited by distance, or change of climate; and since they had left the kingdom with consent and with privileges from the royal authority; since this same right, not to give their own money without their own consent, had been solemnly recognised by the government in charters granted to many of the colonies; and since assemblies or courts had been established in every colony that they might be enabled to investigate, and superintend the employment of the public money. And how should the colonies have renounced such a right; they who derived their subsistence from the American soil, not bought or given by others, but acquired and possessed by themselves, having been the first to occupy, to cultivate, and fill it with useful and productive seeds? Every thing, on the contrary, in English America, tended to unprecedented freedom in *social life*, every thing appeared to favour, and incline towards *civil liberty*; every thing looked towards *national independence*. The Americans, for the most part, were not only protestants, but protestants against protestantism itself, and sided with those who, in England, are called dissenters; for, besides not acknowledging as protestants, any authority in the affair of religion whose decision is a rule of faith without other examination, and claiming to be, of themselves, by the light of natural reason alone, sufficient judges of religious dogmas, by opposing and bitterly condemning the hierarchy, and names of ecclesiastical dignity, they had divested themselves of all that de-

ference and respect which men naturally feel for the opinions of those who are constituted in eminent stations, respectable on account of the honours which are usually paid them; and commanding attention by the wealth and magnificence which are seen to surround them. The intellects of the Americans being therefore perfectly free upon this topic, they exercised also the same liberty of thought upon other subjects unconnected with religion, and especially on that of government; an investigation with which they had made themselves extremely conversant during their residence in their original country. In the colonies, lawyers abounded more than in any other country; who, as they are accustomed to distil the essence of subtilty, are commonly, in a country governed by an absolute prince the most efficacious advocates of his power; and in a free country the most useful defenders of liberty. Thus had arisen among the Americans an almost universal acquaintance with the acute disquisitions which appertain to the professions of theology and of law; discussions which often generate in the human intellect obstinacy, and pride of opinion; and though long their discourses concerning political and civil liberty, they always believed that more might be said. And, as polite literature and liberal studies had already made very considerable advances in America, they were enabled to season these disquisitions with the graces of a florid elocution; which, while on the one hand, it fascinated and flattered the supporters of these opinions, on the other it served to enforce them, and to impress them more indelibly on the minds of the auditors. The republican maxims became a common doctrine; the memory

of the puritans, and of those who in the sanguinary contentions of England, had espoused the cause of the people and thus encountered death, was immortalized. These were their apostles, these their martyrs. Of these, of their virtues, of their achievements, of their unhappy, and, to the eyes of the Americans, so honourable exit, the rising generation heard their fathers continually discourse.

If, before the revolution, the portrait of the king was usually seen in every house, it was not less frequent also to find on either side of it, the effigies of those who in the times of Charles I. sacrificed their lives to defend, what they considered, English liberty. No language can express with what exultation they had received the news of the victories of the republicans in England; nor with what grief they heard of the restoration of the monarchy in the person of Charles II. Thus their inclinations and principles were equally in opposition to the English state and church; and though naturally moderate, and guarded, yet expressions frequently escaped them which manifested the deepest detestation for the political and religious establishments of their common mother. Whoever courted popular favour indulged both himself and his hearers by inveighing against these; on the contrary, the heirarchists, and such as favoured England, whose number was never great, were discredited. But all things, particularly in New England, concurred to keep alive the germes of these propensities and opinions. The colonies had few books, but they were in the hands of all, and mostly treated on political subjects, or transmitted the history of persecutions sustained by their ancestors the

puritans. These having been persecuted in their ancient country, for their opinions in matters of religion or of government with intrepid deliberation had chosen to abandon it; and traversing an immense ocean, had taken refuge in the most distant and inhospitable regions to be enabled freely and publicly to profess them; for so noble an object they had sacrificed all the accommodations and delights of that genial clime, where they were born, and educated; and what toils, what fatigues, what perils, did they not encounter upon these new and savage shores? All things had opposed them; their bodies were unaccustomed to the extremes of cold in winter, or of heat in summer, both excessive in the climate of America; the land covered with forests, and little of it habitable; the soil rude and reluctant; the air pestilential; an untimely death had carried off most of the first founders; and those who had survived the contagion, and other calamities, to secure their infant establishment had been forced to combat the natives, a ferocious race, and exasperated, as might have been expected, at seeing a foreign people, now seen for the first time, and never before heard of, come to appropriate the country of which they had so long been the sole occupants, and masters. The colonists, by their fortitude and courage, had, step by step, at length overcome all these impediments; which result, if on the one hand, it procured them greater tranquillity and a better condition of life, on the other it inspired greater assurance and self-confidence, with an elevation of sentiments not often paralleled. Also as the prosperous or adverse events which a generation of men have shared together, and the recollections which attend

them, have a singular tendency to unite their minds, their affections, and their sympathies, so the Americans were bound to each other, not only by the ties which reciprocally attach individuals of the same nation by the identity of language, of laws, of climate, of customs, but also by those which arise from a common participation in all the vicissitudes which a people may sustain; whence they presented the image of these congregations of individuals who live not only subject to the laws of the general society of which they are members, but also acknowledge certain particular and appropriate rules or statutes to which they have voluntarily pledged their obedience; and which are wont to produce, besides an uniformity of opinions, also a common zeal, and enthusiasm.

Nor is it unworthy to be remarked, that the state of society in the American colonies rendered the inhabitants averse to every species of superiority, and inclined them to liberty. Here, was but one class of men. The mediocrity of their condition, did not invite the nobles of Europe to visit their shores; riches, and hereditary honours were unknown amongst them.

Whence no vestige remained of feudal servitude. These causes were of a nature to produce a general opinion, that all men are by nature equal; and the inhabitants of America would have found it difficult to persuade themselves *that they owed their lands, and their civil rights—to the munificence of princes.*

Few had heard mention of *Magna Charta*; and those, who were conversant with the history of that important period of the English revolution in which this compact was confirmed, deemed it rather a

solemn acknowledgment by the king of England, of the rights of the people, than any concession. As they referred to heaven the protection which had conducted them, through so many perils, to a land where they had finally found that repose which in their mother country they had sought in vain; and as they owed to its beneficence the harvests of their exuberant fields, the only and the genuine source of their riches; so, *not from the concessions of the king of Great Britain, but from the bounty, and infinite clemency of the king of the universe, did they derive every right*; these opinions in the minds of a religious and devout people were likely to have deep, and tenacious roots.

From the vast extent of the provinces occupied, and the abundance of vacant lands, every colonist was, or easily might have been, at the same time a proprietor, farmer and cultivator.

Living, and taking delight in a country life, under their own eyes, from their own grounds, and often by their own hands, they beheld all things necessary for human subsistence spring up, grow, prosper and arrive at maturity; and thus found themselves free from all dependance or subjection: and individual liberty is a powerful incentive to civil independence. Every one might hunt, fowl, and fish at his pleasure without fear of possible injury to others; bauditti and poachers were, therefore, unknown in America. Their parks and reservoirs were boundless forests, vast, and frequent lakes, magnificent rivers, and waters flowing in streams of every name, with an infinite sea, subject to no restriction, and, more than any other, abounding in every species of the finny race.

As they lived dispersed in the fields, one here, and another there, mutual affection was thus increased between members of the same family, and finding their pleasures in the domestic circle, they had no inclination to seek them abroad, or in the resorts of idleness, where men, too often contract the vices which terminate in dependance, and habits of servility.

The greater part of the colonists being proprietors and cultivators of land, they lived continually upon their farms; merchants, manufacturers, and mechanics, composed not a fifth part of the entire population. Cultivators of the earth depend only on Providence, and their own industry; while other occupations, on the contrary, are compelled, more or less, to assume and accustom themselves to servile manners, in order to humour the caprices of those by whom they prosper; and thus the great proportion of the first class, with respect to the others, must of necessity have produced in these colonies a description of independent men, who unaccustomed to stop at any obstacles but those presented by the very nature of things, could not fail to resent with animation, and oppose with indignant energy, every curb which human authority might attempt to impose.

The inhabitants of the colonies were also exempt and out of danger as it were, from ministerial seduction, the seat of government being at such a distance that, far from having handled, they had never even heard of this *glittering rhetoric*. It was not, therefore, customary among them to corrupt, and be corrupted: the magistrates were few, and the means at their disposal too limited to furnish temptation.

This love towards the sovereign and their ancient country, which the first colonists might have retained in their new establishment, gradually diminished in the minds of their descendants in America; where one generation succeeding another, at every stage removed them further from their original stock; and when the revolution commenced, the history of which is preparing, the inhabitants of the English colonies were, for the most part, the third, fourth, and even the fifth generation from the original colonists who had left England, and transplanted themselves in the new world. At such a distance, the relations of consanguinity were enfeebled by desuetude, or had little to recommend them; and the recollections of their ancestors, though written in their memories, was nearly effaced from their hearts.

Commerce, which has power to unite and conciliate friendship between the inhabitants of the most distant countries, was not in the early periods of the colonies, so frequent as to produce these effects between the inhabitants of England and of America.

The most of the colonists had heard nothing of England, excepting that it was a distant region from which their ancestors had been wickedly and cruelly expelled or hunted away; since they had been forced to seek refuge in the deserts and forests of wild America, inhabited only by savage men and prowling beasts, or venomous and horrible serpents.

The distance of a government diminishes its force, either because in the absence of the splendour, and magnificence of the throne, men yield obedience only to its power, unsupported by the invitations of respect and of illusion; or because its agents, entrusted with

the execution of the laws in distant countries, are allowed a larger discretion; and thus the people governed is inspired with the hope of being able to escape their restraints.

What therefore could have been the force of the English government in America, when it is considered that between the two countries lies an ocean three thousand miles in breadth; and that entire months must transpire between the date of an order and its execution? It should be added also that, except in time of war, standing armies, this powerful engine of coercion, were not numerous in England, and still more inconsiderable in America; it being also contrary to the laws to maintain them: it follows of necessity, that as the instruments of constraint on the part of the government were feeble, so there must have arisen, and hourly increased in the minds of the Americans the hope, and with it the desire to throw off the yoke of English superiority.

All these considerations refer more especially to the condition of the oriental provinces of English America. But in those of the south, the lands being more fertile and the colonists thereby enjoying a greater affluence, they must also have been more at liberty to consult their own will, and less dependant by natural wants on that of others. Nor can this be thought to have enervated, or vitiated their minds; but, on the contrary, as they resided continually on their plantations, far from the luxury and seductions of cities; as they were frugal, and moderate in all their desires, the great abundance of things necessary to human life must have contributed to render their bodies more vigorous, and their minds more impatient of all subjection.

In these provinces, also, the slavery of the Blacks, which was in use, though it may seem at first a strange assertion, rendered liberty more dear to the white population. Having before their eyes continually a living example of the wretchedness to which man is reduced by slavery, they better knew, and could more justly appreciate, the liberty they enjoyed; this liberty they considered not a right but a franchise, and privilege; and as it is usual for men, when their own interests and passions are concerned, to judge partially, and with intellectual blindness, the colonists impatiently supported the superiority of the English government, and its pretensions, as tending to reduce them to a state approaching, or similar to that of their own slaves: thus detesting, when applied to themselves, what they practised upon others.

The inhabitants of the colonies, and especially those of New England, enjoyed not merely the shadow, but even the very substance of the English constitution: for, in this respect, little was wanting to their entire independence. They elected their own magistrates, and paid them; every thing relating to internal administration was in their own hands; and the sole evidence of their dependance on the mother country, consisted in this: that they could not enact laws or statutes contrary to the letter, or intention of the English laws; that the king might withhold his sanction, essential to the validity of the deliberations of their assemblies; and that they were subject to such regulations and restrictions of commerce, as the Parliament should judge necessary, and conducive to the general good of the empire.

These restrictions, however, were rather nominal

than effectual; for the king very rarely exercised the right of *Veto*: and, on the other hand, they dexterously evaded these rules and restrictions, by means of contraband traffic. The provincial assemblies, also, were abundantly free; and perhaps less dependant than the parliament of England itself: for in them were no ministers prompt with the daily whisper; and the democratic zeal and ardour, was under no restraint, or little less than none; since the governors who intervened on the part of Royalty had too little credit to control it; as they received their salaries, not from the crown, but the provinces themselves; and, in some instances, were elected, also, by the suffrages of the inhabitants.


The religious zeal, which prevailed even to excess in the colonies, and chiefly among the inhabitants of New England, maintained the purity of their manners; frugality, temperance, and chastity, were ordinary virtues in the midst of this people. There were no examples among them of wives devoted to the toilette, of husbands to ebriety, or of sons to the walks of pleasure. The ministers of a severe religion were respected, and revered; for they presented the example of the virtues they preached. Here time was no burden; divided between rural occupations, domestic parties, and prayers and thanksgivings addressed and returned for innumerable blessings, to that God by whose bounty the seasons were made propitious, and the earth to smile on their labours with beauty and abundance. And if we add further, that the inhabitants of New England, after vanquishing the first obstacles, found themselves in a prolific, and healthful region, it will appear less surprising, that in the


course of a century, the population of the American colonists should have multiplied so rapidly, as that a few, unfortunate families driven by adverse fortune to these distant shores, should have become in this short period—*a great and powerful nation*. For it should be recollected, that American fathers were exempt from these inquietudes which daily and almost hourly perplex and goad the minds of European parents, concerning the subsistence, and future establishment of their offspring.

Thus the natural wish to enjoy the endearments of connubial life, encountered in America no opposition from the restraints of a narrow fortune; but, on the contrary, the birth of a son was an event not only flattering to paternal love, but also prosperous for the interests of a whole family; for in this immensity of uncultivated lands, it could not be doubted that the new infant when arrived at the proper age, by reducing other tracts to a state of cultivation, would procure for himself and his parents, a new support; and, therefore, the more children, the more instruments of competence and ease for all. Whence it is plain that, in America, nature, climate, civil, and religious institutions, and even the interests of families, all tended to people it, with robust and virtuous fathers—with swarms of vigorous and spirited sons.

*Storia della Guerra dell' Indipendenza degli
Stati Uniti d' America.*

DA CARLO BOTTA.







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